Toward a Roadmap for Peace and Development in Northeast Asia

A Collection of Essays

Edited by
Vladimir Petrovskiy
Thomas G. Walsh

Universal Peace Federation
Toward a Roadmap for Peace and Development in Northeast Asia: From Conflict to Dialogue on the Korean Peninsula

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Foreword

An international conference “Towards a Road Map for Peace and Development in Northeast Asia: From Conflict to Dialogue on the Korean Peninsula” took place on May 30, 2014 in Vladivostok, Russia. The event was attended by 100 experts and representatives of governments, business and media of the region from Russia, the US, South Korea, China, and Japan, who discussed issues of security and cooperation in the Northeast Asia, among them about 60 invited delegates and guests from the countries of the region.

Issues of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia are attracting attention worldwide, primarily in connection with the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The dramatic division of the Korean nation continues to be the focus of international attention and remains the subject for academic debate. Universal Peace Federation (UPF), and NGO in special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC), launched the Northeast Asia Peace Initiative. As part of that initiative, a series of conferences on peace and security in Northeast Asia took place in Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Moscow, and, most recently, in Vladivostok. A number of international research projects aimed at developing plans to promote peaceful dialogue between South Korea and North Korea and involving North Korea in international economic and political relations in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region are also underway.

The Northeast Asia Peace Initiative is based on the following principles. Dialogue is a tool for peace and development providing a basis for mutual respect, trust, and cooperation. Despite the existence of different points of view or disagreement between peoples and governments in the region, there are common values, common interests and common aspirations which should be explored and supported. Local organizations and NGOs can play an invaluable role in addition to the work of governments through official diplomatic channels. Economic and trade cooperation is an important component of a comprehensive peace agenda. People-to-people diplomacy involving ordinary citizens, youth, women leaders, etc., promotes mutual understanding, cooperation, and prosperity.

The conference was initiated by the Universal Peace Federation and the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples in the Far East, Far Eastern branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography is the only academic institution in Russia and in the world dedicated to the complex study of the past and present of the region through the prism of history, archeology, ethnography, cul-
ture, politics and economics, and to project on this basis the future of the Russian Far East and adjacent areas of China, Japan and Korea. Structurally, it is a part of the Far Eastern branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and it cooperates with all agencies and individuals in Russia and abroad that are interested in the study of this region. The Universal Peace Federation is a global alliance of organizations and people of good will committed to the cause of world peace; members of the organization live and work for the common good and prosperity of all.

Opening the first session of the conference, the chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Primorsky Krai, Viktor Gorchakov, urged participants to work for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which is the foundation of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia. Dr. Victor Larin, chairman of the Public Chamber of Primorye and director of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples in the Far East, delivered the keynote address. He analyzed the situation in comparison with the Crimea and its influence on the creation of a “new security architecture” in Asia as well as the future of the Korean Peninsula.

In particular, the participants draw attention of academic scholars, politicians, and community of countries in the region on the following problem areas:

- Developing a model of sustainable and progressive inter-Korean dialogue with a view to make it irreversible, by creating a system of transparency and mutual trust
- Solving the North Korean nuclear issue on the basis of respecting the international non-proliferation regime and security interests of the countries involved
- Exploring the role of external factors in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula: participation of the United States, Russia, Japan, China, international organizations and institutions
- Designing international programs to promote the socio-economic development of the DPRK (economic and agricultural reform, land reclamation projects in the field of environmental protection, etc.)
- Involving the DPRK in regional economic and political cooperation
- Developing plans for sub-regional cooperation in the energy sector (construction of oil and gas pipelines, oil and gas processing enterprises in North and South Korea with the participation of Russia, China and Mongolia; building a unified energy system on the Korean Peninsula and connecting it to the energy system of the Russian Far East)
- Creating of an integrated transport system in the Korean Peninsula and its integration in the Eurasian transport corridors (completing
the restoration of the Trans-Korean railway and connecting it to the Trans-Siberian railway)

- Promoting cultural and humanitarian cooperation and people-to-people exchanges on the Korean Peninsula using the potential of interreligious dialogue

The conference initiated and carried out in Vladivostok based on the partnership effort of the UPF and the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of Peoples in the Far East proved to be of great academic and political significance, as the subjects discussed address the long-term interests of the Republic of Korea, North Korea, Russia, USA, Japan and China in the Asia-Pacific region, and arouse lively interest on the part of the governments and the academic and business communities of these countries.

The participants of the conference agreed that the end of North Korea’s isolation and its socioeconomic growth and transformation into a full-fledged member of the international community would benefit Russia and other countries of the region. Expectations of an imminent collapse of the existing system in North Korea are not justified, since it has repeatedly proved its considerable margin of safety. A relatively secure and confident DPRK is a much more reliable partner for negotiations on any issue than a country that is cornered under the burden of sanctions.

The conference also showed that, although the six-party talks about peace on the Korean Peninsula have stalled for more than five years, non-governmental organizations and experts consider this type of negotiations to be the most effective. These de facto non-party talks on May 30, 2014 in Vladivostok gave new hope for peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Dr. Vladimir Petrovskiy,
Member, Russian Academy of Military Sciences,
Chief Academic Researcher, Institute of Far Eastern Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences
Session I:
Toward Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula:
A Foundation for Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia
Opening Remarks

Viktor V. Gorchakov

Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the Primorsky Territory

On behalf of the deputies and the public of the Primorsky Krai I have the honor to welcome the participants of the conference here in Vladivostok! The theme you have chosen for discussion is very interesting for us. Besides its importance for the region as a whole and for the residents of the Primorsky Territory, which is adjacent to the Korean Peninsula, the issues raised are particularly relevant now, when we make long-term development plans in various areas, including in the fields of economics and culture. Consequently, we must be sure that we are surrounded by good, friendly and peaceful neighbors. That is why progress in reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and building good and friendly relationships is of great importance to us. We have accumulated our own experience in relations with North and South Korea. I think that speakers representing the Primorsky Territory will present in detail our position on this issue. I sincerely wish you success in your work.
I would like to focus on security issues in the field of cooperation in our region and the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, everything that happens on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and in the Asia-Pacific Region is important and relevant for Vladivostok and the entire Primorsky Territory.

There is much talk about changes in the world: globalization, shifting of the center of world economic activity and political activity in the Asia-Pacific Region. However, it seems to me that the events of early 2014, both in Europe and in Asia, suggest that this year may to some extent become a crucial turning point. I titled my speech: “After Crimea: Creating ‘a New Security Architecture’ in Asia and the Future of the Korean Peninsula.” Almost simultaneously, two events occurred in Ukraine and in Shanghai. I mean, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Based on this, I will try to explain my views on the possible development of events in this region.

First of all, a few words about new, well-known trends in the field of security in Asia. We see increasing tension in interstate relations; we observe the actual failure of the six-party talks on North Korea. We see a turnaround of U.S. interests in Asia and the United States’ growing interference in interstate conflicts. We are witnessing an attempt of Russia to face the Asia-Pacific Region issue and significantly accelerate economic and social development of the Pacific regions. We see increasing threats in non-traditional security. The new phenomenon in the last few years, in my opinion, is China’s willingness to take on the burden of leadership in promotion and creation of a new regional security, and growing support of these initiatives on the part of Russia.

Recently among the leaders of these two states there has been much talk about Russia and China having risen to a new level of interstate relations. There are several factors that make it possible to conclude that cooperation between the two parties shifts the emphasis from internal problems to global
and regional issues. There are certain reasons that push both Russia and China in this direction. On the one hand, it is China’s growing involvement in the solution of global problems, the need of this nation for resources and its growing rivalry with the United States. On the other hand, it is the growing tension of Russia vs. the European Union and the United States.

It is well known that the approaches of Russia and China to solving most of the problems at the global and regional levels are very similar. Unfortunately, we are not doing well in the area of economic cooperation, although a lot of right and good decisions are being made. Many of them were included in the last communiqué signed in Shanghai on May 20, 2014. The needed modernization of these relations is still only a distant prospect. Circumstances are pushing Russia and China to boost relations in the sphere of global and regional policy, and to form a new security system in the region.

Two documents emphasize Russia’s approaches to world security issues and, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific Region. The first document is the National Security Strategy of Russia until 2020. In this strategy, the Asia-Pacific Region is practically not represented. Here are listed the external threats that Russia considers to be fundamentally important. Note that in terms of threats to Russia coming from unstable areas, only one Asia-Pacific area, the Korean Peninsula, is mentioned. Among the general security problems in the region, we can mention: nuclear proliferation, terrorism, cross-border crime. All this is certainly related to the Asia-Pacific Region. Still, the emphasis (that is quite obvious) is made on the Atlantic.

This primarily means that Russia considers the Asia-Pacific Region to be an area conducive to formation of a new security system. There are two conditions that Russia considers to be important in ensuring its safety. The first is strategic stability and the second is equal strategic partnership. These are the two fundamental positions on which Russia is building its relations with other states and forming its own approaches to the new world order and formation of a security system.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Russia together with China started creating a new concept of security in the Asia-Pacific Region. This was first done in September 2010 at the summit in Beijing, where the parties declared a new chapter in Sino-Russian relations and a new start in bilateral relations. At that time the initiative to create an integrated system of an Asia-Pacific security cooperation was formulated; it was to be based on the so-called “Shanghai spirit,” the foundation principles of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

In October 2010, in Ankara, Turkey, the so-called joint Russian–Chinese initiative to strengthen security in the Asia-Pacific Region was adopted. At the
summit in June 2011, the intention of Russia and China to build new relations in the world and create a new system of international relations by joint efforts was confirmed.

Another very important document that, in my opinion, defines Russia’s approaches to world politics and a new security system is the concept of Russia’s foreign policy, adopted in early 2013. I have highlighted here a few points that are of fundamental relevance to the Asia-Pacific Region and, of course, to the Korean Peninsula. As you see, one of the main points is the creation of a transparent and equitable architecture to strengthen security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. Relations with the countries of the region—China, India, the two Koreas, Japan, Mongolia, Vietnam and other nations in Southeast Asia—are generally formulated as friendly and neighborly. And finally, a very interesting nuance in this concept: This Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia is not just important; rather, it is the main platform for constructing a strategic dialogue between the leaders of the key nations in the field of Asia-Pacific security and cooperation.

A new stage in the development of the Russian and Chinese approach to security issues and building a security system was the recent CICA summit in Shanghai, which took place a few days ago. The communiqué issued at this summit contained a number of points showing common approaches to the formation of international relations and a security system. What is particularly important in this communiqué? Russia and China are in favor of the need for an equitable and dogmatic world order and the creation of a transparent architecture for equal and indivisible security. The term “equal and indivisible security” is perhaps the key element in the approaches of the two nations to the formation of a security system. They feel confident that cooperation and sustainable development form the only imperative for our common future. The parties emphasized the principles of indivisible security in international relations. Particularly emphasized was the assertion that a nation cannot ensure its security at the expense of the other side, and that security really should be equally guaranteed for all. The participants spoke in favor of cooperation for establishing effective mechanisms to ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia. In their unanimous opinion, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia is an effective mechanism to strengthen dialogue on peace, stability and security in the region.

The interpretation of these events by the media, particularly in China, is interesting. There are a lot of comments today about China and Russia working together. Here is one of these statements: “China and Russia are working together to make this conference the basis for a new security system without the involvement of the United States.” Here you can feel a kind of
challenge. It is difficult to say where this will lead. Certainly, it is impossible to estimate now all the pros and cons. I think, building any security system without involving the United States is extremely problematic, if not altogether impossible.

On May 21, 2014, Shanghai hosted the 4th Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. It was quite imposing. Among the participants were leaders and representatives of 47 nations and international organizations, including UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the presidents of 11 nations. This extremely important event was characterized as highly positive, especially in China. The most impressive address, of course, was the speech of the president of China, Xi Jinping. China will be presiding over the conference from 2014 to 2016. In fact, China’s activity will largely determine the nature of the deliberations of the conference in the next years. Some theses declared by Xi Jinping in his speech have been quoted often. This suggests that the views of the new security system declared in the September document after the summit of former Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in Beijing are now in the process of development.

I should underline here a few highlights. The region needs a new system of regional security. In Asia, there should be no military alliances directed against any third nation. Security problems in Asia should be settled by the inhabitants of Asia. For solving the problems, only peaceful means should be used; in any case, applying force or threat of force is inadmissible. Fighting against terrorism requires very close cooperation. There is need for development of business, tourism, environmental protection, culture and human exchange. In other words, we should emphasize the importance of economic, humanitarian and human contacts. We need synchronization of cooperation in economy and security. Economy, sustainable development and security are interconnected. It was suggested that the conference should be a platform for enhancing security dialogue and cooperation in Asia.

Then followed different and sometimes very harsh comments. Some experts declared that the new security concept was aimed at combating Western aggression. But you feel that there is no mention of the conflict over Crimea. In addition, this summit was held at the time when anti-Chinese riots were breaking out in Vietnam. This also made an impact on China’s approach to security problems. The current political situation and, to some extent, emotional approach was reflected in the speech of the Chinese political leader and the estimates of experts and journalists. The conference adopted the declaration composed, of course, in milder tones than the speech of the People’s Republic of China chairman. Some very important principles highlight the
purpose of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.

One of the main principles is that the concept must be indivisible, equal and comprehensive. This is the main principle that must be followed. I will not list all the principles; they are recorded here. The declaration is quite voluminous. There is another point I would like to emphasize. It is the fact that the fight against destitution and poverty is the biggest global challenge facing the world, and we should fight it all together. The main threats are not military, but political. It goes about ensuring the overall economic development.

Russian views concerning creation of an Asia-Pacific security system in the region are expressed in a number of documents. They were announced in the speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin, addressed to Russian and Chinese journalists. These same principles were declared during his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Obviously, from the point of view of the Russian government, the region needs a new security architecture to guarantee equality for all, and balance of power and harmony. Russia supports the creation of a system of international relations to secure modern approaches and principles. Much has been said about the current system being an echo and a heritage of the Cold War that should be left behind. It again emphasizes that the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia may become a good format for working effectively to establish a system of security not only in the military-political sphere but also in the fields of economics, environmental engineering and humanitarian exchange.

Now a few words about how the future of the Korean Peninsula is viewed by the Russian and Chinese leadership. The Russian–Chinese Communiqué (in Shanghai) pays enough attention to the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Obviously, both sides consider it necessary to take concrete measures to ease tension on the Korean Peninsula. In their opinion, the problems on the Korean Peninsula should be resolved only through negotiations, without use of force. However, in their opinion, the six-party talks are the only way to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, which I very much doubt. Also in Korea, I think, it gives rise to serious doubts. Today, it seems, there is no mechanism that could address this problem. If such a mechanism appears, or will be created, we can move forward on this path.

As emphasized in the communiqué, it is important that peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization and solving all the problems of the peninsula, should be carried out only through dialogue and negotiation. This meets the interests of all parties, without exception, not only those of Russia, China and neighboring countries located close to the Korean Peninsula but also of nations all over the world.
Interestingly, in the documents of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the issue of the Korean Peninsula was not touched. Why? Honestly, I myself wouldn’t know the answer to this question. There might be different assessments, different approaches. But I think that this organization will make every effort to join in addressing these problems. These are my thoughts in connection with the recent events in Europe and Asia. They instill some anxiety, but at the same time give some optimism. I would like to believe that humanity is becoming wiser in solving problems through dialogue, cooperation and common development.

Dr. Victor Larin is director of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, Far Eastern Federal University, a professor and doctor of historical sciences. A native of Vladivostok, he is a graduate of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Far Eastern State University (now the Far Eastern Federal University), majoring in “Country specific studies” with qualification as an “Orientalist, historian, Chinese language interpreter.” He was an assistant at the Department of Chinese philology of the Far Eastern State University (1974–1981); senior lecturer in the history and literature of the Far East (1981–1983); assistant professor of geography (1983–1986); dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies (1986); professor at the Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service (1994–2000); head of foreign policy and international relations in the East Asia Department, Far Eastern State University (2002–2011); head of the of Pacific Russia Department, Far Eastern Federal University (since September 2011).
As we gather here in Vladivostok, we should recognize that we are very close to North Korea and the DMZ, the demilitarized zone that has separated North and South Korea for the past 60 years. A permanent peace treaty has never been signed between North and South Korea, and so the people of the Korean Peninsula live under the constant threat of war.

The topic we are addressing this morning is a topic of immense geopolitical, humanitarian importance. It is a matter of life and death, not only for Korea but for all Asia.

You may ask why nongovernmental organizations such as the Universal Peace Federation are involved in discussions of political and military issues in Northeast Asia, as well in the Middle East. These are significant flashpoints in global affairs and will be addressed at this conference. Please know that our aim is simply to help prevent conflict and promote reconciliation.

In the case of the Korean Peninsula, a small spot has the potential to ignite a devastating world war that would bring in its wake unspeakable suffering for the people of this nation and region. We cannot rely exclusively on governments to resolve this crisis. Civil society has an important role to play in global affairs and has unique capacities to initiate soft-power approaches to conflict resolution and peace.

Many of you know that Rev. Dr. Sun Myung Moon and Dr. Hak Ja Han Moon, the founders of UPF, were born in what is now North Korea. Their lives, along with millions of their countrymen, were turned upside down as a result of the Korean War. The Korean War almost destroyed this peninsula and its people. The war divided 10 million families. Many remain divided to this day, but many of them are dying. Think about a nation being divided for 60 years. Last year 38,000 people went to spirit world without seeing their loved ones.

