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Major Contribution to Historiography on China of the 1920s–1940s (on the Publication of the Comintern and VCP(b) Politburo Top Secret Documents Regarding China)

Abstract: The article analyses the "The VCP(b), Comintern and China" documentary series issued jointly by scholarly teams of the RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies, East Asian Seminar at the Freie Universität Berlin and Humboldt University under the lead of Mikhail Titarenko and Mechthild Leutner.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union were followed by the removal of many ideological barriers that had been hindering cooperation between Russian and German sinologists in the sphere of timely issues of history. Thus it became possible to undertake joint research on a number of subjects including such acute and timely topics as the role and influence of the Comintern, VCP(b) as well as German left-wing and rights organizations in the period of complex political struggle in China and at the critical stages of rivalry between the CCP and the Kuomintang.

Following President Boris Yeltsin's edict on dissolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), many strictly classified archives of the CPSU Central Committee (CC) and Comintern were made accessible. Before that, by virtue of the specific situation, the former Soviet leadership actively attracted the scholars of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Institute of Far Eastern Studies to engage in research of the relations with China as well as in the search for ways to develop normal good-neighborly contacts with the PRC and its leadership. When in the early 1990s the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CPSU unleashed their sharp ideological polemics, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES) scholars were assigned to identify the root-causes of party-to-party and interstate disagreements and to find ways to eradicate the latter.

To this end, sinologists were provided with access to archive of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the History Archive, and the Comintern archive.

1 The abbreviation stands for the name of the Soviet Communist Party from 1925 to 1952 with the (b) meaning Bolshevik.
Work in those archives made it possible for scholars of the IFES (then, under the USSR Academy of Science) to start studying the multi-volume collections of documents dealing with the 400 years-long history of Russian-Chinese interstate relations. Ascertaining and academically processing such documents played an important role in the course of Soviet/Russian-Chinese negotiations on border settlements that were underway since 1963 for 40 years and were crowned by signing the documents on border demarcation between the two countries.

As for the documents on party-to-party relations being stored at the Comintern and VCP(b) archives and other state-run archives, the revealed picture was as follows.

Documents of the Chinese section of the Comintern Executive Committee, as well as the documents that the CCP CC and Kuomintang leaders had been sending to Comintern until 1943, were, under N. S. Khruschev’s instruction and CPSU CC resolution, put into sacks and transferred to the CCP CC without an inventory and without copying, just in bulk. That was presented as a sign of the Soviet leadership’s trust in Mao Zedong’s leadership. In the course of the so-called Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the Gang of Four selectively abused many documents from these archives in order to fabricate law suits against many CCP veterans, who were disfavored by Mao Zedong, and to depict them as “foreign agents”.

It should be noted that in those years, Soviet and foreign sinologists already focused their research on a considerable amount of general documents of the Comintern Executive Committee related to development of the CCP strategy and tactics, Chinese revolution and CCP-Kuomintang relations, as well as the anti-Japanese war.

Published in the early 1970s for office use, the book “History of the CCP” was written on the base of Chinese and Soviet sources. The authors took an attempt to analyze the complex political struggle that had been underway in China from the early 1920 (i.e., after foundation of the CCP) as well as the interaction of nationalist and international forces within the CCP leadership in the Chinese revolution. Naturally, special attention was paid to the issue of Mao Zedong’s ascent to position of the CCP’s and China’s leader. In a whole that fundamental work was assigned to explain why the split that took place after and despite the massive assistance provided by the CPSU and USSR to the cause and success of the Chinese revolution, the establishment and development of the PRC as well as the personal support provided to Mao Zedong on the part of the Comintern Executive Committee and the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that in German sinology, too, the subjects of modern Chinese studies invariably took and take important positions. This is quite understandable.
as since mid-19th century Germany pursued an active policy towards China and, together with the leading major European powers, quite often interfered into China's affairs and thus created enclaves of its influence. And, after the World War I, Germany as well as German left-wing and right-wing organizations sustained and successfully were building up their influence on the political scene of China. Meanwhile, the influence of the Soviet factor in the political struggle within China quite often was growing in parallel with the growth of the German influence. There are all the grounds to suggest that the socio-political life of China between the two world wars, from the late 1920s through to the late 1930s was marked by such a peculiar feature as participation of Germans who acted both on the CCP and Kuomintang sides.

As known, German "left radicals" actively supported Lenin and the Bolsheviks in formation of the Comintern. Following the RCP(b)2, the German Communist Party (GCP) was the second largest and most influential section in the Comintern. Throughout the history of the Comintern, representatives of the GCP H. Brandler, E. Wollenberg, F. Heckert, H. Glaubauf, E. Meyer, W. Münzenberg, W. Pieck, H. Remmel, A. Rosenberg, W. Florin, F. Frölich, and H. Eberlein in their capacity of the Comintern leaders and its Executive Committee members took part in Comintern policy-making with regard to China.

In China as such, German representatives of the Comintern appeared in 1927, when after the search of the Soviet Embassy's premises in Beijing it was decided to replace Soviet representatives by Europeans with "clean" foreign passports. One of the first representatives of the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI) in Beijing and Shanghai was H. Neumann, who started to work there by the end of 1927. From 1929 through to mid-1930s ECCI was represented in China by German Communists G. Eisler, A. Ewert and A. E. König.

When the first united front of the CCP and Kuomintang collapsed and Soviet military advisors were recalled, Chiang Kai-shek by the beginning of 1928 took hold of the bigger part of China. Invited by the Nanking government, in November 1928, a group of German advisors headed by W. Bauer started to train Chinese officers and form the exemplary Kuomintang divisions. After Bauer's death in May 1929 his work was continued by Colonel H. Kriebel, General G. Wetzell, Colonel-General H. von Seeckt and General A. von Falkenhhausen3. By that time the number of German advisors and all kinds of military specialists amounted in total to about 70 persons.

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2 This abbreviation stands for the name of the ruling political party in Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union from 1918 until 1925.

Communists, in turn, operating in thereby controlled territories, began setting up Soviet regions and founded the Chinese Soviet Republic. In 1930–1933 the Kuomintang army undertook four punitive marches against the Soviet regions. A noteworthy point is that while fighting against the Kuomintang army the Red Army detachments received assistance from German military representatives of the ECCI at the CCP CC – members of the party Military Committee O. Braun known in China under pseudonyms Li De and Hua Fu, as well as K. Fisher.