Dr. Moon witnessed this disaster firsthand. Since then he always wanted to see the reunification of his homeland, Korea, and the reunion of the Korean people. This was his constant hope and aspiration. He kept this hope alive, despite the terrible realities he faced during the Korean War.
Dr. Moon made a historic trip to North Korea in 1991 and met personally with Kim Il Sung. During their meetings Dr. Moon and Kim Il Sung agreed on five specific points to hasten the peaceful reunification of North and South Korea. This document was signed in North Korea on December 5, 1991.

Since that time a constant and strong effort has been underway to build bridges of understanding and cooperation between the two Koreas. Let me mention two concrete examples. First, in the area of sports Dr. Moon asked the Sorocaba and Senay football team, a premier club in Brazil founded by Dr. Moon, to participate in competitions with North Korean football teams and to help upgrade their football capacities.

Second, in the area of trade and commerce for peace and development, he initiated a project aimed at building an international peace highway, railroad and tunnel system that would become a major artery linking South Korea and North Korea, as well as Japan, China, Russia and beyond through a Bering Strait tunnel. He also invested in an auto manufacturing enterprise and hotel in the North.

I also want to recognize the humanitarian and cultural work of the Women’s Federation for World Peace, an important NGO affiliated with the United Nations that has been actively supporting programs in North Korea for many years. Its members have been to North Korea more than 20 times, with an incredible humanitarian mind and a mother’s heart.

Today’s program is the fourth in a recent series of international meetings on peace in Northeast Asia. Our first meeting was held in the Japanese Diet in Tokyo in August 2013, featuring distinguished experts from Japan, Korea and the United States. That same month we held a similar program in Seoul, and in September 2013 we hosted a third program of American specialists in Washington, D.C. Our latest conference on the Northeast Asia Peace Initiative took place in February 2014 in Seoul. The program benefited greatly from the distinguished participation of Dr. Alexander Zhebin from Russia and Ambassador Christopher Hill from the United States. Our aim throughout this series has been to develop a roadmap for permanent peace and stability in Northeast Asia, working toward the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Of course, this is no easy task. The complexities are immense. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the governments of both Koreas, as well as of the United States, Russia, China and Japan, continue their work to find a solution to this ongoing crisis. At the same time, civil society and NGOs such as the Universal Peace Federation should encourage soft-power solutions and develop track two, people-to-people diplomatic efforts that promote trust and mutual
respect between the people of North and South Korea and among all the nations in the region.

We must not be blind to the hard-power realities that we face in this effort. National interests, including political, military and economic interests, are very much in play and cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, we are committed to an ongoing effort to prevent conflict and promote peace in Northeast Asia. For this reason, we are considering a variety of follow-up programs for our Northeast Asia Peace Initiative, possibly in China and hopefully Pyeongyang.

In addition to academic forums we also want to encourage the broadest possible expansion of trading between the two Koreas. The industrial complex at Kaesong, just 20 miles north of the DMZ, is an important step in the right direction. In addition, cultural and sports exchanges can help to build trust between the two Koreas.

At the intergovernmental level, it is extremely important that the principal leaders of the main stakeholder nations in the region continue their efforts to reduce tensions and reach a peaceful agreement. For this reason we support the establishment of a Northeast Asian Union that’s similar to other regional intergovernmental entities, such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Pacific Islands Forum, the African Union, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

*Dr. Chung Jin Hwa is a graduate of Unification Theological Seminary (1995). He served as the vice president of the Youth Federation for world Peace in Japan (2005-2008) and director of the PR Department of the Tongil group in Korea (2009-2011). He has been the chair of UPF-Eurasia since 2013.*
Korea should come up with a new diplomatic approach to change its destiny after having been victimized by the great power politics of the 19th century.

The geopolitics of Northeast Asia has undergone a fundamental change in the 21st century that goes beyond the demise of the Cold War environment in the 1990s. It is more fundamental in the sense that the change is as radical as the one that took place in the late 19th century, when the traditional order that revolved around China for several centuries was overturned by the arrival of Western imperialism and the rise of Japan. The Korean Peninsula was at the center of this power transition that took place some 100 years ago. And the Korean nation again finds itself at the center of the 21st century power transition today. But the current geopolitical environment includes a variety of features and characteristics that are different from those of the past.

First, the balance of power in Northeast Asia has been reversed as a result of the rise of China. China already has surpassed Japan in terms of economic scale as of 2010. China is making its comeback as the regional hegemon of Northeast Asia some 100 years after its humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War at the end of the 19th century. Already in 2005, China’s national defense expenditures exceeded those of Japan.

Recently China’s military strategy has focused on cultivating the capability for anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) that would deter any interference by external groups seeking to challenge the territorial or sovereignty rights of China, which Beijing regards as its core interest in the Asian region.

Meanwhile, mired in economic and financial crises, the United States announced plans in 2012 to cut its defense expenditures by 10 percent over the next decade. The automatic budget cuts and the sequestration also will result in further reductions of US defense expenditure. Political realists have warned that the rise of China will heighten tension and rivalry with surround-
The present situation shares many similarities with that which prevailed in Europe shortly before World War I and II. However, Stephen M. Walt of Harvard University has pointed out that although the possibility of small-scale skirmishes between China and these countries does exist, the likelihood of a full-scale war between the world’s superpowers remains low. This is because rising China does not possess the territorial ambitions or desire to usurp surrounding countries that Japan had possessed at the end of the 19th century and that Germany exhibited in the early 20th century.

Meanwhile, the East Asian countries, including China, have placed a clear emphasis on economic development. For this, they are all keenly aware that it is most important to assure a peaceful environment. Furthermore, the presence of nuclear weapons has emerged as a powerful deterrent to all-out war among the East Asian countries. In this regard, the nature of the traditional hegemonic competition between strong powers has been altered inevitably by the emergence of nuclear weapons in the 20th century and globalization trends in the 21st century. What is more important is that the United States has continued its role of an offshore balancer. The Obama administration recently has highlighted its “pivot to Asia” policy. The rebalancing of US interest and policy toward Asia signals US willingness to take the necessary steps to restrain the hegemonic ambition of any country, most notably China, while trying to reduce the military burden due to its economic constraints.

Third, the relative stability of the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia, however, could be seriously disrupted by the lethal transformation of the North Korean threat. The totalitarian nature of the North Korean regime, based on its absolute reverence of Kim Il Sung and his family, along with its armed provocations and continuing nuclear weapons program, have not changed. Nevertheless, a series of recent events has resulted in elevating the North Korean threat to a new level.

North Korea’s de facto status as a nuclear weapons state could not come at a worse time, as Pyongyang’s leadership is going through a critical transition for its own survival. The passing down of power from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un has further enhanced the feudal characteristics of the North Korean system. In particular, the emergence of Kim Jong Un as the North’s absolute leader while still in his 20s has raised numerous questions about the future viability of the North Korean system.

Nevertheless, Kim Jong Un’s lack of political experience, as compared to that of his grandfather and father, and the perceptions of him as an inexperienced leader wielding absolute power, have contributed to a sense of uncertainty for
the future of the North Korean system. The North Korean economy’s fundamental inability to show any sign of major improvement will only further worsen the inherent instability of the North Korean system over time. The North’s recent nuclear test is expected to further derail the economic reforms that constitute the key to the survival of the North Korean system due to a strengthening of the sanctions imposed on the North by the international community.

Fourth, while today’s nuclear North Korea might be doomed to an ultimate demise as was the case with the late 19th century Joseon dynasty, South Korea offers a very different story. The most vital difference in the Korean Peninsula between the 19th century and today is the remarkable ascension of South Korea’s global capability and status. Although its geopolitical location assures that it is still surrounded by stronger powers, South Korea has now become the world’s 15th-largest economy and 12th-largest military power.

The situation of the Republic of Korea thus differs greatly from the chaos and darkness that engulfed Joseon during its final days, and that of modern-day North Korea, a country devastated by its isolationist and oppressive policy. This noteworthy development of South Korea means that it now has the capability and duty to play an active role, along with other major powers, in the promotion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the world overall.

**Diplomatic strategy toward the four powers: Objectives and principles**

The first priority should be the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Given the current situation in which the two Koreas are engaged in ongoing military tension, it is only natural that the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula are regarded as Korea’s overriding goal. In addition, this objective is also largely shared by the United States, China, Japan and Russia.

A second objective should involve the promotion of peace and co-prosperity in Northeast Asia. As previously mentioned, Northeast Asia is now in the midst of the most far-reaching power transition since the end of the 19th century.

Although the hegemonic war predicted by realists might not unfold in the near future, the current situation is laden with uncertainty and volatility. This will contribute to lingering instability until a new order is firmly established in the region. The territorial and historical conflicts between China and Japan, Korea and Japan, and Russia and Japan, as well as the war of nerves being
waged by the United States and China, all serve to heighten the region’s uncertainties.

The third objective of South Korea’s four-power diplomacy should envision the country playing a more proactive and leading role in the region’s geopolitics. In particular, Korea must make it clear that it has the desire and capacity to take the initiative in efforts to realize the above-mentioned goals. South Korea must take the lead role in maintaining peace of the Korean Peninsula via managing stable inter-Korean relations.

While recognizing the limitations of its national power, South Korea should search for new opportunities and roles by combining Korea’s geopolitical position and its global standing to advance a new paradigm of complex network diplomacy in the 21st century. To substantiate such an ambitious diplomatic undertaking, South Korea should be able to present its strategic vision, policy priorities and concrete measures to spell out exactly how it intends to assume greater responsibility in assuring peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

A three-tiered middle-power diplomacy

South Korea’s new four-power diplomatic strategy is formulated by a three-tiered approach as a middle power. The first tier relates to the geopolitical situation of Korea. The Korean Peninsula, located in the midst of the four powers (United States, China, Japan and Russia), has experienced an unfortunate history of finding itself being repeatedly subjected to the vortex of power politics of the surrounding powers.

The second tier of this middle-power diplomacy involves the national capability of South Korea, which thus far has been widely regarded as a middle power. As previously mentioned, South Korea now occupies an elevated stratum within the global community, thanks to its current economic and military strength. This reality means that South Korea has acquired the status needed to play a certain role beyond the Korean Peninsula and to have its voice heard by the international community.

The third tier of this middle-power diplomacy relates to the unique characteristics of South Korea’s economic, social and political achievement. South Korea is practically the only developing country with a colonial past that has succeeded in joining the ranks of the advanced countries. In addition, Korea’s political development represents an exemplary case of how Western-style democracy has taken root successfully in a traditional Asian society. During this process, Korean culture and tradition have taken on a multifaceted character that combines principles of the East and the West. This has provided an
impetus for the unique inclusiveness of Korean society in which the traditional Asian religions of Confucianism and Buddhism are able to harmoniously coexist with Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam. The recent multicultural initiatives needed to accommodate the migration of foreign nationals to Korea, so as to offset its low birth rate and declining labor force, also distinguish Korea from China and Japan, which tend to exhibit overt signs of insular nationalism.

A balanced complex diplomacy strategy

South Korea should adopt a “balanced” complex diplomacy rather than pursuing a “balancer” role. In fact, such a balanced approach has been evident in the diplomatic strategies of the four powers in regard to their diplomacy vis-a-vis Korea and the Korean Peninsula.

The first task of Korea’s four-power diplomacy is how to position itself between the United States and China, which represent the two most important external actors on the Korean Peninsula. Although the competition between the two strongest powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula is likely to intensify over the long term, the United States and China, for the foreseeable future, will continue their collaboration in pursuing their common interests in maintaining regional stability.

Second, South Korea’s complex diplomacy may play an important role in mediating tension between China and Japan, as well, when it comes to resolving its own bilateral issues with the two countries. For this, South Korea should take a broader regional approach to resolve the historical and territorial conflicts of Northeast Asia rather than focusing on bilateral issues. South Korea’s complex diplomacy should be able to lend Seoul a lead role in mediating rivalry and disputes among China, Japan and Korea. Indeed, the disagreement, mistrust and conflicts between the three countries over their past history and territorial issues are nothing new. The problem is that these conflicts recently have exhibited a tendency to rapidly become highly contentious when fueled by newfound nationalism in each country.

It is thus incumbent upon Korea to be prepared to intervene to avoid such a situation by initiating steps to improve Korea–China–Japan relations. Although South Korea may feel that it is the biggest victim of past geopolitical and historical issues among the three countries, it should pursue a respectful and objective approach to rectify related disagreements.

The time has come for Korea to move beyond its victim mentality and confidently take the lead in bringing about future-oriented cooperative relations in Northeast Asia. The Korea–China–Japan Cooperation Secretariat,
installed in Seoul, and the Campus Asia Program that offers joint degrees to exchange students attending universities in Korea, China and Japan, are tangible examples of this emerging trend. These efforts, over the long term, will alleviate the China–Japan, Korea–China and Korea–Japan disputes. In addition, they will help to create a new role for South Korea as a preeminent force in bringing about peace and stability in Northeast Asia by fostering reconciliation and cooperation between China and Japan.

The third area of South Korea’s balanced complex diplomacy with the four powers would involve promoting region-wide economic cooperation and development among Korea, China, Japan and Russia. The already concluded ROK–US Free Trade Agreement and the Korea–European Union Free Trade Agreement have provided South Korea with valuable experience and a potential for a leading role in future trade negotiations with China and Japan. Korea should use the Korea–China, Korea–Japan, Korea–China–Japan FTA negotiations, as well as the US–led Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) negotiation process, as opportunities to establish itself as a bridge and a center in advancing trade cooperation and economic integration in Northeast Asia.

At the same time, Korea should take advantage of Russia’s Far East and Siberia development policy. The vast potential of Russia, especially Siberia’s mostly untapped reserves of oil and natural gas, cannot be overestimated. This area also serves as a gateway to connect Northeast Asia with Europe. Korea needs to play a bridge role in the formation of a mega-economic bloc that includes the Japanese archipelago and the Korean Peninsula, along with the three provinces of Northeast China and Russian Siberia. To this end, Korea must develop a long-term strategic vision and pursue feasible projects.

Finally, the most urgent task for ensuring the success of the above-mentioned complex four-power diplomacy (Korea–US–China, Korea–China–Japan, Korea–China–Japan–Russia) centers on maintaining the stability of the Korean Peninsula. At the core of this matter is the stable management of the North Korean situation, particularly with regard to the North’s nuclear development and the uncertainty of its regime. The North Korean problem is an international concern that goes well beyond inter-Korean relations. The most pressing issue for the surrounding four powers in the region is in fact North Korea. Concerns over the management and resolution of the North Korean situation have been heightened in line with growing questions about potential instability within the North Korean regime. Close cooperation with the four powers has now become more critical than at any other time.
As such, the stable management and resolution of the North Korean situation should be led by South Korea’s diplomatic efforts, in concert with the four powers. After all, it is South Korea’s destiny to take the role of mediator/coordinator between the four powers in resolving the 20th century Cold-War legacy on the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion

For South Korea, the importance of its four-power diplomacy cannot be stressed enough. Bilateral diplomacy is the basic track that must be used to resolve the current outstanding issues between South Korea and these individual powers, along with continued efforts to build trust and advance common interests. However, South Korea’s diplomatic effort should not end there.

It was emphasized that President Park Geun-hye intends to maintain a balanced approach to the four powers. Her spokesperson explained that President Park would use the 60th anniversary of the ROK–US Alliance as an occasion to launch a 21st century-type of “comprehensive strategic alliance” with the United States while advancing a “strategic cooperative partnership” with China. As for Japan, the new government will make an effort to establish a reciprocal cooperative relationship while decisively responding to territorial and history-related issues. It also was mentioned that Korea would make new efforts to engage Russia in the promotion of economic cooperation and to resolve the North Korean situation.

However, the high level of distrust and antagonism among the powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula has been a key obstacle to these objectives. The divisions between the four powers have impeded the advent of positive developments in North Korea and created an ironic situation in which the weakest of the six parties in the region—North Korea—has come to dictate the geopolitics in Northeast Asia. This situation has been exacerbated by the current reality in which the four powers and South Korea have blamed one another for responsibility for North Korea’s provocations and nuclear threats.

Positive change must be induced in North Korea by advancing the common interests of South Korea and the four powers. This should be undertaken in accordance with a comprehensive roadmap that addresses the most pressing problems, namely the North Korean nuclear crisis and the country’s military provocation, over the short term, followed by dialogue and engagement with North Korea over the intermediate term, and the eventual establishment of a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula that is conducive to reunification.
The Park Geun-hye administration’s “trust-politik” is trying to overcome the inter-Korean crisis and become the starting point for South Korea’s four-power diplomacy in the 21st century. In this way South Korea’s four-power diplomacy should lay the groundwork for bringing about the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula and common prosperity in Northeast Asia.

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Human Bonds Shape the Road to Peace

Hon. Yoshinori Ohno

Former Minister of Defense, Japan

Please allow me to start by briefly introducing myself. I was born in Taiwan (which then was called Formosa) in 1935 and repatriated back to Japan when I was 11 years old. That’s two years after the end of World War II. As a small boy, I experienced a lot of misery, having scanty meals, putting on shabby shirts and pants. And my name? Oh, yes, it’s Oh—no!

It’s spelled OHNO, and sounds like “Oh, NO”! A bit of a negative name. I’ll keep shouting loudly, “Oh, no,” to any war, any threat, in light of my experiences of the war as a small boy.

On the contrary, I’ll say, “Oh, yes,” to international cooperation for the sake of building world peace and security—like this meeting of the Universal Peace Federation.

Having said this, let me go to our subject: peace and security in Northeast Asia. There are some serious problems we have to tackle in this region:

1. North Korea
2. The less than satisfactory relations among the neighbors Japan and Korea, and Japan and China. In addition to this, tensions have increased because of China’s deploying an oil rig in the South China Sea. Tensions escalated, for example, quite recently when Vietnam accused China of ramming and using water cannons against Vietnamese fishing boats.
3. Under such circumstances we need a very tough and forceful international policeman.

Within Northeast Asia, needless to say, North Korea is an extremely unstable factor. North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Its Korean People’s Army is the largest military organization on the earth, comprising almost 40 percent of the total population. In comparison, Japan’s military makes up only 0.2 percent of its population and in the case of the United States: 0.5 percent. The military expenditures of North Korea equal about 16 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). In the case of Japan, military expenditures equal a little less than 1 percent of the GDP.
The standard of living is very low in North Korea, and yet North Korea’s leaders are placing the greatest importance on strengthening their military power. Why?

**How can the problem of North Korea be solved?**

Above all, the six-party talks should be resumed at the earliest possible date. The six-party talks started in August 2003 under the chairmanship of China. However, the last meeting was held in December 2008. In other words, a meeting has not been held for more than five years.

In my analysis, each member should carry out its own role in the six-party talks. China should play the part of the very severe and strict brother. China has the most influence on North Korea. So its role is particularly important. Korea should play the role of a kind brother. The United States, a strict and tough policeman. Japan, a kind policeman. Russia, a fair judge.

Needless to say, in the case of Japan there is another serious problem: the abduction of Japanese citizens by the North Korean secret services.

In the second place, the relations among the members of the six-party talks should be kept cordial. Japan’s relations with Korea and with China should be improved. In particular, cooperation among the United States, Korea and Japan is essential.

The United States is particularly concerned about the relations between its allies, namely, Japan and Korea. Quite recently the United States initiated a trilateral summit on the occasion of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague. The United States urged both Japan and Korea to improve the ties between the two countries. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Geun-Hye Park met in The Hague through the efforts of the U.S. president as a go-between. Yes, this time, the United States played the part of a go-between.

What about China? Quite recently U.S. President Barack Obama visited Japan, and he clearly stated that the dispute of Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyutai Islands by the Chinese) falls under Article 5 of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. China has been acting rather provocatively toward Japan. As you know, China unilaterally declared an air-defense identification zone, etc. As to international relations, we should refrain from taking any provocative attitude. The relationship between Japan and China is crucially important, not only to world peace but also to the world economy.
In the past, the relationship between Japan and China was quite often called “cold in politics but hot in economy.” But now, both politics and economy are very cold. That is too bad. The No. 2 and No. 3 leaders of the world economy should cooperate with each other, not only for their own benefit but also for the benefit of the world.

It may take a long time for Japan to improve its relations with its neighbors, China and Korea. We should keep in mind the following points:

1. We can choose our wife, but we cannot choose our neighbor countries. Japan’s neighbors are Korea and China. That is the wish of God. And strengthening ties with the neighbors is fundamental to peace and security in the region.

2. Please do not think foreigners are opponents. Let’s talk with foreigners face to face as our friends. It’s important for leaders of neighbor countries to meet each other periodically.

3. An exchange of people is the basis of peace and security. Let’s push forward an exchange of students. Overseas students are ambassadors from the future.

4. Please let me say a few words about the discussions going on in Japan on the collective right of self-defense, which, to the eyes of foreigners, may seem to indicate that Japan is now going to be militaristic. The answer is NO.

Japan is a peace-loving country. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renounces war. It allows us to exercise our individual right to self-defense but does not allow us to exercise our collective right to self-defense, according to the interpretation of the Article 9 of the constitution. We have been engaged very actively in peace-keeping operations overseas. Take, for example, the case of Iraq. We sent approximately 800 Self-Defense Forces, and they were engaged in the repair of roads and the reconstruction of bridges, schoolhouses, etc. But they could not shoot guns at any enemy that attacked U.S. soldiers working together with them because Japan is not allowed to use the collective self-defense right. Is this fair or justified?

On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in New York, and George W. Bush, then the president of the United States, shouted, “It’s a new war.” Yes, indeed, it’s a new war!

Wars in the past were wars for countries to fight against each other, but a new war is the war for those countries through international cooperation to fight against terrorists, nuclear weapons, etc., and to eliminate them from the world.

Most important is the cooperation among democratic countries to fight against terrorists, dictatorships with nuclear weapons, etc.
Japan has been a peace-loving country, but now it is trying to become a peace-making country through international cooperation.

All said, in order to build and maintain good relations with each other, I’d like to quote the teachings of Buddha: “JIRI JITA.” That is to say: “Benefit others, and you’ll benefit from others.” I’ll close my speech by stressing the importance of the teachings of Buddha: “Benefit others, and you’ll benefit from others.”

Hon. Yoshinori Ohno is a former member of the House of Representatives of Japan, elected eight times from the Liberal Democratic Party in 1986–2012. A graduate of Tokyo University, he worked for the Ministry of Finance. He has served in various prominent positions, including first secretary to the Permanent Delegation of Japan in Geneva and director of the International Organizations Section under the Minister of Finance, minister of defense, and senior vice-minister of education, culture, sports and technology.
Russia’s Efforts for Peace and Harmony in Korea

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The cross-cutting character of Russian foreign policy was formed mainly in the early 2000s, with different geographical directions and priorities supplementing each other. Work in each of these areas is subject to the interests of Russia, strengthening of international security and stability in the world. All these years, one of the central priorities remained the formation of space and neighborly partnership along the Russian borders. This is the direction Russia has taken in connection to the Korean Peninsula.

Moscow’s attention to this region is quite justified, since aggravation of the situation in Korea and, what is more, military conflicts on the peninsula have always had a negative effect on the security of Russia and forced it to take additional security measures. Thus, twice during the last century Russia had to fight a large-scale war in Korea against Japan (1904–1905 and in 1945), beat off Japanese expansion on the continent in the late 1930s, and take a limited indirect part (military advisers and pilots as part of the Sino–North Korean forces) in the Korean War of 1950–1953.

The current course of Russia’s efforts concerning the Korean Peninsula is characterized by the virtual disappearance of the ideological factor and an equally marked rise of pragmatism in developing approaches to assessing and solving problems arising in the peninsula. Currently Moscow is seeking to develop relationships of mutually beneficial cooperation with both Korean states, thus striving to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. However, Moscow has consistently advocated for the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

Russia’s Korea policies: The search for a new paradigm

In 2015, Koreans in both the North and the South will celebrate one of the crucial dates in the history of Korea: the 70th anniversary of liberation from Japanese colonial rule.
This date is common to the peoples of both Russia and Korea. Hundreds of Soviet soldiers gave their lives in August 1945 for the liberation of Korea from Japan. While paying tribute to the contributions of the Soviet Union’s allies—the United States, Britain and other members of the anti-Hitler coalition—to the victory over Japan, I would like to remind you that it was the Red Army who in those August days battled with the Japanese troops on the Korean soil and defeated them.

After Korea’s liberation and the emergence of the two Koreas in 1948 and up to the end of the 1980s, the USSR, mainly for ideological reasons, recognized only one of the Koreas: North Korea. Then, after the well-known changes in the Soviet Union’s foreign and domestic policy and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea on September 30, 1990, there started a rapid rapprochement between Moscow and Seoul and an equally rapid cooling with Pyongyang.

It soon became clear that the imbalances in Russia’s policy in favor of one of the Koreas would lead inevitably to a drop of interest in Russia as a partner on the part of both Koreas and other participants of settlement of issues in Korea.

It became clear that the optimal model of the “balance of interests” of Russia on the Korean Peninsula is, apparently, such a system of relations between Russia and each Korean state that would exclude the possibility of both of them using the connections with Moscow at the expense of breaking the relationship with the other Korean state.

**The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and the position of Russia**

Since the appearance of the nuclear issue in Korea, Moscow began strongly supporting denuclearization on the peninsula, together with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, Russia is pressing for the settlement of the problems there by political and diplomatic means; it stands for due consideration of legitimate security interests of all states in the region as the most correct way to ensure lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The emergence of new military nuclear powers is unacceptable for Russia. This is the common position of Russia, China and the other participants in the six-party talks in our approach to North Korea. We explain the benefits of the matter, in accordance with the Joint Declaration of 2005, to our North Korean friends and their neighbors. This includes the creation of a stable system with security guarantees for the DPRK.¹
Respecting DPRK concerns about its security, the Russian side has consistently drawn attention to the fact that the solution to this problem “should be in line with negotiations and not through expanding the arms race, especially nuclear.”

Moscow is systematically reminding Pyongyang that future relations between Russia and the DPRK will depend, more than ever before, on the behavior of the North Koreans in respect to the nuclear issue.

Moscow believes that the six-party talks are the only effective way to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. This position, which is shared by China, was reaffirmed during the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to China on May 20 and 21, 2014.

The purpose of the negotiation process remains the same: the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The basis for the talks is also the same: the statement of the six states, including North Korea, adopted in September 2005. This document sets out the steps expected of Pyongyang, and countermeasures to be taken in response to its cooperation in the matter of dismantling its nuclear weapons program, which suggests the development of peaceful nuclear energy in the DPRK, and other material benefits.

Currently North Korea is sending signals announcing its readiness to resume negotiations without any preconditions. Several other participants of the six-party process believe that Pyongyang must be the first to take steps and convince the others of its seriousness, i.e., to resume negotiations; the DPRK is expected to initiate some unilateral action.

Russia, together with its Chinese partners, who play an important role in this process, tends to grope for a consensus that would allow negotiations to be resumed.

Within the framework of the six-party talks during their previous active stage, several working groups were established. Russia leads a working group to develop the principles of peace and security in Northeast Asia. It was meant, in practical terms, that in case of progress on the issue of denuclearization, this group would be in demand and would coordinate Northeast Asian parameters for the long term. The Russian Foreign Ministry does not rule out that we could use the presence of this group and convene a conference in its format to begin discussing confidence-building measures. This was the idea that the Russian side shared with its partners in the six-party talks in the hope of the talks being renewed.

Simultaneously Moscow is condemning the attempts of some countries to benefit from the current position of the DPRK and disproportionately increase their military capabilities in the region. In particular, the steps taken by
the United States in reaction to the threat posed by North Korea greatly exceed the real military capabilities possessed by Pyongyang. Russia opposes the inflation of “military muscle,” including deployment near our borders of strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, and the forced creation of the U.S. global missile defense components in the region.

The actions of the United States and its allies, who have boycotted the negotiation process and at the same time are trying to use United Nations sanctions to paralyze the entire foreign trade and foreign economic affairs of the DPRK, give reason to believe that in line with its strategic plan, the United States is not interested in a full and final settlement of the situation and disappearance of “the North Korean threat,” as it inevitably would reveal the United States’ true motives for preserving its military presence in South Korea and Japan, and deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) in the region.

It seems that the United States does not want any agreement with the DPRK. Indeed, in such a case the so-called “North Korean threat” would disappear. That would knock out the cornerstone underlying the entire U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, which is based on bilateral military alliances with Japan and the ROK and the forward deployment of U.S. troops in those countries that is intended not to deter the DPRK, which has weakened markedly in the last decade and a half, but to save the U.S. politico-military dominance in the region. At the same time the true intentions of the U.S. leadership, to use the theater missile defense deployed in the region for neutralizing the nuclear missile deterrent of Russia and China, would be laid bare.

Hence, the United States will benefit both by (as a minimum program) maintaining a certain level of tension in Korea that would allow keeping troops and deploying a missile defense and (optimally) by the elimination of the DPRK some way or another. The latter would give Americans the chance to exercise control over the unique Korean Peninsula, unparalleled in the world in military-strategic importance in the Asian region as it is located on the border of Russia, China and Japan. It is impossible to overemphasize the meaning of control over the area in light of the already started U.S.-Chinese rivalry for dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, which, in all probability, will be exacerbated by the increasing national strength of China.

For the negotiations to be a success, the answer to the question “What is the United States going to eventually seek? Will it limit its demands to nonproliferation topics or will it try to use the negotiations to create prerequisites for regime change in North Korea?” will be of top importance. In the latter case, Pyongyang is unlikely to abandon its nuclear deterrent.
Russia and the unification of Korea

Moscow’s position in relation to inter-Korean rapprochement and its possible outcomes is determined by the national interests of Russia, which certainly welcomes liquidation of the source of tension on the borders of Russia’s Far East and the emergence of a unified Korea in the future that is ready to continue relations of friendship, neighborliness and cooperation with Russia.

However, there is no doubt that despite implementation of any unifying scenarios, the priority for Russia is to ensure peace on the peninsula. Also important for us is the maximum predictability of the final result of the reunification process.

The current high level of uncertainty regarding the nature of the foreign policy of a future unified Korea, its participation in military-political alliances with other countries and the direction of such alliances forces Russia, while welcoming inter-Korean détente, to be cautious about the prospects for unification.

Russia could hardly welcome the appearance of a united Korea as a neighbor, with a population of 70 million, under prevailing U.S. influence, and with U.S. troops on its territory. This would be tantamount to the emergence of an Asian clone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on our eastern borders. Some prominent Russian experts believe that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is a “Cold-War anachronism.”

In Russia, some analysts believe that the military presence of the United States in Korea after its possible unification would be directed only against Russia (as well as its strategic partner China), especially given the almost inevitable inclusion of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Korean Peninsula into the scope of actions of the TMD system created by the Americans.

Relevant for Russia is not the task of obtaining the prevailing position in Korea, but preventing a situation in which all of Korea would be under the influence of a single nation, especially one that is hostile to Russia.

Since under the current balance of power in Northeast Asia and economic prospects for Russia, development of this scenario cannot be ruled out for Russia (and China too), it seems to me, in the short and medium term, that the existence of the DPRK as a friendly sovereign state performing the role of a certain buffer against U.S. geopolitical ambitions in the region would be much more profitable.

In the light of these factors, the unifying proposals of the DPRK on establishment of a non-aligned neutral state in Korea look, from the point of view...
of Russia’s security, more attractive than the bias of certain circles in Seoul against the U.S. military presence even after unification of Korea.

Conclusion

Russia is vitally interested in peace on the Korean Peninsula and normalization of inter-Korean relations, and not only for security reasons. The fact is that the tension in Korea has become a major obstacle to implementation of multilateral projects, which, in addition to their economic value, have increasingly important political dimensions. Their practical implementation not only would open new possibilities for business cooperation and economic integration in the Eurasian continent but also would contribute to confidence-building, peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.8

During the November 2013 visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Seoul, the signing of 13 Memoranda of Understanding, including involvement of a number of South Korean companies in the creation of a transport corridor between Asia and Europe, was a logical continuation of Russia’s consistent efforts in establishing multilateral economic cooperation in the region, including inter-Korean. In February 2014, a group of representatives from a number of interested ROK companies visited the sites of joint Russian–North Korean projects for the prospect of joining in, in accordance with documents signed in Seoul in November 2013.9

Given the increased activity of Russia and China in the DPRK, opportunities of third countries to invest in the Kaesong Industrial Region, as well as considering the plans of China and South Korea to create a new silk route from Asia to Europe, there is reason to talk about the prospects of establishing in Northeast Asia a zone of multilateral economic cooperation between Russia, China and the two Koreas. Only through such cooperation will it be possible and practical to start the process of confidence-building between Pyongyang and Seoul, the need for which is so much speculated about by the Park Geun-hye administration.

In a situation of the near stagnation of the six-party talks, the attempt to postpone implementation of these projects under the pretext of unresolved nuclear issues is not justified. Probably in this way it would be possible to positively influence the position of the DPRK concerning the nuclear issue. By the way, the prominent representative of the U.S. foreign policy establishment Stephen W. Bosworth, among others, speaks in favor of this approach.10

By its practical acts Russia is demonstrating that it is fully committed to promote trust, uphold the principles of peaceful coexistence and establish stable
and comprehensive cooperation between the DPRK and the ROK, which will lead to peace and tranquility on the Korean Peninsula.

In this regard, some analysts’ striving to enroll all of Korea’s neighbors, including Russia, among the opponents to its unification, is nothing more than an attempt to mask the selfish interests of a number of countries that consider the peninsula as a pawn in their geopolitical ambitions. In terms of security and economic reasons Russia undoubtedly would gain from the reconciliation of the two Koreas and cooperation between them.

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Session II: Toward a Roadmap for Peaceful Unification of the Korean Peninsula: From Conflict to Dialogue and Trust
Toward Dialogue, Development and Peace on the Korean Peninsula: The Significance of Track II Diplomacy and Civil Society Institutions

Dr. Thomas G. Walsh
President, Universal Peace Federation

As we convene here in Vladivostok, we recognize that our world faces a wide range of threats and opportunities. Some people compare our current time to the situation in Europe 100 years ago, on the eve of World War I. In particular, the recent developments in both Northeast Asia and in Ukraine and Crimea have captured the world’s attention, and many fear a return to a new Cold-War era. We all hope it will not lead to a “hot war.”