In 1930–1932, in Shanghai, which was a center of activities of many foreign intelligence services, a number of German military advisors, including H. Kriebel, served, being unaware of that, as “informers” for the Soviet military intelligence and its Shanghai resident R. Sorge – a famous Soviet intelligence officer and clandestine member of the GCP, who collected information on the domestic situation in the Chinese Republic and its foreign policy – especially, vis-à-vis Japan. R. Sorge worked in China under the pseudonym of Johnson, and formally as a correspondent of “Soziologische Magazin” newspaper. The core of his agential group included, among other intelligence officers, Germans – H. Siebler, M. Klausen, R. Stahlinmann, and others.

The circumstances of Comintern’s relations with one of its sections – the Chinese Communist Party – are a subject of debate in the contemporary Russian and international historiography. The Soviet historiography was focused largely on the study of history, ideology and international activities of the RCP(b)/VCP(b) leadership. Until recently, the latter’s and the Comintern’s policy towards China was represented only in the thoroughly edited and ideologically validated concise historical epitome “Communist International”, published by the CPSU CC Institute of Marxism-Leninism in 1969. As for the history of the Comintern’s Chinese section, the exceptional cases were represented by the collection of documents and materials of “Comintern and Chinese Revolution” and two monographic studies classified as "for office use" that were written by prominent Soviet historians, Professors V. I. Glunin and A. M. Grigoriev, who introduced some archive materials.
in the academic circulation. A certain contribution to enlargement of the source base for research on the given subjects were made by the PRC scholars—for example, historians from the CCP CC Office for Party History Studies, who in mid-1980s issued the book of "Comintern and Chinese Revolution", which included translations of the Comintern documents earlier published abroad. As any major publications of sources on the given subject were actually absent, sinologists in various countries could not verify the relevance of their own interpretations of such a complex and intricate problem, adequately interpret Moscow's policy in China as well as the reasons and motivations of turns in its tactics, as well as to identify the genuine causes of its successes, mistakes and failures.

The opportunity appeared in the early 1990s, with opening of access to materials from the former Central Party Archive of the CPSU CC Institute of Socialist Theory and History (now, Russian Government Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPH)) that before had been closed for researchers. Thus sinologists were enabled to do their research of the VCP(b) and Comintern's China policy on the base of new primary sources. By initiative taken by the leaders of the IFES, its Department for China History Studies undertook the task to reveal and publish the archive documents on the history of the national-liberation movement in China. It should be noted that following the change of the socio-political system in Russia, the profound financial and economic crisis had a direct impact on the sphere of science as the material spending on its development was reduced sharply.

At that time which was quite difficult for the Soviet/Russian sinology, the moral and material assistance rendered by sinologists from the East Asian Seminar at the Free University of Berlin and the Humboldt University played a decisive role in support of this project. In May 1992, Prof. Gerlach, President of the Free University of Berlin, and Prof. Titarenko, Director of the RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies signed the agreement of cooperation.

The almost 15-year cooperative work of researchers led by M. Titarenko, Kuo Hengyu and M. Leutner resulted in the fundamental collection of documents comprised of five volumes (eight books) under the general title of "The VCP(b), Comintern and China. Documents: 1920–1943". The first volume of this series,
prepared under the lead of Academician M. L. Titarenko and Prof. Guo Hengyu, was published as early as in 1994. The work on all other volumes was led on the German side by Prof. M. Leutner and Prof. R. Felber, and on the Russian side by Prof. M. Titarenko and Prof. A. Grigoriev. The team of German sinologists included a number of young researchers from the East Asian Seminar at the Free University of Berlin as well as renowned sinologists from the Humboldt University, Professors R. Felber and J. Krüger. The Russian team included Drs. V. Glunin, K. Shevelev, A. Kartunova, N. Melnikova, I. Sotnikova, V. Larin and E. Staroverova. The final, fifth volume of the series was published in 2007.

The documentary series included over 1500 archive documents. Most of them were found in the Russian Government Archive of Socio-Political History, and smaller numbers from the Presidential Archive and Russian State Military Archive. Actually all documents after the complex declassification procedure were introduced into academic circulation for the first time. For the purposes of this collection, some documents were translated from German and French (Comintern working languages), as well as from Chinese into Russian.

Publication of such a representative complex of documents on "Comintern studies" presented the full picture of the main development vectors and specific features of the VCP(b) and Comintern's China policy, to analyze the key points in China's and CCP history of that time, and to draw political portraits of the most important figures of the national-liberation movement in China. While publication of this
Major Contribution to Historiography on China of the 1920s–1940s series does not at all exhaust the stated subject and the available archive documents, the complex of documents, which have been introduced in academic circulation and the bigger part of which were classified as "Top Secret: Special File" or "Top Secret", is quite considerable. It includes several major groups of materials, interconnected by (generic) and structural ties. The qualitative proportion of documents in this group is predetermined by the concept of the collection. The compilers were giving priority to the documents which disclosed some or other theoretical and political assessments of the situation, the strategic objectives and tactical techniques of the China policy by the Soviet and Comintern leadership and policy by the CCP leaders, the mechanisms applied for its practical realization and for ideological, political, material, military and personnel provision, as well as the entwinement of universally acceptable diplomatic practice with the broad-scale assistance to the national-liberation movement.

The published sources are divided in two basic groups of documents on the "Soviet side" and the "other side". Published for the first time, the so-called "executive" secret documents appear most interesting as they enable researchers to approach understating the process of Comintern political decision-making on China. Such documents include minutes and resolutions of RCP/VCP (b) CC Politburo on China, with the so-called "Special Files" (resolutions of the ECCI Presidium and some of its plenums, decisions by ECCI Eastern Department and Eastern Secretariat that operated in 1928–1935, including the earlier unknown instructions by J. Stalin and by G. Dimitrov's Secretariat). The documentary series also contains different materials of ECCI representatives at the CCP CC, minutes of sessions and letters by the ECCI mission in Shanghai – Far Eastern Bureau of ECCI, reports by the CCP CC and its representatives in the Comintern, multiple encoded telegrams, letters, reports, information notes, etc.

Besides, the collection contains some documents on the Comintern's financial policy in China (estimates, financial statements, and materials of the VCP(b) CC Politburo), which serve a ground to conclude that the CCP existence was subsidized throughout the whole lifetime of the Comintern. Another group of documents related to the military issues offers a reason to discuss considerable Soviet military and humanitarian assistance for the Chinese revolution. It should be taken into account that the Comintern as such did have such considerable funds and potentials as it itself was funded from the national budget. All decisions used to be taken and realized by the Politburo of the VCP(b) CC.