In the Middle East there seem to be no prospects for progress toward a two-state solution in the Holy Land. The horror in Syria continues unabated. And Sunni and Shiite Muslims at times are fighting a jihad against one another. Iraq looks like a failed state. Meanwhile, the “Arab Spring” seemingly has become an Arab winter, especially after serious setbacks in Egypt.

Some 20 to 25 years ago, there were post-Cold-War discussions about “the end of history,” as voiced by Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 article “The End of History?” published in The National Interest. Fukuyama argued that the liberal, free market and democratic model had emerged from the Cold War as the only viable system of government, a system that eventually would be implemented by all nations. In an article in The Wall Street Journal as recent as June 7–8, 2014, Fukuyama commented on his “end of history” thesis, which was grounded in the German philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. While factoring in a contemporary “democratic recession” evidenced in setbacks for some liberal democracies, Fukuyama stated, “In the realm of ideas, moreover, liberal democracy still doesn’t have any real competitors.” He continued, “The only system out there that would appear to be at all competitive with liberal democracy is the so-called ‘China model,’ which mixes authoritarian government with a partially market-based economy and a high level of technocratic and technological competence. Yet, if asked to bet whether, 50 years from
now, the United States and Europe would look more like China politically or vice versa, I would pick the latter without hesitation.”

A few years after Fukuyama’s essay, the discussion took a more pessimistic turn toward the prospects for a new kind of Cold War, described as a coming “clash of civilizations,” a thesis articulated by Samuel Huntington in 1993 in an article in Foreign Affairs. Huntington had a less optimistic view of the future. While ideological struggle over political economic systems may have declined, a new struggle or clash was emerging centered on more basic human forms of association: ethnicity, religious identity and civilizational values. Huntington feared a growing clash among competing civilizational spheres—the West, China and the Islamic world—each with unique histories and identities, and each with some hegemonic aspirations.

Fukuyama’s thesis is compelling in that there has been a growth of democratic and free market institutions globally. In many respects the concept of “globalization” is linked to the rise of a transnational global economy, along with appreciation for relatively democratic global institutions such as the United Nations itself. However, on the global stage we witness two opposing trends: one leading toward universalism, globalization and what we may call cosmopolitanism, and the other leading toward nationalism, separatism and communitarianism.

Recent elections in Europe, where more nationalistic, anti-European Union sentiment is on the rise, and in India, where Narendra Modi, a staunch advocate for Hindu values, has become the prime minister, indicate a growing nationalism. Even the United Kingdom and Spain face challenging separatist movements. At the same time, regional unions are also on the rise, from the EU, ASEAN and the African Union to the recent efforts by Russian President Vladimir Putin to form a Eurasian Union.

Where does this lead? Are we destined toward increasing decentralization into various national, ethnic or sectarian enclaves, or toward increasing regionalization and globalization?

The Universal Peace Federation has been actively engaged in efforts to promote dialogue, cooperation and peace. For the past ten years it has actively carried out a series of programs to promote peace in the Middle East, with a focus on Israel and Palestine. In this same period UPF has convened more than 50 conferences and seminars, bringing together both Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Jews, Christians and Muslims, for dialogue.

UPF also gives special attention to Northeast Asia, with a focus on the Korean Peninsula, through our Northeast Asia Peace Initiative. Through this initiative UPF brings together principals from all sectors and national
backgrounds, convening programs and seminars aimed at building trust and confidence. Through dialogue, a path can be paved toward mutual understanding, respect and cooperation.

These same principles apply to the UPF conference series that seeks to promote better relations between the EU and Russia. A few years ago, at the urging of its late founder, Dr. Sun Myung Moon, UPF began a series of programs dedicated to promoting trust, confidence and cooperation between Europe and Eurasia. A series of conferences in Moscow, Vienna and Paris were carried out with this focus in mind. Following the November 2013 meeting in Paris, UPF planned to convene its next program in Kiev, but this has been postponed.

As an NGO in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, UPF cultivates cooperative relations with UN member states, centering on programs that promote interfaith dialogue, the peaceful reconciliation of disputes, strengthening of marriage and family, peace and security, and humanitarian service.

Where are we headed as a global community? Toward increasing clashes? Or toward an era of global peace?

The outcome depends, in large part, on the decisions we make as individuals and citizens.

**Reflections on European integration and its relevance to East Asia**

Both Europe and Northeast Asia are impacted by major powers. At the present time, the ideal of European integration faces both opportunities and threats. On the one hand, there are many win–win economic opportunities, if peaceful relations and stability are established both within the EU and in the relations between the EU and Russia. However, recent actions on the part of Russia are troubling, even if they are understandable. Whereas the nations of Europe no longer pose military threats to one another, there remains some uncertainty when it comes to Russia’s perceived national interests, and its own historical experience and memories, which differ significantly from those of most of Europe. Russian Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and Southern and Southwestern Europe, not to mention Anglo Europe, all have unique histories, national interests and civilizational characteristics.

In East Asia, at least for the U.S. and many of its East Asian allies, China represents an opportunity and a threat that has some parallels to Russia in the West. For example, in recent times China has grown not only economically but also militarily. It recently has asserted its intention to expand its sphere of
“national security interests” to include territory that overlaps with other sovereign states in the region. While there is reason to believe China is benevolent in its intentions, there are also historical reasons to be concerned. The economic power of China is growing, and military expenditures are escalating rapidly.

As is the case with Europe and Russia, the trade relations between China and countries such as Korea, Japan and Taiwan are considerable.

Despite the historical differences in terms of culture, geography and language, the nations of Europe have managed to transition from being mutual threats to being cooperative neighbors. In the process Europe not only gave birth to the Council of Europe, the Euro Zone, the Schengen group of nations, NATO and the EU, but also gave rise to much of what we know as the modern world, or modernity. In many respects the ideals of the League of Nations and the United Nations had their philosophical and even theological foundations in Europe. Factors both secular and spiritual contributed to this process, including Scholasticism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the rise of internationalism, and revolutions calling for human rights, equality and democratic government. Marxism itself is a European export.

Of course, many of the great ideals of Europe were awakened by experiences of horrific suffering and bitter cruelty and violence. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 arose after decades of unspeakable violence. The Council of Vienna in 1815 arose from decades of destructive power politics and war. The League of Nations followed World War I and the UN followed World War II.

Asia has a very different history. However, despite the differences, might Asia, and East Asia in particular, form the basis for a new council or “league of Asian and Pacific nations”? Could such a distinct and new council of nations be established, one that builds on the foundations and “best practices” of European integration? Is an “East Asian Union” or “Northeast Asian Union” possible? It seems to me that the nations of the six-party talks could take initiative in proposing a series of dialogues with the formation of an East Asian Forum or Council as its objective.

The obstacles are clear. Relations between the two Koreas, and between Korea and Japan, are at a significant low. Relations between China and Japan are also politically difficult, even if economic relations are growing stronger. South Korea and Japan are strong allies of the U.S. North Korea leans closer to China and Russia, while U.S. relations with the DPRK are deteriorating.
In this regard, I suggest that efforts to build stronger relations between the two Koreas, between Korea and Japan, and between Russia, Korea and Japan are extremely important. I believe UPF could be a civil society partner in the effort to promote dialogue, build trust and promote peace. Such a process could be enhanced by efforts to develop commerce and trade.

It was part of Dr. Moon’s vision to develop an international highway connecting the two Koreas, and a tunnel between Japan and Korea, as the basis for an international highway, rail and tunnel project around the world, including across the Bering Strait. Trade and commerce, despite the criticism they receive for being rooted in a “dismal science” and grounded in greed, self-interest and the promotion of inequality, are great peacebuilding institutions. In the history of European integration, guided by the ideals of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the development of the European Coal and Steel Community was a substantial first step that gave rise eventually to what we know as the EU.

Trade, commerce and prosperity provide great disincentives for conflict and war. These institutions are rooted in mutual trust, respect for contracts and agreements, and appreciation for win–win negotiations and win–win outcomes.

In addition to trade relations as a step toward peace, institutions that promote dialogue are equally important.

**Civil society**

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, human societies largely have been organized and governed by the state. The entire planet is organized according to nations or countries. A nation-state is constituted by territory, people and a sovereignty that is affirmed by a large majority of other nation-states. The United Nations has 194 member states, and the U.N. Charter acknowledges each as a sovereign state.

While the nation-state remains the primary structure of governing and securing populations, there are other significant social and extra-governmental forces at play in global affairs. These include religion, business, and civil society institutions or NGOs. These entities, each in their own way, often operate transnationally. Multinational corporations operate globally and may have headquarters in several locations around the world. Religions such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism are global or world religions with adherents and institutions in countries around the world. The same is true of non-governmental organizations or civil society institutions.
Religious resurgence and interfaith dialogue

One area in which dialogue has been effective in building better relations between peoples is religion.

Religion remains a significant force in the lives of billions of people around the world. In effect, religion impacts global affairs. The great German sociologist Max Weber saw Protestantism, specifically Calvinism, as the root of Northern Europe's development and the rise of modernity. Weber held that the way in which societies or civilizations explain justice theologically, as in theodicy, forms the basis of their views of the world. The doctrine of karma, for example, Weber argued, led to a kind of fatalism about life that was an inhibiting force relative to modernization and rationalization. Whether one accepts Weber's analysis of the social significance of specific religious doctrines, his thesis that religious ideas have social consequences seems incontrovertible.

The Weber thesis has wide relevance in our current era, given that one of the most significant developments of recent decades has been religious resurgence. While, on the one hand, this development has included the rise of various forms of religious extremism and fundamentalism, it has been accompanied by a movement to promote interfaith dialogue and understanding.

The Cold War was very much a period in which ideology was centered on the position one took on political economy and the distribution of wealth. Geopolitical tensions were related to debates about socialism versus capitalism, or more liberal, free societies versus more state-organized or state-controlled societies. Religion was relegated to the private sphere, not only by the communist countries but also to some extent by the liberal democracies. Religion was viewed largely as a private affair. The concepts of separation of church and state or secularization were dominant.

In the post-Cold War era we have witnessed a global resurgence of religion and the religious factor in world affairs. The shocking experience of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, had a religious dimension to it. Of course, we all recognize the twisted and distorted thinking of terrorists, but there was some aspect of that senseless act that related to the religious, cultural, civilizational differences between people—in this case, Islam and the West—differences that are rooted in religious ideas, even if those ideas have been distorted.

Consider Mindanao in the Philippines. It's an area where religious differences, cultural differences as well as political and economic factors are very, very relevant to understanding what's going on. A comprehensive analysis
cannot exclude religion, alongside other factors related to politics, economics, history and culture. From a social-science point of view or a political-science point of view, religion is increasingly relevant and significant.

When you look at politics in India, the parties that always have been strong usually have been from the lineage of Mahatma Gandhi. He was deeply rooted in a religious worldview. The main party emerging at this time, the BJP, is guided by the Hindutva philosophy, or a Hindu nationalist idealism rooted in Hindu thought. Religion is clearly a factor. It's not the only factor, but it is a factor in world affairs.

Consider the Arab Spring and in particular the disaster in Syria. Like Iraq, Syria is characterized by sectarian divisions among Sunni, Shia, Druze and Alawite; then there are the Christian divisions between Orthodox, Catholic, Maronite, etc., that are very relevant to the political landscape.

This is being noted increasingly by political scientists. In the field of international relations, where religion usually was not discussed, it now is becoming part of the core curriculum. The founder of the International Institute for Religion and Diplomacy, Dr. Douglas Johnston, published Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft. Jimmy Carter wrote the introduction. And former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright came out with a book called The Mighty and the Almighty, talking about faith, politics and the United States of America. She strongly advocated for greater religious literacy among both academicians and government officials.

Such a shift does not mean that we each are called to become religious or join a religion or change our religion. That’s not the issue. Rather the point is to look at the world as it is, to see things as they happen in the real world. In so doing, we come to see very objectively that religion is a very, very strong force in the world. If we are going to understand the crisis in Syria, we cannot understand it just geopolitically. We also must consider the religious factor, the ethnicity factor and the cultural factor.

This reality has come out very strongly in the former Yugoslavia, after the coming apart of the USSR. Each of the nations that emerged—Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Kosovo—generally was formed in accordance with religious and ethnic identities. Religion often is transmitted through the family line. It is not widespread that people leave the religion of their birth; thus, ethnicity and religion often are very much tied together. So people identify with ethnicity—as Serbians, or as Kosovars. These identities have dimensions that underscore who we are culturally, civilizationally and religiously.
This is impacting the United Nations. UPF’s founder, Dr. Sun Myung Moon, proposed in an address at the United Nations in 2000 that the U.N. needs to appreciate more the significance of religion and should create an interfaith council within its system. He could see the emerging problem of the 21st century, namely, that geopolitics are becoming even more complicated as the religious sphere, the civil society sphere and the sovereign nation-state sphere all are engaged actively on the world stage. It is no longer just a game played by the nation-states. Today there are many non-state actors, such as religion and civil society, actors that governments cannot control and which cannot be ignored.

For this reason, religious literacy among political scientists is increasingly important. At the same time, mutually respectful interfaith understanding among believers is equally, if not more, important.

**Dialogue among nations**

There is much misunderstanding between and among the nations involved in the affairs of Northeast Asia: China, Japan, DPRK and ROK, the U.S. and Russia. We must understand one another, not only geopolitically but at a deeper level. That is why dialogue is so important. A variety of institutions have emerged that underscore dialogue, mutual understanding and mutual respect. One, which had its origins in Iran as a response to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis, is known as the World Public Forum: Dialogue of Civilizations. Russia’s Dr. Vladimir Yakunin is its founding president and Austria’s Dr. Walter Schwimmer, former secretary general of the Council of Europe, is the head of its International Coordinating Committee. The organization, with dual headquarters in Vienna and Moscow, is dedicated to promoting dialogue among peoples to serve the ideal of peace. The United Nations has its own Alliance of Civilizations program, led by the High Representative Ambassador Nassir Al-Nasser, former president of the U.N. General Assembly.

In the area of interfaith relations, there are multiple organizations that promote dialogue, mutual respect and cooperation. These include Religions for Peace, World Congress of Faiths, the Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions, and the Universal Peace Federation.

“Dialogue among civilizations” is critical at this time. Thus we must seek to understand the heart and the soul of nations and values and people. Another aspect of the paradigm shift that I think Dr. Moon identified is the need for dialogue to replace conflict-oriented dialectics. Conflict and struggle must be resolved through respectful, confidence-building and constructive dialogue.
The way to peace is through a dialogical process. That was the message Dr. Moon took to Kim Il Sung in 1991, and to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990.

By promoting dialogue among the nations, among the governments, among the people, we can move toward peace. The dialogue should not take place merely between governments; “track 2” dialogue is needed—between peoples, between women, between the youth, as well as among artists and athletes, students and academics.

As we work for peace in Northeast Asia, we should give needed attention to this broad dialogue that includes not only the representatives of governments and “track 1” diplomacy, but also people in all the richness of their identities and worldviews, including culture, religion and ethnicity.

UPF is committed to supporting this effort in an ongoing way, for the sake of peace in Northeast Asia.

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1 Hegel had interpreted Napoleon’s military victory over Prussian forces at Jena as evidence of the dominance of the post-1789 French Revolution state over other systems, thus bringing about the “end of history,” that is, an end to the question as to where history was heading and which system would prevail.
3 The term “clash of civilizations” originally was coined by Bernard Lewis, a Princeton scholar of Islam.
Perspectives on the Situation in North Korea

Dr. Valery Y. Mishin

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Events in the Euro-Atlantic region have overshadowed the situation on the Korean Peninsula to some extent, especially in the North. However, this does not mean that the current and future situation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has escaped scrutiny by the international community and, above all, the main regional actors. On the contrary, even minor fluctuations in North Korea’s military-political situation can cause a sharp reaction in the United States, Republic of Korea, China and Japan, and influence their political and military-defensive balance.

Information available to us from the North is usually fragmented, inconsistent, sparse and sometimes outright false. Even the most sophisticated political analysts in Washington, Beijing and Seoul have given up trying to make reliable predictions about the DPRK, knowing that their estimates may lead to missteps on the part of higher levels of government. Russian experts also present various estimates and opinions and sometimes offer diametrically opposite approaches to solving the Korean problem.

The contradictory and unstable level of information, as well as the different geopolitical and national aspirations of each of the regional actors, have led to various approaches. The goal is clearly one: to make Pyongyang abandon its nuclear program and start demilitarization, but the approaches are different. South Korea’s abandonment of the Sunshine Policy and the implementation of “creative pragmatism” as the basis for relations with the DPRK have negatively affected inter-Korean dialogue. Bilateral relations have dropped to the level of the early 1990s. North and South are trying to build a consensus, but all the time there remain reasons for mistrust and confrontation.

The current U.S. political and academic elites demonstrate their approaches to the functioning of the North Korean regime and security on the peninsula. It’s hard to guess whether Washington will refrain from directly interfering in the affairs of Pyongyang, but it definitely will continue to support Seoul in the context of preventing war and minimizing damage from Pyongyang’s potential provocations.
Although Japan continues to build bilateral relations with the DPRK on the basis of the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration, it considers the abduction of its citizens by North Korean secret services to be the principal obstacle. Bilateral meetings last April have shown that in the long term Japan will not shut its door to North Korea, but instead will try to show a balanced approach.

Official Beijing is actively trying to resume the six-party talks, but in recent years it has shifted away from being the main supporter of the DPRK. In the future China will objectively face the limited possibilities for resuming negotiations, as a result of the sanctions and other restrictive measures that the United States and its satellites have imposed on Russia.

Russia’s participation in the problems of the Korean Peninsula is very limited. However, based on the fact that North Korea was the only country at the United Nations to support Russia’s position in regard to Ukraine, Moscow should use its relationship with Pyongyang to persuade North Korea to end its isolation.

Returning to the subject of the report, we find that overall the current situation on the Korean Peninsula is fragile and dynamic.

What is the situation in the North as of the beginning of 2014? Various recent events include the unprecedented outdoor media coverage of Jang Song Taek’s repression and the purges in the ruling Workers Party of Korea; the first “live” New Year’s message delivered by Kim Jong Un to the people and nation in many years; an appeal to the South to stop its hostile ideological confrontation; proposals to reduce the confrontation; a search by the DPRK leadership for new ways to intensify and modernize economics without entirely scrapping the current system—at first glance would seem like the beginning of “glasnost and perestroika,” North Korean style. But how true is this assumption? In retrospect, Kim Jong Un’s activities on the domestic and foreign scene after his father’s death suggest that he has been building his own “Byzantine games.” This is especially evident in his vision of inter-Korean relations and the position of the United States, as well as his attitude to the old military-party cadres inside the country.

What if he has taken a sharp start and is overestimating his potential and the dedication of his colleagues and the entire nation? Here we are talking about the North Korean mentality. People from generation to generation have been brought up to have a deep and unconditional veneration of old party members and the military, especially those who were associates of past leaders.

Apparently the new DPRK leadership is using the trends of the current political situation pragmatically, questionably and skillfully and is not worried about the consequences of its actions.
To realize his goals and objectives, Kim Jong Un has chosen the right moment: For many years in a row, the North has had good harvests. At the very least, the people will be fed, and their leader will receive the credit.

This clearly shows that Kim Jong Un and his team have diversified their tactics in manipulating the consciousness of the nation. Instead of the old appeals that were used ad nauseam, a cunning new plan to engage the South in negotiations about stopping mutual hostile activity has appeared, deliberately calculating that Seoul will disbelieve this venture and leave it unanswered. All that has happened in reality. That is what Pyongyang desired. The nation and the world community were shown that the South is still hostile toward the North and continues moving in this direction; consequently, international sanctions are untenable. The South and the United States have one and the same desire: to destroy the DPRK; thus the North Korean leadership has a free hand and feels justified in augmenting its nuclear deterrent.

We believe that the novelty of the North’s new tactics is based on the particular personality and ambitions of the new head. Kim Jong Un, leader of the new way of thinking, is a political player prone to extraordinary moves. However, he does not deserve to be demonized, because despite these qualities, he is essentially a son of his parents and a product of the existing system.

On the opposite side of the barricades is the new South Korean president, Park Geun-hye. Ms. Park is a worthy national leader and an experienced politician. Just like the head of the North, she is a child of her father, a former South Korean president, and thus has imbibed the appropriate mindset and mannerisms.

Are the two leaders of the one artificially divided nation, at such points of contact, able to solve, in the common mother tongue, the problems that have been accumulated over the years?

You can play the Korean solitaire as many times as you wish, but there will be no answer to this and many other issues of inter-Korean relations.

But the relentless confrontation, mistrust and sometimes hatred cause us concern that one of the sides of the 38th parallel may lose patience and take (according to the same Kim Jong Un) proactive measures for “peace enforcement.” Both the North and South have arms and troops in store. Use of existing arsenals of both sides in the form of a local conflict might lead to irreparable loss to the armed forces and the infrastructure of the two states, but the main problem will not disappear. Moreover, the worst outcome of the confrontation might be numerous civilian casualties.

However, any inter-Korean war would take on a completely different character if the United States and China, which are bound to the two sides by
contractual obligations to provide mutual military assistance, were to become involved. Both Washington and Beijing are desperately unwilling to get involved in an armed conflict, because right after the first loss between the two sides North Korea would be forgotten but Northeast Asia would turn into a huge flaming torch when the two most powerful nations start fighting each other, relegating the Korean problem to second place.

Another solution to the problem should be considered: In the near future, Washington and Beijing could begin a dialogue on how to avoid involvement in any war between North and South. If the two sides could agree, they obviously would choose the lesser of two evils, namely developing their own model for unification of Korea without the direct involvement of the DPRK, implying the non-violent removal of the main representatives of the North Korean dynastic clan—although Seoul and Pyongyang would be unlikely to accept this kind of action.

Summing up the current situation, we predict that in the foreseeable future, positive developments are not to be expected in the inter-Korean dialogue and in the DPRK’s attitude to international appeals concerning denuclearization:

- Due to the lack of measures of bilateral trust, the state of confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK will continue in the medium term, despite appeals on both sides to find a compromise. Moreover, taking into account the military component of both sides, there is a real probability of war on the Korean Peninsula, which could be realized at any time without visible preparations or special occasions.
- All deliberations and statements about the unpredictability of the North Korean leadership should be recognized as invalid. Everything is quite clear and understandable: Until the basic stimuli (ideological attacks, the presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula, etc.) are eliminated, neither Kim Jong Un nor his team will give up their nuclear ambitions. The ineffectiveness of international sanctions will only increase the proud self-consciousness of the DPRK population.
- We must recognize the new leader of the DPRK as a political player, prone to drastic and unconventional measures in terms of Korean psychology. On the one hand, he understands the need for change; on the other hand, he remains a rigid dictator without a hint of democracy. In the domestic political aspect, the execution of Jang Song Taek and other old party members was the first step. Political purges of individuals who do not fit into Kim Jong Un’s model of military-political and party cadres can expand from the center to the provinces and districts, but at the moment it is not possible to predict the ef-
fects and responses to repressive measures on the part of the North Korean community.

Conclusion

North Korea is a slowly transforming but still autocratic crony regime with a high level of repressiveness, which for the sake of “saving face” is ready to sacrifice its people. The situation on the peninsula already has gone beyond the narrow national problem; it hourly keeps in suspense not only regional actors but also the world community. The solution to the Korean problem depends entirely on relationships between North and South and on the positive political will of their leaders. Other regional partners need to have patience and tact, while focusing their efforts on North Korea in terms of releasing it from isolation and involving it in integration processes and certainly non-violently encouraging it to reject its nuclear blackmail.

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Proposal to Establish a Tumen River International Economic Cooperative Free Trade Zone as a Regional Cooperation Project to Promote Northeast Asia Security

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The political factors and environments affecting the security of Northeast Asia are hard to break through in a short time under current conditions. For example, the issue of North Korean denuclearization, the tensions between North and South Korea, the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the dispute between Russia and Japan over the Kuril Islands, the rise of China and the United States’ pivot back to Asia, the differing interpretations of World War II, Chinese and Korean anger about Japanese leaders visiting war shrines, etc.

We need to work on basic practical details to gradually improve the political condition. What I mean mainly is to aggressively promote cooperation in economic and cultural exchange in the Northeast Asia region.

The new trade agreement between China, Japan and Korea will be hard to break through in the short term. Promoting regional cooperation would be an effective method, benefiting not only national economies but also exchange and cooperation in various aspects. For example, it would reduce misunderstanding, enhance mutual trust and help to build peaceful relations and harmonious cooperation among different cultures, political systems and nations. The bilateral regional cooperation in the Northeast region should be developed more widely and deeply, for example, between China and Russia, China and North Korea, China and South Korea, China and Japan, Russia and North Korea, Russia and Japan, North and South Korea, North Korea and Japan, etc.

It is better for bilateral regional cooperation to invite a third nation to participate as well. It would help to enhance stability and development. Take the Korea Kaesong Industrial zone as an example; if it could bring in the invest-
ment of a third nation, I believe that the region would be more stable and developed in many different aspects.

I would like to suggest that a Chinese–Japanese special cooperation development zone be established in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as well, in order to work together for peaceful development. Once China and Japan reach an agreement, then a third nation—for example, the United States, South Korea or Russia—could be invited to join in.

I also suggest that Russia and Japan establish a special economic zone in the Kuril Islands to solve their dispute.

Other controversial regions in Northeast Asia also should establish special cooperative economic zones to ease tensions and promote exchange and cooperation. Furthermore, I suggest to that a fund to promote Northeast Asia Regional Cooperation be established, in a way that the private sector and government will work together more easily to enhance effective cooperation.

What I really mean is to promote the model of multi-regional cooperation. I could take a development zone surrounding the Tumen River—which forms a border between North Korea and China and between North Korea and Russia—as another example:

Twenty years have passed since research began on how to develop a Tumen River development zone. After so many years of outreach and discussion, some progress has been made, but no substantial breakthrough. China invested a great amount of effort to revive Northeast China and also Northeast Asia as areas of strategic concern; yet little result was produced. Although every stakeholder thinks it is necessary to cooperate together for the future, due to different political, economic and military concerns, enthusiasm and support have been lacking in this Northeast Asia region. In order to promote international cooperation and development of the Tumen River region, the new idea would have to stand on the current trend of economic globalization.

In the last 20 years, China has worked hard to strengthen its domestic economy, while during the same period the international situation has seen tremendous changes. The development of technology such as electronic communication has enabled the world economy to break through national boundaries, gradually creating economic globalization. The confrontation between the two political superpowers disappeared, the Cold War ended, the political obstacles to economic globalization were removed and the formation of a globalization market has been pushing forward. While we are still discussing and hesitating about cooperation in Northeast Asia, the globalization of the world economy has been moving at an unprecedented speed, depth and scope; fundamental changes have occurred in global politics, economy,
technology, society, culture and our living environment and religious faith. These changes interacted and interrelated to stimulate greatly the integration of the global economy and generate a great impact on every district, nation and family. The trend of economic globalization has become the reality. Our only choice is to have a deeper and more accurate understanding of globalization and to be fully prepared for it in order to avoid loss and pursue benefit, taking advantage of globalization to develop our own economy.

The phenomenon of economic globalization appeared when the global economy developed to a higher stage. When technology and productivity develop to a higher level, national barriers stop the free circulation of production factors. More severe competition in the global economy demands that people use global resources more efficiently, in order to greatly reduce production costs and meet challenges. This requires the breakdown of national barriers and district restrictions, further relocating the production factors on a global scale, causing economic development to enter into a more advanced stage.

In the economic globalization stage, when the production rate, commodity trade and capital exports are doubling, the direct investment, international mergers, service trading, technology transfer, information sharing and people exchange would develop rapidly. With horizontal international divisions as a foundation, the development of the world market economy is formed. Borders among nations diminish, and channels or business links between each nation increase. Such linkage is mutually integrating, mutually penetrating, mutually affecting the transnational global economy and global banking; the non-state economic actor becomes the major economic form.

Facing economic globalization, each nation needs to renew its thinking toward cooperation in the Northeast Asia region, utilizing the geographic advantage in the area of the Tumen River, establishing a new framework for Pan-Tumen River District cooperation, catching up to the development pace of the world.

A Pan-Tumen River District would link the development of the Tumen River with that of Northeast Asia. Such an idea would be in accordance with the current trend of global economic integration. The central locations of the river district would be China’s Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, especially the cities of Tumen and Hunchun.

From this point, the western side, via highway and railroad, could link to the eastern part of Mongolia; the eastern side, via railway, could reach Heilongjiang Province and the Suifen River and link to the city of Dalian in Liaoning Province; a Chinese–Korean railroad could link to the Rason Special Economic Zone and the port of Chongjin, North Korea’s third-largest city. Through the ten ports along the coasts of Russia and North Korea one
could reach the South Korean cities of Sokcho and the port of Busan and link to the cities of Niigata and Akita on the west coast of Japan.

From Dalian in Northeast China to Japan, takes more than 400 nautical miles, which could reduce the route by half or two thirds. Yanji Airport, which has the capacity for large airplanes to land and take off, would be another link to this region. If the undersea communications cable could be laid, the superiority of each nation’s resources in this district would be demonstrated. The capital and technology of Japan and South Korea, the natural resources of Russia, Mongolia and North Korea (oil, coal, mining and wood), China’s strongest manufacturing foundation, skilled labor and large consumer market would enable the complementarity of each nation’s resources and cooperation for surplus to become reality.

The specific idea is to set aside land from the cities of Hunchun and Tumen in China, the Khasan economic zone on Russia’s border, and North Korea’s Rason Special Economic Zone to construct an international cooperative free trade zone. In this zone there would be an independent duty-free port, trade, processing zone and logistics center. Three nations would manage and operate this cooperative development zone together, allowing free passage and mutual free tariffs. It could be called an international special zone. If such cooperation is still premature, it could start from two nations and expand later.

Such thinking would break out of the model of separate investment and small-scale trading and would move toward a model of multinational cooperation in line with the trend of economic globalization. It would allow the movement of various resources with the lowest cost and efficient integration.

During this process, Tumen, the central point of circulation of materials, capital, information and human resources, would develop greatly.

How was Hong Kong developed in the 1950s? At that time, China was being punished by the United States and Hong Kong was the only place that was allowed to engage in foreign trade; therefore, the logistics and export processing industry developed rapidly and enabled the development of the financial sector. Hong Kong became the transportation and financial center of Asia. Will the Tumen River zone become the Hong Kong of the North? It all depends on our common effort.

Once the Tumen River zone opens, it will provide opportunity for development in China’s Northeast, the economic revival of the Russian Far East and the success of the North Korean economic plan. This regional development will stimulate the development of the western part of Japan and east coast of South Korea, and some industries in Japan and South Korea will move to this
region as well. Mongolian resources can be accessed through the gateway of this region and go to the nations of Northeast Asia. Through such a model the cooperating nations can maximize the absorption of various resources with the lowest cost, develop their own economies and at the same time benefit the common welfare and overall development in this region.

Currently the international mega-trend is good for international cooperation in the Tumen River zone. So far, international peace and friendship are replacing regional confrontation, and cooperation for common wealth is replacing Cold-War confrontation. The international environment around the Sea of Japan has changed greatly, and especially the six-party talks have brought great advancement. Overall, the relationships between the United States and North Korea and between North Korea and South Korea have seen great improvement. In particular, Russia in recent years has changed its thinking about the development of its Far East region. On September 23, 2009, China and Russia approved the Guideline of the Cooperation Plan between the People’s Republic of China Northeast Region and Russia’s Far East and Siberia (2009–2018). President Vladimir Putin expressed that “Russia wants to aggressively readjust the cooperative relationship allowing China and Russia to integrate their technology and production power.” Last year both nations reached a consensus of cooperation between the Yangtze River and the Volga River, establishing a bilateral regional cooperation working team. Today we should take a stand on the position of globalization to analyze and design the issues related to the development of the Tumen River zone. Let us work together to open up a new chapter of international economic cooperation in the Tumen River region.

Mr. Ge Zhili is a member of the advisory board of the Committee for Industrial Reform and Business Development of the Chinese Society for Economic Reform. Born in 1958, he graduated from the Institute of Foreign Languages; he was lecturer at the China Central University of National Minorities (1986), professor at the Far Eastern branch of the Moscow Commercial Institute (1999); organizer, designer, and chief presiding person of the first historical conference on “Coordination and Information Support in Asia and Their Functions in the Field of Security Guarantees” (2002). In 1995, he was the only Chinese who has ever been appointed advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia for trade and economy in the countries of Southeast Asia. He was an observer at the referendum in the Crimea (2014).
Session III:
Peace in Northeast Asia: The Significance of China, Russia, Japan and the US
A Grand Vision of the Future of Northeast Asia

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On April 3, 2014, the Universal Peace Federation of Japan held a forum in Tokyo. A keynote speaker was Dr. Walter Schwimmer, the former secretary general of the Council of Europe and an Austrian politician. He made a great speech about the European Dream. I would like to tell you about the beginning of his speech.

He started by paying tribute to a brave Japanese woman, Mitsuko Aoyama, who married an Austrian diplomat and nobleman, Heinrich von Coudenhove-Calergi, in 1893. It was the first official international marriage of a Japanese woman. She became the mother of Richard von Coundenhove-Calergi, who transferred the thousand-year-old European dream of peace through unity into a Pan-European vision of unification.

It was a few years after the end of World War I when Count Richard von Coudenhove-Calergi published his book *Pan-Europa* and founded the International Paneuropean Union in 1923. Today both events are seen commonly as European movements. Therefore, he is called “the father of Europe.”

**Collapse of mutual trust between the United States and Russia**

However, with the Ukraine crisis, several questions are being raised, not only about Russia but also about the West. The Ukraine crisis will be the largest crisis and trial for both the West and the East since the end of the Cold War.

There are concerns about a collapse of mutual trust between the United States and Russia, between the United States and the European Union, and inside the European Union. Even during the Cold War, there was mutual trust between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which was protected by several secure structures and systems. Today, however, we cannot find any such structure and systems between the U.S. and Russia.

On April 17, the four parties announced an agreement on Ukraine at Geneva; however, President Barack Obama suddenly said that it would be doubtful that Russia would keep the agreement. That is not right in politics. It is not normal relations.
The European Union is facing a big test and challenge with the Ukraine crisis, just after getting over last year’s economic crisis.