The five-volume series is structured by the problem/chronology principle and thus amply presents the dynamics, interconnection and the whole aggregate of contradictory processes of different nature and different orientation that took place in the given period of time and to follow certain phases and landmarks in
their development, as well as makes it much easier for researchers to find documents on the problem or period of their interest.

The introductions (prefaces) to the respective volumes and specific sections are of independent academic value. All introductions emphasize the new elements of knowledge given to historians by the documents of the respective period in the context of specific processes that took place in China then. Owing to the data of annotated name indexes and series restores the forgotten names of dozens of the VCP(b) and Comintern workers who had suffered without guilt in the years of Stalinist repressions and were exonerated later.

In most cases, such introductory articles were drafted by Russian scholars - Drs. A. Grigoriev, V. Glunin, A. Kartunova, K. Shevelev, and I. Sotnikova and then, upon discussion and additional wording, were sent to Prof. M. Leutner. After translation of such articles into German and revision of the set of documents, approved for publication, by German colleagues, the two parties used to hold bilateral discussions at the regularly organized Russian-German seminars, round-tables and conferences. That served a remarkable example of joint work on an important subject of history undertaken by scholars of the two countries.

As evidenced by the mass of documents, published in this series, the rather contradictory information, received in Moscow from the representatives of the Comintern, Profintern and Comintern of Youth, as well as from different Soviet workers in China, representatives of the Intelligence Service of the Red Army Headquarters and other source, not at all always contained the relevant and similar assessments of the quite complicated and contradictory situation in China. As also evidenced by the documents, realization of the Comintern guidelines in China was not at all automatic, and from the very beginning faced the enormous and sometimes insurmountable difficulties that were predetermined, in particular, by the wide gap between the intent and reality. Therefore the Comintern and the CCP leadership in many cases were constrained to act by the trial-and error-method, when the Moscow tactic was modified or its modification was dictated by subjective ideas of the situation in China rather than by specific reasons and circumstances.

The first volume covers the period from 1920, when Comintern representatives had their initial contacts with Chinese advocates of Marxism and the revolutionary democrat Sun Yatsen, through to the dramatic events for Chinese politics and the CCP in spring-summer of 1927. The documents of this volume for the first time clearly show the dualism of the Soviet policy in China, as while the official interstate relations with the ruling regime of the Chinese Republic were in the making, the RCP(b)/VCP(b) and Comintern were providing assistance to the CCP though to 1943, when the Comintern was dissolved. As presented in other volumes of the
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documentary series, such peculiar approach was sustained in the later periods, too. Together with the earlier unpublished letters by G. V. Chicherin, A. A. Ioffe, A. K. Fatkes, L. M. Karakhan, Sun Yat-sen's letters to V. I. Lenin, G. Maring, and A. A. Jofe, and correspondence between L. M. Karakhan and M. M. Borodin, all reflecting the diplomatic efforts taken by Soviet Russia, the volume includes quite a few documents showing that Moscow's envoys sought to find alliance and establish contacts with Zhang Zuolin, Wu Peifu and Sun Yat-sen. For example, an interesting point is that A. A. Joffe called Wu Peifu "a major political and military figure of China" and actually offered him to replace the Beijing government by a new one that would be formed by Wu Peifu together with Sun Yat-sen (documents nos. 24, 37, 39). On the other hand, the documents serve a ground to discuss a considerable role played by the Comintern representatives – especially, by G. N. Voitinskiy and G. Maring – in formation and ideological as well as material consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party (documents nos. 1–3, 8, 21, et al.).

The first volume presents all the earlier unpublished full-text records of many meetings and talks held by several Soviet political and military leaders with the mission sent to Moscow in autumn of 1923 by Sun Yat-sen and headed by Chiang Kai-shek (documents nos. 82–100). As a result of that visit in Moscow, the ECCI Presidium passed its Resolution on the national-liberation movement in China and on the Kuomintang party (document no. 98), which played a significant role in preparations for the first Congress of the Kuomintang (January 1924), its resolutions and establishment of initial cooperation between CCP and Kuomintang.

A large group of new documents is related to the problem of Kuomintang-CCP relations – one of the most important issues in the Chinese policy of the RCP(b) and Comintern. In this connection, it would be very interesting to read G. I. Voitinsky's information of April 1925 regarding his conversation with J. Stalin, when he, Voitinsky, managed to convince the leader that the Communists did not at all dissolve themselves in the Kuomintang (document no. 147). As evidenced by many documents, the forms of cooperation between the two parties were a subject of discourse for several years and quite often caused disagreements between the Soviet representatives in China (documents nos. 135, 137, 142, 149, 151, 164, 181, 199, 203–205).

Beginning from 1925, the Soviet leaders held the ever stronger view that the military force was the decisive factor of the national revolution. The concluding section of the first volume contains documents on the new emphases that in the policy of the RCP(b) and Comintern in connection with the coup organized in Beijing on October 23, 1924 by Feng Yuxiang, on whom big hopes were laid by Moscow.

The publication of the first volume revealed the need to develop a new concept of the Chinese revolution, although that did not mean to negate the whole number of successful studies by Chinese and Russian historians on such subjects as the
national-liberation movement in China as well as the role of the Comintern and the
USSR in its development. The task was to find out more clearly which resolutions
by the Comintern were most relevant to the conditions in China, and to outline
the delusions that originated because the Comintern representatives in China and
Comintern leadership in Moscow had been ignorant or insufficiently knowledge-
able about the Kuomintang program and the situation in China.

Like it was the case with Volume 1, the compilers of Volume 2, too, focused on
the earlier unpublished documents disclosing the theoretical and tactical guide-
lines issued by the VCP(b) and Comintern from early 1926 through to mid-July
1927, when the break of Moscow's and CCP’s relations with the Kuomintang of
Wuhan occurred. The given volume highlights the policy of “recite” pursued in
connection with the defeat of Feng Yuxiang's First National Army near Tianjin
in March 1926 and the well-known "events of March 20", 1926 in Canton, as well
as with the military-political plans, developed by the Kuomintang in consulta-
tion with the Soviet military advisors and realized in the Northern March of the
National Revolutionary Army. The documents included in the second volume
disclose correlation of various forces in the national-revolution movement in
China, the search of proper forms of the Soviet Unions, the Comintern’s and CCP’s
cooperation with different forces of the national-revolution movement (especially,
with the Kuomintang), the identification of methods to reach the set goals, and
the positions of the Soviet representatives in China.