Western sanctions of Russia will end soon, but the collapse of mutual trust seriously damages relations between each government. And it will take decades to restore their relations of mutual trust.

**Risk in Northeast Asia**

In Northeast Asia today there is no comprehensive system for maintaining security, even though there are several factors that may put the region’s stability and prosperity at risk.

In Japan there is a discussion on the right of collective self-defense. The right itself is acknowledged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations as providing “for the right of countries to engage in self-defense, including collective self-defense against an armed attack.”

I believe Japanese collective self-defense must be restricted within the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and UN activities. Nevertheless, there are serious concerns about the expansion of that right in the current Japanese discussion, because of the possibility of using that right in the future to form a puppet government similar to the Manchukuo regime of 80 years ago.

China also has several risks to its economy, regime, armaments expansion, human rights, pollution, energy, and so on. In particular, there are risks in the South China Sea and the East China Sea that also will damage China.

**Why are there so many risks in the region?**

It looks like each country is stuck in the ancient past. Their way of life, economy and industry have changed dramatically under the influence of free-market capitalism, but their mind, philosophy and way of thinking have not changed much. They might be confused between modern life and the old thinking. The greatest risk might come from such confusion, in which each country in the region is floundering desperately.

Each of them is expecting to change the others, especially in the relations between Japan, China and the Koreas, even between the United States and Russia, and between the U.S. and China.

However, those are just expectations. Often a government uses power politics as a means of changing others’ behaviors. However, they will never...
change fundamentally. People cannot change their character so quickly and easily. Moreover, they are afraid to change their behaviors too.

In the region currently there is no structure for mutual trust.

What was the Cold War? It was to maintain security between the West and the East based on some mutual trust. Otherwise, it would have been easy to start a real war.

Trust and distrust are like peace and war. It is easy to distrust others, and it is easier to start a war than to establish peace and stability. We need patience and effort in order to develop mutual trust and peace.

Quite often we make profound mistakes in analyzing others. We analyze others negatively and pessimistically, or we assess them with our own cultural assumptions.

A colleague of mine from the United States says that American analysts have always tried to use their own cultural assumptions to assess others, and have always failed.

Japanese and Koreans are influenced much by American ways; often it looks as though they are trying to be American. But they should know this is impossible. Japanese and Koreans believe they have to change their management, social system, education, and other systems to be same as the American system. Maybe the Chinese do, too. However, it will not work properly, since their minds have never changed.

Even so, there was an American model that we were able to see and feel. And it was a goal to their modernization.

A grand vision

Here I would like to propose a grand vision of Northeast Asia in the future. A grand vision means not simply solving a single current issue but drawing a vision with grand wisdom. It might take decades or centuries to realize a grand vision, but we have to hand over a vision to our next generations. I would like to present you with some images of a grand vision, using three examples.

- A grand vision would include the oceans, which cover over 70 percent of the earth’s surface. Oceans should be the common property of all humankind and future generations. Development of the ocean, including natural resources and fisheries, will be the major issue for the survival of humankind, taking into account climate change, natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis, and the rising sea lev-
Therefore, profit from development of the ocean should be shared globally through the United Nations or other international organizations as a kind of tax to be used for global security. The UN and other international organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, could have their own independent income, which would be huge and could help their significant activities, including United Nations Forces, to exist more independently. The Northeast Asia region could take the initiative to develop a new dimension of the world with this vision.

- The earth’s environment, including the oceans, also will be important. Airplanes and vessels create pollutants. They should pay some tax to the UN for the purpose of protecting the environment and ecosystem of the ocean.
- In particular, territorial conflicts, including those in the South China Sea, are destroying the stability of the region. We have to get rid of the old abuses.

I would like to propose that the grand vision include the following:

- The parties concerned, including a state, should agree that the conflict area, sea and islands, are the common property of the parties.
- The parties should agree to abandon their sovereignty over the territory.
- That territory would be administered by an organization to be formed with participation of the UN and the parties’ representatives.
- The organization should have responsibility for protecting the security, environment, natural resources and ecosystem of the area, and should make comprehensive rules concerning them.
- The organization should have functions for judicature, the right to punish, and investigation of the rules to be kept.
- The parties would have priority for developing natural resources and fisheries in the area.
- The parties should pay to the organization some tax on development of resources and fisheries.
- Non-members of the parties should follow the rules and pay non-member admittance fees and taxes to the organization.
- The parties would have freedom of the seas in the exclusive zone of the area.
- The organization would establish research institutes for ocean development, fisheries, ecosystem, environment, natural disasters, and so on. Further, those research institutes should be open to scientists and researchers from all over the world.
The first experimental period would be for 100 years.

The establishment of a Northeast Economic Zone for sharing interests, functions, business, technology, and education with each other. The zone would cover Russia, Mongolia, China, North and South Koreas, Japan, the United States and Taiwan. The Northeast Economic Zone would lead free and fair trade, no current exchange rates; this would mean a fixed rate system, sharing rules and so on.

Sharing energy. For example, it would be possible to develop an electric grid network around Russia, North and South Korea, Japan and China.

There are many more ideas to include in the vision. If there were no prospect for the future, people, including North Koreans, would be afraid to change their behavior. However, if we could share a well-designed vision of the future, each would be able to find what they should do.

It would be helpful for developing trusting relations in the region. It would not be so easy for sharing a sense of the value of each other. It would be difficult to develop mutual understanding. However, one can learn much about European experiences without creating the European Union.

I hope you will challenge a historical grand experiment and a grand vision of the future for developing the security and stability of the region and the world.

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Nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula still seem to be in a stalemate in spite of continuous efforts by China, the United States, South Korea and other related countries. North Korea’s unpredictability has caused great concern among neighboring countries. The six-party talks, which seemed to be the only potentially effective multilateral mechanism, have been practically suspended for several years. Although China has made great efforts to try to resume the talks, disputes between China and the United States over preconditions for the resumption of the talks substantively have created serious barriers to their resumption.

Despite this situation, the six-party talks still have been generally effective in dealing with this complicated issue in that they are the only practical platform for negotiation that can be accepted by all sides. The current political atmosphere doesn’t support high-level bilateral dialogues between the United States and the DPRK, and South Korea and North Korea on denuclearization issues. The de facto function of the six-party talks is to provide the platform for these bilateral negotiations under the disguise of a multilateral mechanism. The crux of the problem is that the ROK, the DPRK and the United States seem to lie on the same bed with different dreams. Each holds its own ambition in the talks. China’s role is to bridge these gaps, which will facilitate the resumption of the six-party talks. At the same time, due to the DPRK’s unpredictability both in its internal politics and its external behavior, China, the ROK and the United States should prepare for unexpected scenarios in the DPRK and make contingency plans. Under-the-table conversations among China, the United States and the ROK have been necessary. I will explain them as follows.

For the United States, the six-party talks are deemed as the mechanism to achieve denuclearization of the DPRK with no other goals. According to the United States, the DPRK must show a sincere attitude and take substantive actions toward denuclearization before it returns to the six-party talks. Policy-makers in the United States have no intention to make it a mechanism to reward the DPRK, or to manage the DPRK’s possible provocations. Denuclearization should be the only topic in the talks, and the DPRK should take some actions, before rather than after the negotiations, to show its
Zhuang Jianzhong

seriousness toward the six-party talks. The United States no longer trusts the DPRK after Pyongyang unilaterally broke the “Leap Day” Agreement in 2012. Mutual mistrust between the United States and the DPRK is at its peak.

South Korea intends to take advantage of the six-party talks to maintain regular contact with the DPRK on a whole range of issues, including economic integration and even final reunification, etc. The South Koreans perceive themselves and the DPRK to be the core components of the six-party talks, and feel that the main goal of this mechanism is to deal with inter-Korean relations, while denuclearization is one critical part of the talks. The ROK expects the DPRK to take it seriously and hopes that the DPRK is willing to make compromises on certain issues.

For the DPRK, the six-party talks have been used to deal with DPRK–U.S. bilateral relations. The talks are especially about the termination of official antagonism between these two countries. According to the DPRK, the United States and the DPRK should be the core components of the six-party talks. The DPRK is eager to be recognized as a nuclear power with normal diplomatic relations with the United States. It is impossible that the DPRK will suspend, much less terminate, its nuclear and missile projects. The North Koreans’ intention is to push the international community to accept the fait accompli that they already possess nuclear weapons.

What China pays most attention to is the resumption of the six-party talks. According to China, the absence of the six-party talks leads to the lack of momentum to improve the situation. China’s position is that as long as the six-party talks resume, it is possible that each side may make some compromises. The six-party talks may not lead to breakthroughs, but there will be no improvements without the six-party talks. That is, the six-party talks at least create some possibilities. China supports the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the improvement of U.S.–DPRK relations, but China also completely understands the deep mistrusts among related countries. What China has been doing is to try to find a way to accommodate all sides to resume the talks, while there also exist possibilities that China may bring about breakthroughs. The central part of it should be closer cooperation between China and the ROK.

Since Park Geun-hye took power as president of the ROK, she has taken a pragmatic path in dealing with the DPRK. Her DPRK strategies consist of two parts: realignment and “trust politics.” President Park isn’t giving up on the ultimate goal of the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, but she seems to be very patient and ready to take gradual steps. She greatly favors the China–Taiwan model and expects to apply it to the Korean Peninsula to some extent. That is, President Park expects to engage the DPRK through eco-
nomic cooperation, or even economic integration first, to build trust between each other. It's true that the ROK never stops building up its military (just as the mainland is doing). South Korea’s main goal is to prevent the DPRK from provocations as it did several times in the past few years. If economic engagement has been intensified between South and North Korea, the political atmosphere will be eased and trust gradually will be built. The ROK has no intention to unify with the DPRK by force. The U.S. –ROK alliance is not there for military unification. This is what the ROK needs to convince the DPRK of through President Park’s trust politics.

South Korea has put a lot of expectations on China. China has maintained good bilateral relations with Korea since Park Geun-hye took office. She was warmly welcomed by China’s President Xi Jinping in Beijing. China recently established a memorial hall in honor of Ahn Joong-keun. Actually President Park first asked whether China was willing to build a statue of Ahn Joong-keun, but China returned with a hall that was far beyond South Korea’s expectations. It’s true that China was taking this opportunity to send clear signals to Japan regarding history issues, but it still shows the strong bilateral ties between China and South Korea at present in spite of disputes over Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) issues.

Because China provides the largest oil and food assistance to the DPRK, it has an advantage with North Korea that other countries do not have. However, it is understandable that China takes these advantages with caution in that China is unwilling to face uncertainties that are caused by DPRK’s domestic chaos. Park Geun-hye is conscious of it, so that during her visit to China, she mainly talked with Xi Jinping on policy coordination to encourage the DPRK to undertake open and reform economic policies. South Korea expects joint efforts with China to open the DPRK’s markets and deepen economic cooperation between South and North, which in their views should be the first step toward reunification. Of course, the two presidents also talked about how to prevent the DPRK’s provocations. China still holds some concerns over reunification of the Korean Peninsula, but China shares the same position with South Korea on the DPRK’s open and reform policies. This is the space for cooperation between China and the ROK on DPRK nuclear stalemates.

South Korea has more expectations for the six-party talks than the United States does, and it is eager to take the leading role in this multilateral mechanism. China should support it. China should discuss with the ROK more closely regarding the specific functions of the six-party talks and coordinate with the United States and other countries to confirm the central role of South Korea and the DPRK in the talks. The first step to resume the six-party talks is for China, the United States, the ROK, Japan and Russia to
take uniform positions. The DPRK has shown several times its extraordinary talent at capitalizing on gaps among the other five countries. It is acceptable for every country to accept the ROK as the leading country in the six-party talks, and under this circumstance, the ROK is also willing to try to persuade the United States to expand the functions and topics involved in the six-party talks.

At the same time, another equally important thing for China, the United States and the ROK is to take part in under-table negotiations to develop contingency plans for the Korean Peninsula. The execution in December 2013 of North Korean government official Jang Sung-taek once again showed how unpredictable the DPRK is. We have no idea what has happened inside the DPRK, but what we know is that there must be some factors that we haven’t mastered, and no one inside the DPRK is completely safe, including the leader himself. North Korea should be the test of Sino–U.S. New Type of Great Power Relations. One characteristic of this type of relationship is that both sides are willing to talk about any sensitive issue frankly. The possible domestic chaos of the DPRK should be among those topics that are worth discussing. It indeed will be risky if there is no coordination between China and the United States when the DPRK confronts with political problems. The presence on the Korean Peninsula of both China’s People’s Liberation Army and the U.S. military potentially will be the biggest safeguards for the stability of Northeast Asia or even the world. How to ensure the security of China and South Korea in those scenarios should be planned in advance. It will be a sophisticated process that entails careful thinking and coordination.

The Korean Peninsula is full of uncertainties. We have to admit that the prospect of the DPRK’s denuclearization seems bleak, but there is still much room for China and other countries to manage this problem. South Korea should play the central role during this process, and China should support it.

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The Korean Presence in the Economies of the Russian Far East as a Factor of Regional Stability

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The problem involves understanding the new realities of Russian–South Korean economic cooperation. These realities are the result of new processes in the development of the national economics of both countries and the resulting new opportunities for international cooperation. The effect of the new situation in the world markets, one of the characteristics of which is the slowdown of the global economy, also counts. As a result, the Republic of Korea’s economic presence in the development of the Russian Far East is changing in volume and shape. The first part of our study will contain an analysis of these changes.

Since we consider the emergence of new problems in mutual relations not as rising obstacles but as increasing opportunities, the second part of our research will consider finding the contours of new prospects in the development of Russian–South Korean relations.

Finally, one part of the article will be dedicated to an analysis of Russian–South Korean relations in their regional context.

Problem of dynamics and forms of the Korean presence

Statistics certify a rise in the volume of the Korean economic presence. This is due to the development of both traditional direct and indirect forms of this specific presence. The former include commodities, investment, labor and tourism. The latter is the presence in Russia of Koryo-Saram, descendants of Soviet and post-Soviet ethnic Koreans who settled in the Russian Far East beginning in the late 19th century.

The latter circumstance determined the title of the article—the Korean presence, because in this case Koreans act as one nation without dividing into north and south. In turn, this name gave a reason to include in the analysis of Korean labor the presence provided exclusively by migrant workers from North Korea.
There have developed three more specific indirect forms—demo, emotional and “experienced.” The Korean experience is presented as a folded form of indirect Korean presence in the Russian economy.

The wide availability of Korean products in Russian Far East markets reflects the dynamics of export of the Republic of Korea. This presence is significant. Official statistics do not find the generalizing share of this presence as well as the share of goods of any other country. However, the Korean presence is no less noticeable than that of the Chinese or Japanese and in some product groups exceeds them. South Korean cargo vehicles—tippers, trucks, cranes and tractors—long ago firmly earned the trust of Russian buyers. In no way inferior in quality and functionality, South Korea has competed with Japanese manufacturers by lower prices, and with the Chinese by quality. The same can be said with respect to household appliances, electronics, auto parts, tourism and especially medical tourism.

What are the implications of such a commodity situation? They are extremely positive. Korean goods have their own specific niche. Their competitive advantages are high, but they do not displace Russian manufacturers. Their unique consumer properties and price range are improving the quality of life in Russia, especially in the Far East.

The labor form of the Korean presence is the temporary presence of Koreans as foreign labor on the labor market. They are North Korean citizens. This component of human resources is not significant in the regional economy for two reasons.

The first reason is the generally low-level presence of foreign workers on the regional labor market. In Russia’s Primorsky Territory the figures state: In 2011 there were 33,000 foreign workers; in 2012 there were 28,000; in 2013—if we start from the approved quota—there were 24,000. The figures show: dynamics—negative, volumes, even with illegal migration—within the statistical error. What is 0.2 percent of the total labor? This component does not affect anything.

The second reason is that only a small number of North Korean citizens are temporary migrant workers. Although they are second in number after Chinese migrant workers in the territory on the approved quota, in 2013 their number was only 4,770.

The presence of South Korean capital investment in the economy of the Russian Far East is also not significant. This conclusion follows from an overall assessment of foreign investments in this Russian region.

Altogether in the Far East Federal District there are 853 enterprises with foreign capital. They employ 73,000 people. Of these, 474 such enterprises are
located in Primorsky Territory, which makes 55 percent of all enterprises of this kind in the Far East.

On the background of 200 billion rubles of investments in the region’s economy, $100 million investment is a half percent. Their effect determines little. Therefore, point examples of companies STC, “Lesexport,” Big Stone—they are point examples that do not govern the overall picture. The statistics of accumulated investments do not change this conclusion.

Given the positive effects of trade and factor flows in the host country that are known in the economic theory, we can come to some conclusions about the lost economic benefits of the Russian region.

**Potential problems of using Koryo-Saram**

The unique form of Korean presence is the *Koryo-Saram*. Koryo-Saram is a self-name of Koreans, descendants of Soviet and post-Soviet ethnic Koreans. Koryo-Saram as the Korean presence in the Russian economy in the form of human capital is also noticeable. It is not evident in quantity figures, because it is in the very essence of the phenomenon of Koryo-Saram.

According to the 2010 census, there are 153,156 Korean citizens of Russia. In 1935, only in the Far East region, according to the census, there were 204,000 Koreans. On April 1, we commemorated the date associated with the tragic fate of the Koryo-Saram—the 30th anniversary of recognition of illegal acts adopted after 1937 against the Soviet Koreans. They were the first in the USSR who suffered Joseph Stalin’s deportation on a national basis. By its nature, this recognition means rehabilitation of Koreans as victims of political repressions.

Currently 18,824 Koreans live in the Primorsky Territory. This is slightly more than 1 percent of the total population of the region, whereas 100 years ago, this share amounted to one-third; in 1901 among the territory population there were about 30,000 Koreans.

One result of the Koryo-Saram presence in the life of Russia as a visible part of the Russian way of life is the Korean cuisine. You can find Korean meals in all food markets, restaurants and cafes. A product such as *pyanse*, a modification of the popular Korean dish *pyeonsu*, is now a kind of trademark in the markets and pavilions at public transport stops in the city of Vladivostok. Extremely popular are “kimchi” and “carrot-cha.” These dishes are integral to the holiday and special occasion tables of most families in the Primorsky Territory. Korean noodles such as *donsam*, *tvigin udon* and *shin ramen* have become an integral part of the Russian consumer culture and economy.
These and other examples, as well as the very history of the Koryo-Saram, reflect such wonderful features of Koreans as enterprising skill, resourcefulness, creativity, and the ability to see the world in new ways.

Here is Korean human potential as evidenced by two facts. First, in the USSR, Soviet Koreans ranked first in the number of Heroes of Socialist Labor per thousand (the highest proportion of recognition of the achievements of labor), according to a number of Internet resources. The second point concerns the level of education among Koryo-Saram. By the number of people with higher education per thousand, the Soviet Koreans were second only to the Jews.

These facts show the high quality of Korean human potential and the possibility of putting it to better use in the economic life of the Russian Far East.

Conceptual problems

The successful development of bilateral relations depends on addressing conceptual problems—in particular, the choice of foreign policy concepts. In our view, development of the official concept of Russian-Korean economic cooperation (as advocated by many authors) is not as important as familiarity and the desire to understand the position of the expert community and political leaders in both countries.

An analysis of position on this issue by economists of Korea allows us to point out two positions which, in our opinion, are the most interesting and consequential.

The first position relates to the asymmetry of integration partners in Northeast Asia. Asymmetry means imbalance in market size and level of technology development. In the category of symmetric countries cannot be, for example, Russia, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The amplitude of variation in their weight categories has increased significantly. As a result, as demonstrated in studies of South Korean economists, there can be defined a hierarchy of trading partners according to their profitability for the country’s economy, and their steps in the direction of creating a possible regional free trade zone. The most developed country in the region is Japan, and it occupies the last place in the hierarchy of South Korean preferences. The first place is occupied by the technologically less developed countries of Russia and China.

The second position characterizes the mindset of the South Korean side in relation to the most effective trade model, based on which it would be possible to build up trade policy and, accordingly, integration policies.
The model of “flying geese” has long attracted the attention of South Korean economists; in the academic literature it is known as a Vernon hypothesis. However, in their opinion, this model has several modifications. In the model of the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu, a country’s comparative advantages are determined by the level of its technological development. The most technologically advanced country (and in the framework of this model it always will be Japan) receives the greatest benefits. According to the South Korean professor Kim Inchul, such a model is not conducive to regional cooperation. It is necessary to develop and practice a different model, that of Canada geese. It has three special features. The first is distribution of the financial burden and benefits of intraregional integration across the region. The second is periodic change of the leader country, i.e., “the pack leader.”

The third feature is the most important for Russia’s understanding South Korean views on foreign-trade relations. Professor Kim Inchul offers a “technological ladder,” a kind of Maslow’s pyramid to represent the hierarchy of technology-driven comparative advantages. At the top of the pyramid are the “super-high-tech services products,” based on intensive use of human capital. At the second from the bottom stage are low-tech light-industry products, based on intensive use of unskilled labor. At the bottom stage are natural resources and agricultural products. It is noteworthy that their comparative factorial base has not been specified, apparently, according to the author, because of its self-evidence.

Prospects for the “project” triangle

Following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Vladivostok, Moscow is expressing its desire all the more fully to form a three-sided “project,” a triangle of Russia, South Korea and North Korea. Seoul is also interested in this tripartite cooperation. The starting position—a development of Russian-South Korean economic cooperation—is supplemented by provisions to include the North Korean side and at the same time solve the problem of normalizing relations between the North and the South on the Korean Peninsula. This position is referred to as both implementation of the “three Trans-Korean megaprojects” and implementation of specific point projects.

The Trans-Korean megaprojects are the laying of a pipeline, railway construction, and supplying electricity from Russia to South Korea through North Korea. In this regard we should emphasize the resumption of active lobbying by Moscow for the gas pipeline project, from Russia to South Korea through North Korea.
As an example of a specific point project we can cite the proposal of the Russian company Mechel to the South Korean steel giant enterprise POSCO to jointly upgrade the infrastructure of the North Korean seaport of Rajin, where Russia possesses long-term lease rights to one of the terminals.

Part of the “triangle” strategy is to discuss cooperative agricultural projects in the Russian Far East. The scheme “Russian resources plus North Korean labor plus South Korean capital” could be a possible basis for these proposed projects. As a result, both the problem of food security and the problem of normalizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula will be solved.

Modernization perspective

Modernization of the Russian economy is having a positive effect on Russian-South Korean economic relations. Among such promising areas of Russian-South Korean cooperation are the space industry, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, information and nanotechnologies, and ferrous metals.

Features of modernization prospects define the strengthening vector of protectionism in the industrial policy of Russia, which is introducing new elements into the development of cooperation between Russia and the Republic of Korea. Thus Russia can follow the declared rate for development of the national shipbuilding industry only together with South Korea, the world leader in the shipbuilding industry. In this regard, a number of large Russian corporations are exploring the possibility of gaining control over South Korean shipbuilders that have some financial difficulties because of problems in the world economy.

Successful implementation of the modernization prospects depends on using the South Korean experience.

Prospects for using South Korean experience

Korean experience is a form of specific indirect presence of Korea in the Russian economy. The starting position for understanding this phenomenon in the Russian context is dividing the Korean experience into the southern and northern components. South Korea’s experience is important for understanding our future. North Korean experience is needed for understanding our past.

Korean experience is important for Russia in three aspects: changing the base of competitive advantages; basics of economic growth; governmental regulation of the economy.
South Korea’s experience shows that the real competitive advantages of the economy are not static but dynamic. In the early 1960s this base was a relatively high labor endowment of the economy, and the main export items were labor-intensive handmade wigs. In the early 1990s, relatively high capital endowment of the economy became the base, and the main export items were capital-intensive high-tech products. With such experience, the excess of natural resources in the Russian economy and consequently its raw material nature, as well as raw materials exports, are not a fatal verdict. Democratic structure of the state, the market-type financial system will provide a flow of capital from the primary industries into other sectors of the economy, and instead of being resource-intensive it will become capital-intensive.

The experience of the Republic of Korea suggests a series of measures to stimulate domestic savings, a combination of export-oriented investment and economic growth strategies. An economic strategy that is oriented only outside, or based on dominance of public investments, will not bring Russia positive results in the long term.

The possibility of state regulation of the economy in the post-industrial era is sharply narrowed. Manual control of the economy by South Korean presidents—the former generals Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo—generally could be considered a success for one reason: In the industrial era it was possible to correctly trace priorities, identify locomotive industries, and change the vector of investment flows. In the post-industrial era, which Russia is entering now, this is no longer possible.

As for the desire to develop a formal concept of Russian—South Korean trade relations, there are several alternatives. Thus, on the one hand it can be performed either by government agencies or research institutions, or by some commercial structures, or by all of them in various combinations, both in Russia and in Korea with elaboration of a common document at the final stage. It should define clearly the roles of government and business in foreign trade. It is proposed to start from the dominant role of private business. The main actor in the trade cooperation between the two countries should be private business, not the state. By this we understand not a restriction of state functions in the overall management of foreign economic activity, but a correspondence of the state’s activities with the fair needs of private business.

In this connection, the following points are noteworthy.

One of them concerns export orientation as an economic strategy. It seems that Russia should adopt key elements of this strategy. These are the base of comparative advantage. Currently this is determined in Russia by the relatively higher availability of natural resources, and in Korea by relative capital intensity. South Korea’s experience shows that the country’s
comparative advantages are not static but dynamic. Changing the base is possible, no matter what it was in the beginning—natural resources or labor.

Changing the base of competitive advantage is not only possible but also indispensable. This change should go in the direction from natural comparative advantage, based on surplus labor or natural resources, to the benefits gained. Their basis is machinery and technology, and they suggest the purposeful formation of relative capital intensity of the economy.

A change of base is impossible without participation of the state in shaping a new framework of comparative advantage, without compliance of the economic and, above all, industrial and investment policy with objective laws. South Korea’s experience proves this more than convincingly.

**Prospects for the demonstration effect**

The Republic of Korea has a presence in the Russian Far East, not only in direct forms: commodities, human and investment. No less significant are the latent, implicit forms of its presence. One of these forms is the demonstration effect of the Korean economy.

At the heart of the demonstration effect are two components.

First: open borders and free access of Russian Far East residents to South Korea. This is a demonstration effect of economic success. Far East residents can see that in a territory that is 1.5 times smaller than that of the Primorsky Territory a gross national product (GNP) is created that is commensurate with the total product of Russia. This is created by a population that is numerically 3.2 times less than that of Russia. Close to our borders, there appeared an economic space that is unique in its characteristics. How did South Korea manage to shape it? Why we are lagging behind, and our neighbors are moving forward so rapidly? Why is it that they can and we cannot? What is it about them that is so special compared with us? Such questions are changing the attitude and outlook of the Russian Far East residents and evoking questions concerning the policy of the federal center.

The second is a comparative component providing an opportunity to compare the economic development of the two Koreas: One is based on the democratic principles and market economy of the Republic of Korea, and the other is based on the communist principles and administrative-command economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The contrast in the level of development and quality of life between the two Koreas, growing backlog of the DPRK, and positive dynamic shifts in the South Korean reality are influencing the feelings of Russians watching these
shifts. There appears at least a sense of distrust in the capabilities of the state and commanding economy.

Those who have visited both the North and the South of the Korean Peninsula, at the level of their perception of the world have come to understand that “the facts are above the principle.” They try it on to life in the Far Eastern conditions. And if the facts show that these conditions are worse than those in the European part of Russia, such a long-desired declared principle of equalizing the levels of development of the regions is a utopia. The result is “voting with their feet”—migration from the eastern regions of Russia. During the period from 1992 to 2012 the population of the Far East declined by 20 percent and now consists of only 6.4 million people.

The demonstration effect of South Korea has one unique feature—it acts as a multiplier of emotions. In this context, the presence of Korea is perceived as an emotional presence. What does this mean? It is expressed in one and the same emotional mood wave of Russians and Koreans. It should be pointed out that, according to the results of sociological studies of residents of the Russian Far East as to the reasons for choosing South Korea as an object of sympathy, the first reason was formulated as unexplained liking. They left behind the country’s impressive economic achievements.

You can observe similar achievements both in modern China and the Republic of Korea. But the achievements of South Koreans make a greater impression on Russians. The same can be said about the social failings of North Koreans. Why? What underlies the multiplier of emotions?

In our opinion, the reason is the amazing, almost imperceptible human intimacy between Russians and Koreans. What made us alike? Perhaps these were matching items in the historical destiny and economic problems of Russia and the Korean Peninsula, and also wars on ideological grounds, postwar devastation, five-year plans, interaction between business and government, the chaebol [South Korean business conglomerates] and the Russian oligarchs, zigzags and turbulence of political life, and much, much more. And we likewise should mention here the proximity and surprising coincidence of the alcohol consumption structure—a combination of strong and mild alcoholic beverages.

We understand even irrational decision-making phenomena generated by ridiculous bureaucratic structures in the South Korean life. Just remember the ban against neon lamps (up to 1970), combating red cars (mid-1980s) and a ban on holidays abroad (up to 1987). These phenomena make us closer, because the list of similar phenomena in Russia would take more than one page.
Naturally, what happens with Koreans, the people we understand very well, is a deep concern of the Russians. We take their example, adopt their experience and try to prevent copying their mistakes and errors.

Conclusion

Russia will be able to overcome the challenges of time and move forward successfully only with development of the eastern territories. This requires interaction with nations in the Asia-Pacific region. In this interaction the economies of Russia and the Republic of Korea are keeping a strategic position. Hence, it looks important to understand their problems and prospects. In this article we made only one step on this long and complex research path.

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Sources

In their coverage of events in the DPRK most Russian and international media use stereotypes demonizing North Korea, painting the life of its citizens black. Information about positive changes is ignored not only by the media but also by specialists. Andrei Lankov, a professor in Korean Studies in Seoul, said that North Korea “has become much more liberal, although no one noticed it; the economic situation in the country has improved, but these estimates are ignored.”

As you know, a lack of information gives rise to false conclusions, and today, when North Korean scientists have come to the realization of development in the field of nuclear energy that certainly requires monitoring by the international community, we need, as never before, a more complete picture of the DPRK inner life to activate and make more fruitful the dialogue with Pyongyang.

Almost every year since 2002, I have received invitations to visit the DPRK. My most recent visit, with a delegation from the Russian Far East, took place from April 11 to 21, 2014, at the invitation of the Korean Association of Scientific Workers, North Korea, to participate in the international conference on “Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism and the Cause for Self-Sufficiency throughout the World.”

Every one of these visits included introductory tours, so I was able to visit a number of industrial enterprises, agricultural cooperatives and fish farms, cultural and historical monuments, cultural institutions, military units,
universities, a center of information, etc. My literary and artistic impressions are described in my book Korea from North to South: Travel Notes, published in Vladivostok in 2011.

Direct observation as a field research method, experiments, personal communication and interviews with managers in enterprises and ordinary citizens, and photographs gave much food for reflection and allowed the formation of opinions concerning the life of citizens in North Korea, national traditions and internal changes.

The changes in the internal affairs of the DPRK that began with the new millennium are associated with the personality of Chairman Kim Jong Il. On January 4, 2001, the newspaper Rodong Sinmun published an editorial that quoted Kim Jong Il as saying: “Today, as we enter the 21st century, we need to see and solve our problems from a new perspective and a new height.” On January 9, an editorial in Rodong Sinmun issued appeals “to get rid of everything that is outdated, to fundamentally update the ideological vision and thinking, as well as rethink everything and always act in a new way.” The designation of “new thinking” was a signal to change approaches to development. A number of informal visits to China that Kim Jong Il made early in the century as well as official visits to Russia shaped his understanding of the new information age, market relations and new thinking.

As a consequence, on July 1, 2002, a decree was issued on a new approach to economic development. This decree defined some decentralization of the planned economy; the procedure of economic links was much simplified. Some enterprises received the right to enter overseas markets. The list of these reformist measures permitted companies to set their own prices for products and to enter into contracts on the supply of raw materials and components. Administrations of factories and agricultural cooperatives were allowed to introduce a system of material incentives for workers. Food coupons were canceled and wages were increased; however, there was some increase in prices for transport, fuel, housing and utilities, food and industrial products. In the social sector, the fee for the maintenance of children in kindergartens increased; DPRK people began to pay for housing, which until then actually had been free; they started paying a fee to visit sports and leisure centers.

The transformation unfolded slowly but steadily, reflecting the idea of Kim Jong Il’s economic reform to keep the existing model of the socialist system, i.e., without political transformations.²

In 2002 a national-level meeting of financial workers dealt with the transfer of the majority of enterprises to cost accounting. In the same year, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) with the
agenda “On the introduction of the new system of economic management” also recommended that agricultural cooperatives actively use a self-supporting model. In the 2007 New Year editorials, the newspapers Rodong Sinmun, Joson Inmingun and Chongnen Dzjonvi emphasized the development of agriculture as the cornerstone for supplying the population with agricultural products. Among the tasks are collection of two crops per year. In this regard, the country initiated the process of expanding the areas for re-sowing. The main agricultural practice was the principle of using high-yielding varieties that meet the soil and climatic conditions of each locality. Absence of taxes, secured by the constitution of North Korea, contributed to the development of cooperatives. Cooperatives were given the task of fulfilling the agricultural plans on their own, without help from outside labor. Under the new conditions outside labor must get paid.

Ten years later, after the July initiatives, in the 2012 New Year’s issue of Rodong Sinmun the young leader of North Korea marked the next phase of economic liberalization: the active involvement of foreign investors. The practice of establishing joint ventures with joint capital was welcomed even earlier; the first investment came from China. The Taean district glass production plant, built in 2007, became a model of such production. Kim Jong Un’s plans involve the creation of the most attractive conditions for foreign investors. Today North Korea has economic ties with the European Union; in Asia, with China, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, Vietnam, Russia, etc.