Several lengthy documents included in Volume 2 represent the nature and con-
tent of the discourse on Chinese affairs that was underway in early 1926 both in
Moscow and in Beijing (documents nos. 15, 17, 20, 36, 38), as well as the lessons
drawn from the national armies defeat (documents nos. 36, 38) and the "March
20 events" (documents nos. 30, 31, 41, 46). In the course of such discussions, the
participants more clearly defined the major "difficult questions" and differences in
their views on the assessment to be given to the status of the national-liberation
movement. Special interest is aroused by the earlier unpublished documents related
to the activities of the new body of the Comintern – the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau,
established in Shanghai in April 1926 as Moscow intended to sew into the events in
China "on-site". The resolution on establishment and composition of the ECCI Far
Eastern Bureau was passed by the VCP(b) CC Politburo (document no. 33), and
the core of the Far Eastern Bureau (Dalburo) was composed of the Russian delega-
tion headed by G. N. Voitinskiy. His letters to Moscow and reports on the Bureau’s
activities provide researchers with new data on tangible activation of the CCP and
problems faced thereby in the military affairs as well as in workers' and peasant’s
movements. Special note should be made of the set of materials related to the visit
of the commission of the Far Eastern Bureau to Canton (documents nos. 79-87.
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94, 95), which substantially supplement the picture of the situation in Guangdong before and after the "March 20 events", present evidence on the positions taken by the Canton communists and left-wing Kuomintang members, and - what is most important - disclose the essence of disagreements between M. M. Borodin and the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau regarding the approach to the central tactical issues to be taken by the national-revolution movement at that time. The disputes between the Far Eastern Bureau and M. M. Borodin were closed by Politburo resolution of November 1926, under which the Dalburo was committed, after L. M. Karakhan's departure from China, to have all its decisions and activities be approved by M. M. Borodin (document no. 127).

The documents presented in the second part of Volume 2 are connected with the events of late 1926-early 1927, when the process of the actual split within the Kuomintang as well as its government and party was underway in China, although a surface gloss of unity was still maintained. The given publication fills the gap in documentary evidences of the VCP(b) and Comintern approach to resolution of the problems, faced by the Chinese revolution, in line with the general political course taken at the ECCI 7th Plenum (November-December, 1926), which summed up the searches the new political course undertaken at the start of the Northern March. The major parameters of the new course were outlined in speeches made by J. Stalin and N. Bukharin for the Chinese commission of the Plenum (document no. 135), who openly oriented China to the non-capitalist - that is, socialist road of development. However, designed for realization of the new course, the "regrouping" of the CCP in the Kuomintang, Nationalist government and National-Revolution Army happened to be unacceptable for the Kuomintang even with the most cautious policy of the Communists.

The volume contains the full-text documents of the period, when the crisis phenomena were taking shape in the national-revolution movement in China, while the directives sent from Moscow to Soviet representatives in China and to Chinese communists were becoming the ever more radical. Decisions of the Soviet leadership caused an equivocal reaction on the part of the Comintern officers engaged in the practical work, and this is evidenced by the documents containing information on disagreements within the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau, as well as between the Far Eastern Bureau and M. M. Borodin (documents nos. 137–140, 162, 171, 172, 175, 176, 187, 188, and 212). All representatives shared the view that the instructions coming from Moscow were unfeasible in the prevailing situation, while M. N. Roy, Wang Jingwei and, partly, M. M. Borodin made vague suggestions that the resolutions passed by Moscow could only be realized by "regaining" the province of Guangdong and building the support base there. Some other documents of the VCP(b) CC Politburo and Executive Committee of the Comintern (documents
confirmed the offensive course of the mass movement, while the work of the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau was suspended (documents nos. 188).

The events in China and the tactics pursued by Moscow in the dramatic period from February to mid-June of 1927 were widely covered in Soviet literature. However, the documents of Volume 2 deliver many new points for understanding the main landmarks in the history of that period connected with the struggle for control over the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Kuomintang and the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) prior to and during occupation of Nanking and Shanghai by Chang Kai-shek's military units in April 1927, as well as with the conflict between the CCP and the Wuhan government — the conflict, which was connected with the efforts taken by Moscow and the CCP in order to transform the Wuhan Kuomintang into a party of "Jacobin revolutionaries" and in cooperation with it to unleash the agrarian revolution.

As a result of the coup organized by Chang Kai-shek in Shanghai on April 12, 1927, the Chinese policy of the VCP(b) and Comintern underwent the further radicalization, while, on the other part, the trend for the Kuomintang militarization was growing. By late April – early May of 1927 the course was taken to reorganize the Kuomintang into a worker-peasant party and the Wuhan government — into a body of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry. The recommendation for the Chinese Communist Party was to start the agrarian revolution and to do so not only "from the top" (through the Kuomintang authorities), but also "from the bottom", "without official licensing".

As evidenced by the documents in this volume, the directive instructions from Moscow became the ever more radical in mid-June to mid-July of 1927. When Feng Yuxiang took the side of Chiang Kai-shek, the political situation in Wuhan-Nanking confrontations changed sharply in favor of Nanking. The Kuomintang of Wuhan, too, was splitting apart. This information was communicated to Moscow by M. N. Roy, who wrote in his telegram to J. Stalin and N. Bukharin of June 27, 1927 that Wang Jingwei was "struggling more against the communists than against counter-revolutionaries" (document no. 229). According to J. Stalin's letters to V. Molotov and N. I. Bukharin (documents nos. 205, 239, 251, 252), the VCP(b) and Comintern leaders in Moscow started to understand that it would be hardly if ever possible for the revolution to overcome the crisis. However, official resolutions and directive instructions sent from Moscow to its representatives and the CCP leaders in Wuhan did not contain any recognition or statement of such dramatic situation.

The decisions taken by the VCP(b) CC Politburo and the ECCI in July contained even the more "leftward" assessments of the situation in China and the new directives of the CCP CC (documents nos. 249, 253), and in a whole, it signaled the official recognition of the actual take-down of the policy for the united national
front and the transition to confrontation with the former allies. On July 15, 1927
the CEC of the Kuomintang in Wuhan passed the resolution on severance of rela-
tions with the CCP and thus the united front ceased to exist. In this connection,
it is worthwhile to note the meaningful letter, sent to V. Molotov and N. Bukharin
by J. Stalin, who actually recognized the failure of the CCP/Comintern strategy in
the Chinese revolutionary movement of the 1920s (document no. 251). However,
in another letter to V. Molotov, J. Stalin stated that "our policy was and is the only
correct policy" (document no. 252).

Volume 3 of the five-volume series includes the documents and materials relat-
ted to the first phase of the so-called "Soviet period" from July 1927 to late autumn
of 1931, when the period of soviets was developed and realized. During this period
the policy of the Comintern and CCP was targeted at toppling of the Kuomintang
regime and its replacement by the soviets on the base of unleashing the agrarian
revolution and building the CCP's own armed forces – the Red Army of China.

With all changes in the situation as well as in development, contents and forms of
realization of the China policy by the VCP(b) and Comintern, the domestic proces-
es in the USSR and VCP(b) caused the decisive influence on the nature of decisions
and the decision-making mechanism. As a result of "purges" in the VCP(b) and
Comintern leadership and ousting of prominent figures – first, representatives of
the "left-wing" opposition led by L. Trotsky and G. Zinoviev, then N. Bukharin and
his supporters (under the slogan of struggle against the "rightists"), resolution for
key issues of the Comintern activities was concentrated in the hands of J. Stalin. The
trend for cutting the numbers of the VCP(b) leaders and delegates to the ECCI who
were authorized to make China-related decisions can be evidenced by the shorten-
ing of the mail-list for circulation of information on China, the dissolution of the
Chinese Commission of the VCP(b) CC Politburo, and the reduction of the number
of Politburo sessions focused on the issues of the Comintern's China policy and CCP
activities. In formal terms, drafting of resolutions on China was delegated to the
ECCI and its Eastern Secretariat, but in real terms the decision-making procedure
provided submission of the ECCI resolution for J. Stalin's approval. The three most
influential figures in the Comintern – D. Manuilsky, I. Pyatnitsky and S. Lozovsky
were not autonomous in their actions. What is interesting, from 1927 J. Stalin did
not deliver any articles or speeches focused specially on China.

J. Stalin's letter to V. Molotov of July 16, 19279 is exceptionally important for
understanding the logic of the tactics pursued in China in the second half of 1927.

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As follows from this letter, Moscow had a hope for a new rise of revolutionary movement in China - that is, no lessons were learned from the events from the spring events of 1927, and the hope for “transformation” of the Kuomintang did not dispel. By the end of July 1927, Communists in China and the VCP(b) CC Politburo were working through the question on organization of an uprising in Nanchang, and at the same the Moscow “headquarters” were drafting directive instructions for the CCP regarding propaganda of the idea of soviets (documents nos. 2, 3), as well as on revolutionizing of the Kuomintang and blocking with it “from the inside” rather than outside.

This volume of the documentary series contains the earlier unpublished documents that draw light on the history of the Canton Commune - in particular, the episode of December 10, 1927, when, as a result of several messages from the Soviet representatives (documents nos. 30, 31, 36), the VCP(b) CC Politburo resolved “to act self-confidently and resolutely” (documents nos. 38). These documents most accurately reproduce the given decision-making procedure. The dramatic outcome of the uprising is well-known.

Documents, included in the section “Moscow’s China policy in 1930 and the Line of Li Lisan” of Volume 3, highlight the policy pursued by the VCP(b) and Comintern in China from early 1930 through to early 1931. The bloc of these materials is quite voluminous and is of high value for researchers. The documents provide a broader idea of the reasons, by virtue of which there was no tough and clearly-cut reaction of Moscow to the formation of the leftist platform in the CCP leadership in February through to mid-June 1930, when the CCP CC Politburo passed the well-known resolution “New revolutionary rise and the victory to be won initially in one or several provinces”. The new sources draw light on the conflict that took place in mid-1930 between the CCP leadership and the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau and grew to confrontation between the CCP CC Politburo and the Comintern Executive Committee. Refusal of the CCP leadership to comply with the Comintern discipline and the severe consequences of mass riots impelled Moscow to several measures of political and organization nature. As the ECCI insisted, at the 4th Plenum of the CCP CC in January 1931, the composition of the CCP governing bodies was changed considerably. The publication of the telegraph correspondence among the ECCI, CCP CC Politburo and the Far Eastern Bureau is very important for the disclosure of relations between Moscow and the CCP leadership at that time, as this correspondence includes the full-text messages from the CCP leaders to the Comintern and VCP(b) governing bodies as well as personally to J. Stalin, and the responses from Moscow (documents nos. 262, 263, 270, 272–275, 277, 281–283, 290, 292).

Another ever first published set of documents included in this volume is related to activities of the group of military advisers headed by A. Yu. Gailis – an officer
from the Intelligence Department of the Red Army Headquarters. That group was stationed in Shanghai from October 1930 through to April 1931 and, as evidenced by the documents, played an important role in restructuring of the CCP work in the military sphere. The telegraph correspondence of 1930 among Moscow, CCP CC Politburo and ECCI Far Eastern Bureau includes all full-text directives issued by the ECCI in that period, including the earlier unknown ones, and the most important of them is the "Directive letter from ECCI to the CCP CC on construction of the Red Army and on guerilla movement" (document no. 259).

The documents published in Volume 3 considerably expand the picture showing the formation of major provisions in the Comintern concept of the Soviet movement – i.e., the provisions fixed the "Resolution of the ECCI Presidium on the tasks of the CCP". As far as novelty is concerned, two groups of documents appear to be the most interesting: documents of the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau (reports, resolutions, correspondence with Moscow and the CCP leaders) (documents nos. 365, 366, 368, 370, 380, 390, 393, 407), and the Comintern documents (documents nos. 397, 402, 410), disclosing the process of formulation of the major provisions in its China policy and in the concept of the Soviet movement. Basing on the platform built in the course of hard searches, the VCP(b), Comintern and CCP entered the new period of China's political history that started in September 1931, when the Japanese troops seized the north-east of China.

Volume 4 of the documentary series includes materials related to the second and third period of the Soviet movement and reflecting the Chinese policy of the VCP(b) and Comintern leadership pursued from the autumn of 1931 to August 1937, when the growing Japanese aggression generated the search of ways to move from the policy of 'Sovietization' to the tactics of the united national anti-Japanese front.

In late 1932, after the short-time territorial expansion of the Central Soviet region, the Soviet movement started to bear defeats and territorial losses. Attacked by the troops of the Nanking government, the Red Army units, suffering heavy losses, were constrained to start moving to the south-west (where in 1933 a Soviet region was set up in the province of Sichuan) and then to the north-west of China. In connection with these events, the ECCI in 1933 introduced a number of corrections in the economic and military policy of the soviets. As shown by the documents, published in Volume 4, this was done, partly, with due regard of the information provided by the new officials of the Far Eastern Bureau, such as

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some provisions of the labor legislation, "some concessions to petty bourgeoisie", etc. (documents nos. 76, 92, 112).

The Documents of this volume make it possible to follow the process of gradual understanding of the need for the CCP to overcome isolation and of maintaining the general course for Sovietization and toppling of the Nanking regime. These changes were initiated by the ECCI-made "Statement by the Interim Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Worker-and-Peasant Red Army of China of January 10, 1933" (document no. 100) and the CCP CC Letter of January 26, 1933 to party organizations and all communists, which were the most important documents in the context of revising the futile tactics of the united front "to be built from the bottom".

The search of ways to move from the policy of "sovietization" to the tactics of the united national anti-Japanese front made the contents of the China policy pursued by the VCP(b) and Comintern prior to the Comintern's 7th congress. As evidenced by the documents, together with the ECCI's Eastern Secretariat, the CCP delegation to the ECCI headed by Wang Ming also started to play an important role in drafting of documents for the CCP (documents nos. 126, 128, 182, 283, 288, 297). The most notable shifts took place in posing the tasks for organization of anti-imperialist struggle in documents of the ECCI and CCP delegation, addressed to party organizations of Manchuria (document no. 288). The firm need to find new answers to "difficult questions", dictated by experience of the CCP and other Comintern parties, predetermined the new approaches to their resolution as outlined prior to the 7th congress of the Comintern.

As known, the initiating impulse for the new political orientation of the Comintern and the CCP came from the "Address of August 1" prepared by Wang Ming in June-July, 1935. Based largely on the working drafts by the Comintern ECCI and the CCP delegation to ECCI, it took its final shape in the situation of turning to the new tactic outlined in the course of preparatory work of commissions for the 7th congress. As evidenced by the published documents (documents nos. 376, 379, 380), development of the CCP's new political orientation unfolded after the Comintern's 7th congress. On September 7, the "Address of August 1" was reviewed at the session of the ECCI Secretariat, and the latter approved it on September 24 (documents nos. 333, 336). The platform of actions was defined in Moscow by July 1936 as a result of permanent correction of the "Address" guidelines by the ECCI and the CCP delegation to the ECCI. The subject of the ways to building the united

front in China was posed in such a way, that the soviets actually had to initiate and become the center for the nation unification for unleashing the liberation struggle, whilst the force of the Red Army had to be strengthened (document no. 380).

The Soviet diplomacy, too, undertook its part of the task to build the united national anti-Japanese front. In late December, 1935, the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs instructed Ambassador D. Bogomolov to inform Chiang Kai-shek on the Soviet leadership's view that the armed resistance against Japan would not be possible without forming the united front of the Nanking forces and the Red Army. Such position of the Soviet leadership pushed Chiang Kai-shek to establish direct contact with the CCP representatives. In this connection, the published documents of interest include records of talks that took place in January 1936 between Deng Wenyi – Chiang Kai-shek's trusted person and defense attaché of the Chinese Embassy to the USSR – and Wang Ming (documents nos. 347, 349, 350). Another step in development of the policy for united anti-Japanese front was made when P. Myth, Wang Ming and several members of the Chinese delegation prepared the "Draft directive document of the ECCI on situation in China and CCP tasks" of March 5, 1936 (documents nos. 360).

The most important resolutions that predetermined the national-scale turn to the united anti-Japanese front were passed by the ECCI Secretariat in July-August, 1936 on the basis of G. Dimitrov's proposals agreed with Stalin. At the same time, the course to building the united anti-Japanese front did not at all imply a weaker role of the soviets. It was only on January 20, 1937 that the ECCI Secretariat resolved to request the CCP CC opinion on advisability of modifying the party's course in the Soviet regions in the sense of transition from the system of Soviets to the system of national revolutionary government built on the democratic basis and struggle for foundation of the All-China Democratic Republic (documents nos. 391). In 1936-first half of 1937, the ECCI Secretariat and the CCP delegation to the ECCI continued their joint work on the tactics for the united national anti-Japanese front. While the work on the CCP CC new course was in process the ECCI Secretariat issued recommendations and corrections as well as directed the work of the CCP delegation at the ECCI on the same subject. The new tactic was articulated in the final form by G. Dimitrov at the ECCI Secretariat session on the Chinese issue on August 10, 1937.\(^{12}\)

Volume 5, the final one in the documentary series, includes the documents that highlight the policy pursued by the VCP(b) and Comintern with regard to

\(^{12}\) *Communisticheskii International i kitaiskaya revolyutsiia*, [Communist International and Chinese Revolution], pp. 274-277.
the Chinese Communist Party in the period from August 1937 through to May 1943, when the Comintern was dissolved. This volume is structurally different from the preceding volumes of the collection. It is focused on one general problem - the united national anti-Japanese front and the CCP tactics therein - plus the CCP-Kuomintang relations as well as the relations of the Comintern and VCP(b) with the CCP.

As shown by the major VCP(b) and Comintern documents of that period, their activity was then concentrated on such tasks as to develop, together with the CCP representatives, the policy for building and functioning of the united national anti-Japanese front on the basis of the CCP-Kuomintang cooperation, and to prevent destruction of such cooperation even in case of crisis situations that might appear in the Kuomintang-CCP relations.

This volume contains many new documents - mainly, correspondence between G. Dimitrov, Secretary-General of ECCI, with different addressees. This can be explained by several circumstances. In the second half of the 1930s, the style of the Comintern's work had nothing to do with collegiality, while its organizational structure, including the Chinese section, was subject to regular simplification. The Comintern did not have any institutes attending to the Chinese affairs and no discussions were held on theoretical or other problems of China. Many former leaders of the East-related activities in the party and Comintern were repressed. The current Chinese matters were a function of G. Dimitrov's secretariat. The number of persons having any relation to the Comintern's Chinese policy was very small. The bulk of the records consists of the so-called "blank" minutes giving no answers to many questions, on which decisions were often made by "poll vote".

Volume 5 contains only three decisions by the VCP(b) CC Politburo. Important decision-making formally was a prerogative of the ECCI Presidium and Secretariat, while it actually entirely depended on J. Stalin. By the end of 1937 the CCP delegation at the ECCI left for China (document no. 6), and Wang Jiaxiang became the CCP's temporary envoy at the ECCI. As evidenced by G. Dimitrov's letters to J. Stalin and G. Dimitrov's diary records, any serious decision - whether on a possibility of the communists' participation in the state defense council, on CCP measures for the participation in the united front, or an extension of financial aid to the CCP, etc. - was in fact agreed with J. Stalin (documents nos. 12, 92, 98, 100, 138). G. Dimitrov's record of his talk with J. Stalin on November 11, 1937, (document no. 7) gives a clue to the understanding of the Comintern's policy during the anti-Japanese

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war: the struggle with the external enemy removed confrontation with the internal enemy (Kuomintang) from the political agenda, and the prospect of the agrarian revolution was postponed until the end of the war. The main objective was not to Sovietize China, but rather to secure survival of the Chinese people.

Another portion of G. Dimitrov's correspondence includes the ECCI addresses sent to different Soviet authorities and requesting to help with financing the CCP, transportation of cargoes, organization of medical aid for the Chinese Red Army, etc. (documents nos. 28, 89, 255). As evidenced by exchange with analytical information on China between G. Dimitrov and heads of foreign-policy agencies of the USSR (I. Proskourov, P. Fitin, P. Shariya, I. Iliychev, and V. Dekanazov), the Comintern actively communicated with the secret police (OGPU)/People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) of the USSR.

A considerable part of G. Dimitrov's correspondence, published in this volume, is related directly to the CCP and includes G. Dimitrov's letters and telegrams to the CCP CC, plus correspondence from the CCP CC members to the ECCI Secretariat, from representatives of the CCP to the ECCI and CCP CC. These documents present the broad range of issues of the CCP CC concern during the anti-Japanese war — and the major one was connected with the Comintern's contradictory guidelines on building the united anti-Japanese front. As such, the idea of uniting the country against the foreign enemy was the only correct one in the circumstances of China's isolation. However, in reality, for the allies in the anti-Japanese war, the conditions for its realization appeared to be rather difficult. For the communists, it meant a U-turn in relations with the Kuomintang — that is, transition of the decade-long armed confrontation with the KMT to unification with it on the basis of Sun Yat-sen's three principles, repudiation of the strategic socialist prospect, replacement of the sovietization slogan by the democratic republic slogan, unequal participation in the work of the united front organization, etc. For Chiang Kai-shek, unification with the domestic enemy was the only chance to preserve the country and, while no support was available from the West until 1939, to receive real assistance from the USSR provided that the CCP and its armed forces were kept intact.

As evidenced by the telegrams sent by the ECCI Secretariat and personally by G. Dimitrov, emphasizing the need to overcome frictions with the Kuomintang and to prevent from the break of the united front even after the Kuomintang armed forces directly attacked the New 4th Army led by E. Ting (document no. 153), the USSR was interested in the continuation of China's war of resistance against Japan.

Apart from the issues of party tactics in the circumstances of war, other questions addressed in the documents of Volume 5 include: possible allies of the CPP in the war against Japan, and substantiation of Mao Zedong's theses saying that the procrastinated war and guerilla-type hostilities against Japan would be beneficial
for China, that the best tactics for removal of frictions with the Kuomintang would be to exert pressure on Chiang Kai-shek as exactly such pressure would bring the desired results. Some documents present the situation in the army as well as the places and dislocation conditions of the 8th Army, based on G. Dimitrov's responses, researchers can define the point that marked the change of the Comintern's attitude to the CCP CC problems. In June 1941, a telegram sent to Mao Zedong contained a phrase: "It is difficult for us to provide any advice of the military nature from here..." (document no. 175).

After the 7th congress of the Comintern (1935), the VCP(b) CC Politburo no longer took any decisions on the Comintern policy issues, except those related to funding of the Comintern activities, conduct of international anti-fascism campaign, and some other emergency events (documents nos. 95, 96, 108, 109, 111). The CCP activities within the national front were analyzed in detail only in two documents – the "Decision by the ECCI Secretariat of October 10, 1937" (assessed by J. Stalin as outdated) and the "Resolution of the ECCI Presidium on Ren Bishi's report of June 11, 1938". The three principles of Sun Yat-sen and the support of Chiang Kai-shek's National Government in resolute conduct of the defensive war were recognized as the political base for the anti-Japanese national united front. The tasks of communists were specified as to contribute to development of defense industry and general conscription, as well as to strengthen and build-up combat potential of the 8th and New 4th armies (document no. 23).

The exception is made by the minutes of the so-called "Chinese team" led by G. I. Mordvinov. G. I. Mordvinov worked in the position of senior referent (information officer) at the ECCI Personnel Department, while the "Chinese team" was set up at the ECCI in late May – early June of 1939 by request of Chinese communists. It was exactly at the team meetings that its members raised the question of contradictions in the guidelines for the CCP in the united front (document no. 47).

Upon signing of the Soviet-German pact of non-aggression of August 23, 1939, the Comintern's work was dispensed by the foreign-policy activities of the Soviet government. The Comintern was to play a supplementary role – i.e., to secure the interests of the Soviet policy by impeding any chance for communist parties to give Hitler any "pretext" for defeating the non-aggression treaty with the USSR. Instructions were issued one after another to the effect that communist parties, including the Chinese Communist Party, must subject their activities to the goal of uniting forces for the "destruction of the common enemy".

The documents included in Volume 5 of the collection help in the objective assessment of the role played by the Soviet Union's and Comintern policy in the prevention of the break of the united front during the anti-Japanese war. In particular, evidences are available on the decisive efforts of the Soviet Union and Comintern...
that prevented Chiang Kai-shek to bring the united front to a collapse and start a
civil war (documents nos. 148, 153). The intensive telegraphic exchange on this is-

The documents of this volume present the amount of the Soviet assistance to the
Kuomintang and CCP during the anti-Japanese war. The whole mass of financial
documents serves a firm ground to conclude that the funding of the CCP was
growing commensurate with the participation of the CCP armed forces in standing
counter to Japan. The same group of documents includes materials on the assistance
provided to China by the authorities of the VCP (b) and Comintern (including the
aid provided under the government treaty of 1937). At the same time, the agreement
was reached that 20 percent of the Soviet military supplies to China give an account
of future loans that would be provided to the CCP-controlled armies. As evidenced
by the documents published in Volume 5, apart from the 20 percent of funds re-
ceived by Chiang Kai-shek under the government treaty, in 1939 additional huge
sums were allocated for the CCP expenditures (documents nos. 65, 100, 126, 140,
157, 180, 198, 202, 217). Besides, the Chinese Communist Party received all sorts of
humanitarian aid – first and foremost, medical aid provided formally through the
Red Cross (documents nos. 28, 57, 69, 94, 116, 124, 157, 173, 202). As evidenced by
the documents, the VCP (b) and Comintern provided the CCP with the military-
tech supplies as well and allocated additional 300,000 USD for the CCP military
spending in 1940 (document no. 100). In 1937 the VCP (b) and Comintern helped
to open a military school in Urumqi for the training of military-tech personnel of
the 8th PRA, and by the autumn 1939 the number of attending students reached 400
persons, while radio-transmitters, radio-materials and codes were being provided
to the CCP-controlled areas (documents nos. 70, 116).

The attack of Nazi Germany at the Soviet Union and the start of the Great Pa-
triotic War of the Soviet People radically changed the situation in the world com-

notwithstanding their difficult position in the context of the war against Germany
and its allies, the VCP (b) and Comintern continued to render regular and multi-
faceted assistance to Chinese communists. At the very start of the Great Patriotic
War, on July 3, 1941, the material assistance in the amount of one million USD
was allocated to cover the CCP needs and was transferred thereto in installments
through different channels (documents nos. 180, 182, 198).

The final part of the volume includes the documents related to the Comintern's
voluntary winding up, the very fact of which until now is a subject of academic
discourses. At the same time, the documents of the final volume unambiguously
evidence that the Chinese communists support the Comintern's initiative for self-dissolving. In its resolution of May 26, 1943 (document no. 291) on the ECCI Presidium's proposal regarding the voluntary liquidation of the Comintern, the CCP CC, having emphasized the new international situation and the higher level of party members' political consciousness, noted all major merits of the Comintern in development of the communist movement in China.

The whole documentary series is a most important publication in terms of the novelty and conceptual content of the presented information. Until the present time, it is the fullest collection of documents on political and practical activities of the VCP(b) and Comintern in China. Its extensive, multi-planed and unique materials make it possible to fill the gaps and the "white spots" in the source studies on the policy of Moscow in China as well as on the CCP history and domestic political situation in China of those years.

The compilers of the documentary series - the teams from the RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Archive and East Asian Seminar of the Free University of Berlin, who prepared such a voluminous collection of the earlier unpublished documents for the first publication ever, within the relatively short time, performed a grand work. In this connection it is worthwhile to pay tribute to and to mention the huge contribution by the late Dr. Konstantin Shevelev - a leading researcher of the IFES, who was a remarkable specialist on the history of the Chinese revolution and an expert in Russian archive materials. The collection did appear owing to his erudition and his highly professional work for disclosure of pseudonyms of those who had participated in illegal activities in China, for authentication of archive documents, for verification of hardly readable texts, for preparation of reference tools, specification dates, and for identification of authorship of archive documents. It should be noted that when the collection was "in the making", Russian archives were just opened, while Internet was not yet widely spread in Russia. It was K. Shevelev's meticulous work in archives and libraries that helped to reveal the information now being widely used by authors of multiple publications on illegal activities of Soviet special services in China. Also, we'd like to note K. Shevelev's contribution to preparations for translation of documents into German and Chinese languages.

The big and difficult work for verification and decoding of the ECCI documents in the German language, as well as preparation of prelims to texts in German, French and Chinese was done by the Humboldt University Professors R. Felber and J. Krüger who cooperated with Prof. M. Leutner in this project.

The publication of this series was received with broad response of historians doing research in Comintern studies, VCP(b) and Comintern's relations with the CCP and Kuomintang, CCP-Kuomintang relations, as well as relations between
Moscow and other political forces whose activities were instrumental in China's development in 1920–1943. These documents are especially interesting and important for specialists in the history of the CCP and Soviet-Chinese relations, as well as those doing research on development and practical results of the VCP(b) and Comintern's strategy and tactic at different stages in China. The importance of the series is evidenced by the fact that it was translated and published in Chinese by the CCP CC Party History Institute in the PRC, in Taiwan as well as in German in Germany. Besides, the CCP CC Party History Institute not only translated all five volumes into Chinese, but also supplemented each volume with a support volume of earlier published documents and issued its own series as "The VCP(b), Comintern and Chinese Revolution. Library of Archive Documents".

Preparation and publication of this series demonstrated the opened potentials of international cooperation that contributed to fulfillment of the grand academic task of building the source-studies base for all-sided highlighting of the RCP(b)/VCP(b) and Comintern's policy in China of 1920–1943. Several major international academic conferences, held on the basis of the published documents in Beijing (1997 and 2004), Berlin (1998), Taiwan (1999), and Manzhouli, PRC (2006), demonstrated the expansion of the research agenda and revision of some characteristics typical of the Chinese and international historiography of the 1980s–1990s.

In view of many researchers, documents and materials of this series open the new stage of studies of Moscow's China policy, as well as history of the CCP and Chinese revolution. Monographs, articles and dissertations prepared on these documents are already described in literature as "works of the new generation". Among the major works, we may refer to "Comintern and Kuomintang" by N. Mamaeva (1999), focused on such least studied subject as cooperation between the international communist movement and Sun Yatsen's party that was a leading political force of the national liberation movement in China of the 1920s. In 2001, Dr. A. Kartunova, a veteran researcher of the revolutionary movement in China, issued the 2nd amended and supplemented edition of her work on the military aspect of Moscow's policy of the 1920s, which was the first study in Russian and international literature with a special focus on the military aspects as integral components of the RCP(b)/VCP(b)
and Comintern's general policy pursued at different stages of national liberation

The final point to be added is that at the present time the documentary collection of "The VCP(b), Comintern and China" is a bibliographic rarity. The first four volumes (seven books) are sold out, and only Volume 5 of the series is so far still available.