If we analyze the situation in North Korea, looking back on the period of 2000 to 2014, this transformation can be considered as a reform, the outcome of which is economic liberalization. In this context, information about improving yields in 2012 becomes logical; therefore, economic measures were successful and the country was able to effectively implement new agricultural technologies.3

Higher yields were contributed by such factors as agronomic efforts to re-focus arable land, completion of major irrigation systems, and commissioning of a 150-kilometer water canal from Lake Khasan to Mount Taesong. According to the chairman of the Gochang cooperative, the state provides raw materials for agriculture and technology to cooperatives. Machines are mostly Korean-made. The cooperative board decides independently on the kind of crops to be cultivated, depending on soil and climatic conditions. The cooperative focuses on cooperative plans for producing meat, rice, corn and potatoes. Part of the output is to be sent to military units, the above-plan products belong to the partnership. After completing the plan, the cooperative sells the surplus, giving awards to members of the cooperative. The coefficient of labor participation, as the principal indicator for evaluation, is an
incentive for people who are already responsible in the case, but now everyone knows: Personal income is directly dependent on the results of one’s labor. Peasant families have their own small plots of land. How to use the harvest is their own business. Farmland, unlike in Russia, is often not adjacent to the house, but located on the side of sloping hills. Many hills are cultivated, which brings the risk of deforestation. This problem is to be solved on the state level.

Attention to farming and agriculture is considered today the main priority. The requirement for “efforts to improve land management” persists in many documents of 2012 and 2013 signed by the young leader Kim Jong Un.4

In the northern provinces, potatoes have been actively introduced into agricultural production. A big potato-growing cooperative has been established in Ryanggang Province. They have built a factory that produces starch, freeze-dried noodles, alcohol, and new single-story houses for the residents of the town of Samjiyeon. In that town of 30,000 inhabitants, about a number of families have received housing in the new low-rise buildings.

Comfortable towns in the north of the peninsula have grown in number. Ramshackle huts, scattered around, were demolished to make room for orderly housing built in modern architectural style. Houses surround the slope or rise in several terraced rows. The roofs of the new homes are made in the traditional Korean style: blue, deep green, terra-cotta colors. The modernized workshop (with computer technology) of the Pyongyang chemical building materials plant specializes in manufacturing shingles.

Liberalization of the economy is changing the way of life of DPRK citizens. Food surpluses, which members of cooperatives could freely dispose of, have formed the basis for private trade and business. The private sector for sales of agricultural and food products is developing in several areas: trade in roadside areas, trays with carts in cities, stationary trade in stalls, and the most active form of trade: stationary markets in Pyongyang. According to various reports, there are about ten markets in the capital. The largest is the double-decker “Tongil,” with extensive parking for cars in front of the building. The market area of more than 5,000 square meters is divided into specialized areas: industrial goods (electronics, building materials), food (pastry, cereals, canned products), and production cooperatives (meat, vegetables, fish). Stretched along the hall are open section cabins with clothes. In the center there are long counters, almost hundred meters of brisk trade. Price limits for every product are set by the state. To prevent spontaneous changes, the prices are reviewed every ten days, considering the rate of the Euro. The main requirement for sellers is to stick to the rule of law: One cannot violate health standards in the sale of food products (supervised by a special laboratory).
There are between 5,000 and 10,000 visitors per day, as reported by inspectors. The products are sold by trade sellers who receive products from agricultural cooperatives, and by the farmers themselves. Slotting fees are fixed by the state.

Koreans learn private enterprise creatively, so that in one kiosk the map of Pyongyang costs 5 Euros, and in another $2. The map of the capital might cost even more; the unique fact is that this was released to the public in English. In July 2013, walking around the city late in the evening, I begged an elderly woman selling boiled corn to sell the map to me. After a slight hesitation, she took the offered $10 (officially foreign currency is prohibited in the DPRK) and instantly disappeared into the darkness. This year there were several cases (before this was impossible to imagine) of bills being paid in Euros; by the way, we paid in foreign currency for our dinner in a schiktane (a type of small restaurant preferred by the Koreans themselves), for petrol on our trip to the 38th parallel and on a night outing to the Easter prayer at the temple of the Holy Trinity.

A number of researchers believe that changes in the DPRK are ambitious. To characterize the nature of changes, Konstantin Asmolov, a leading researcher at the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, coined the term “creeping restructuring.” It is difficult to say exactly how much capitalization has penetrated North Korean society, but an indirect confirmation that the facts not of domestic nature are revealed in Kim Jong Un’s talks with senior officials of the party, state and economic bodies and public organizations of workers, on April 27, 101 Juche (2012). The young leader said: “To earn any currency now, as I see, one wouldn’t scorn thoughtless development and export of precious natural resources in the country. I would classify it mildly as ‘myopia’ and ‘lack of patriotism.’”

The assortment of industrial and food products in the state departments has changed. In the department store near the Arch of Triumph, on the ground floor there is a large department of household appliances—refrigerators, color TVs with LCD screens. On the first floor they sell finishing materials and linoleum of Korean production. In the next section they sell furniture, massive sofas, low wardrobes, beds, desks, pillows, bed linen, handmade rugs and machine-made tapestry sofas and armchairs. In demand is the furniture made in the Engvan factory (joint Korean-Chinese capital). Through a computerized process they manufacture over 60 home decor items. There are renowned expert designers who carry out orders for decorating different organizations and enterprises. In the central part of the city there is a specialized furniture salon belonging to the factory.
Textiles and fashions have become more diverse and the quality of domestic goods has greatly improved. On the premises of the Moran sewing factory, with the use of modern Japanese equipment they make costumes of the current style. Of the finished product 20 percent is intended for the domestic market, 80 percent is exported to Japan, the United States, Hong Kong and South Korea. The profit of the factory is about 1.5 million Euros per year. The salary of workers is very high: from 3,000 to 10,000 won, with the average being 5,000 won (before the July reforms, the earnings were 150 to 200 won).6

A network of private shops has appeared measuring about 15 to 20 square meters; replica of a large format is the first department store hired by Chinese entrepreneurs. The two-level Shopping Center is decorated in a modern style, with the merchandising method of marketing. The product range is extremely diverse, and the price of goods is roughly the same as in the shopping malls of Vladivostok. For example, the Samsung refrigerator costs about 30,000 rubles; an umbrella varies from 600 to 3,000 rubles, depending on its quality; ladies fashionable clothing starts from 1,000 rubles and higher, and shoes sell for between 500 and 3,000 rubles. The goods are mainly of Chinese production and good quality.

However, the DPRK leadership, being concerned about the development of light industry and the competitiveness of Korean-made goods, is urging the people to increase the volume of consumer goods and improve their quality, in order that “any and all would become interested in domestic products.” It requires the manufacture of products that are available to the population.7

Leaders of the new generation understand the new economic realities. The idea of training and retraining managers is mentioned in a series of documents signed by the young leader Kim Jong Un. Overseas internships have become almost the norm; Kim Jong Un writes about the need “to guide our delegations to other countries, so that they learn there and accumulate the required materials.”8

Economic liberalization takes place without transformation in the political field. In 2012, the turnover in party documents introduced the term “Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.” In his articles the young leader Kim Jong Un stresses the continuity of his grandfather’s and father’s policy. In his 2013 New Year speech, published by the newspaper Rodong Sinmun, he stated: “The constant path that should follow our party and our people is the only one—the Juche way; the victorious banner of our revolution is the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.”9

Marking a new phase of Songun [“military first”] state development, the portraits of Marx and Lenin were cleaned away from Kim Il Sung Square. At an
international conference in 2014, it was announced that the classics of Marxism-Leninism described the development processes of the states with basic capital accumulation; for the DPRK these positions are obsolete. The self-reliance advances of the DPRK suggest that the ideological platform for development of socialism in the DPRK is the provision ideas of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. However, the ideologists of the Juche ideology explain that this doctrine is not a dogma, so that social achievements of world progress are surely applicable. Such an adjustment in recent years allows us to explain why the country has used German production lines, British equipment, computers of Taiwanese assembly, etc. This kind of interpretation justifies the fact that North Korea has long been accepting humanitarian aid from foreign countries.

And one more detail: The pathos of Kim Jong Un’s articles in 2012 and 2013 aims at developing the sectors of national economy by using achievements of scientific and technical progress, requiring increased production at the cost of national resources and home technologies, implementing “equipment and production technology with the CNC [computer numerical control] system, actively pursue their full automation.” Computer technology has been introduced everywhere. At the same time, Kim Jong Un recommends, “Let our employees, through the Internet, get more familiar with the information on global trends, the best of developed foreign science and technology.”

Billboards with the acronym CNC that advertised machines with numerical control appeared in Pyongyang in 2007. During this period there was a breakthrough in the steel industry: the use of anthracite coal in the metal production. Two hydroelectric plants were put into operation. Immediately the coal production increased (according to some sources, almost doubled) and mining and processing plants started working. Pyongyang and other cities increased their illumination of streets and houses.

The exterior appearance of the North Korean capital has changed drastically. When Kim Jong Un, who was educated in Switzerland and has firsthand knowledge of European cities, visited the Institute of Architecture, he demanded a new way to develop the image of the capital and promised that he would oversee these projects in the role of honorary rector of the institute. He advised the architects to consider lighting design so that it “would be noble and respectable, our style, and the night view of Pyongyang [would] become glamorous, befitting the capital of a powerful and prosperous nation.” The capital is now brilliant in the evening lights. Now the architects are facing a new challenge: “The provincial towns and cities must show their local features and color.”
The ground floors, reserved for shops, tailors, hairdressers and cafes, have been remodeled and designed in the same style. In 90 percent of the homes, the old muddy-quality windows have been replaced with double-pane plastic. Glass for the construction industry is supplied by the Friendship factory, so named as a sign of consolidating Korean-Chinese cooperation. The glassworks in Teane were built with Chinese investment. It delivers up to 40 percent of its production to the domestic market and exports 60 percent.

The design and construction of large-scale structures are performed by the projecting architectural complex Baekdusan. Reconstruction of residential quarters is under the authority of the Pyongyang General Administration for Construction. Specialized construction trusts and plants within its structure also have undergone modernization. Thus the Pyongyang plant of construction materials has automated all processes, actively introducing the CNC technology. The plant supplies plastic window frames, flooring, colors, marble tiles, faience, which are used to update the sanitary system. The Pyongyang paint factory has increased its output and modernized production lines.

In 2014 we had the opportunity to walk around the city without an escort, taking pictures without restrictions. The residents of the capital are friendly to Russians, ready to engage in dialogue, rarely rejecting a request to have a photograph taken. They look joyful, smiling, wearing diverse clothing, and the ladies wear high heels. Almost every second passerby has a mobile phone, and mobile phones have become available to most citizens. They are using different devices, including Android smart phones. Programmers at the “Chuck Kim” Polytechnic University, working in collaboration with the Korean National Computer Center, created the operating system Linux. The new development is called Pulgyn Pel (“Red Star”). The DPRK is in transition from using Microsoft Windows to software based on Linux. Almost all major universities in the country have access to the domestic network DPRK Intranet. Registered users of the network can exchange text messages in real time or communicate by email. In the DPRK Intranet there are more than a hundred sites. The largest of them are: Nenara of the Korean Computer Center, Namsan of the People’s Palace and Study, and Kwangmyong of the Central News Agency of Science and Technology.

In the words of Kim Jong Un, the present stage of the country’s development has been designated as the stage for construction of a civilized state. The young leader writes that the original democratic state is “a state in which all spheres of culture are highly developed and the people have plenty of opportunity to enjoy all the cultural values created.”

And in this new civilization visible emphasis is focused on the development of a comfortable leisure and sports sphere. The year 2014 has been marked
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by a record number of sports and leisure complexes: Pyongyang Ethnographic Park, National Theatre, the park with sports fields around Nynando Island and a dolphinarium. In addition, there are: a water park with 16 pools and water slides, a hippodrome, an indoor ice rink and an outdoor stadium for skating, a three-story fitness center, and a shooting club. Reconstructed stadiums and outdoor playgrounds are full of fans of sports and outdoor activities. The Taedong and Pothongana river embankments look like a huge stadium with courts, track cycling, volleyball and basketball courts, and fitness equipment. There is a music information center with a computer room where music lovers can listen to not only the Korean classics but also the world’s masterpieces of classical music recorded in digital format on the concert stages of Europe (2012-2013 catalog).

The DPRK leader returns repeatedly to the idea of a civilized state. Several articles written by Kim Jong Un explain the term “civilized state” as: 1) political power with single-minded unity of the people around the leader; 2) military power with a strong nuclear shield; 3) economic power with self-reliance; 3) spiritual power with high culture.

New blocks of apartment buildings, monumental buildings and large leisure centers in North Korea traditionally have been built by soldiers. The slogan “Train the army in all works!” can be considered the program, although, of course, the priority task is strengthening the country’s defense: “Without a strong military force you cannot protect sovereignty and the right to existence, and finally will become a plaything in the hands of imperialists, their victim.” Pyongyang realistically assesses the international situation; the tragic experience of Iraq, Libya and Syria gives them a real reason to realize what will happen to a country that is unable to defend itself.

Many signs, direct and indirect, indicate significant changes in the internal life of the DPRK. To conclude, I want to quote Alexander Prokhanov, writer, publicist and politician, whom I happened to meet and socialize with in Pyongyang. He believes that modern civilization needs North Korea in its unaltered form, because the United States “has processed” a huge amount of state formations, leveled them and made them uniform. Humankind has simplified Americanism and globalism by blending them into one mass. North Korea remained an alternative to this pro-American world. Americans will try to turn this reserve into ashes, but the tension suffered by North Korea gives it strength and is an incentive for development of the country.

Kim Jong Un, the young executive, first secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, first chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission, supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, marshal of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic, supreme leader of the Korean people and great leader
(official titles), has inherited a country updated by transformations made from 2000 to 2011 by Kim Jong Il. Challenges of the global world which the younger Kim will have to face will become harder and harder. The Canadian foreign policy analyst Stephen Gowans has written, “The challenges posed by North Korea for itself—sovereignty, equality, socialism—are today, as a result of the flow of the counterrevolution that swept Eastern Europe, the USSR and partly China, much more difficult to achieve, requiring a huge commitment and pain.”

How Kim Jong Un will be able to balance domestic politics, continuing liberalization of the economy and maintaining the firmness of ideological platform—only time will tell. One thing is certain: In North Korea they are building a new civilization.

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Session IV: Toward Humanitarian Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula: The Future of Northeast Asia: Culture, NGOs, Mass Media and Youth
Inter-Korean Dialogue:
Status and Prospects

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In today’s world the Korean example of interstate relations in all their diversity of ideological and political attitudes depending strictly on the ruling elites is probably unique. Since the DPRK and the Republic of Korea appeared on the world political map, the two Koreas have been walking a thorny and highly controversial path of shaping their bilateral relations. Peace and stability in Northeast Asia, the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world community have depended and continue to depend on how they managed to build inter-Korean cooperation over nearly 70 years.

The Sunshine Policy in the formation of normal interstate relations between the DPRK and the ROK

Abandoning a historical excursion into the problem of inter-Korean relations, we nevertheless believe it necessary to dwell on a brief characterization of the results of the previous stage. This began at the end of the 1990s, when the administration of President Kim Dae-jung proclaimed the “Sunshine Policy,” and ended in 2008 with the victory of the pragmatic conservatives’ course.

The Sunshine Policy as a realization of the ideological and political concept of South Korean liberals given the opportunity to begin normalizing the whole complex of inter-Korean relations: military, political, economic and humanitarian. Its starting point was recognition of the impossibility of unification of the two Koreas in the foreseeable future. Such an assessment of prospects for unification brought to the agenda the task of establishing a system of peaceful coexistence and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, South Korea took responsibility for 1) prevention of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, 2) causing no damage to the DPRK, including its being taken over by military force, and 3) promoting inter-Korean reconciliation and development of comprehensive cooperation with the North.

The result of this approach led to significant changes in inter-Korean cooperation in all the above-mentioned areas and at different levels, starting with two unprecedented summits of DPRK and ROK leaders, joint economic
projects and mutual world tours of art troupes or competing in major international sports competitions under a common Korean flag. This success was largely determined by the positive response on the part of Pyeongyang, which perceived the Sunshine Policy as a clear demonstration of the South’s good intentions.

Having become a conceptual framework for inter-Korean relations, the Sunshine Policy not only could provide peace but also grant a fundamentally new situation to a future Korea in Northeast Asia. Roh Moo-hyun said this in his inaugural speech on February 25, 2003; he called for the creation of a single regional community in Northeast Asia (such as the European Union), in which a united Korea could be a leading economic center.

Unfortunately, further on new factors of subjective and objective character had an impact on the development of inter-Korean relations. The objective factor was the transition of the DPRK to the active implementation of nuclear and missile programs in spring 2003. The subjective factor was the transition of power in Seoul into the hands of conservative circles armed with a radically new concept in relation to inter-Korean cooperation.

**South Korea’s conservative approach to inter-Korean relations**

In February 2008, after President Lee Myung-bak’s administration came to power, the liberal democratic regime of South Korea turned into a right-wing conservative one. New guidelines of the ruling elite could not but affect the North Korean policy vector; Lee Myung-bak positioned himself as a “pragmatic conservative, tending to act prudently in relation to the closest partners, without ideological prejudice and with maximum efficiency for the country.”

Today the South Korean leadership strategy is based on recognition of traditional ties and focused on the United States as a vital prerequisite for the national security of the Republic of Korea, including a joint policy with Washington in relation to North Korea. In such circumstances, the purpose of the South Korean administration’s foreign policy becomes “elevating South Korea to the same level of strategic alliance with America, as the U.S. cooperation with Japan and Australia today.”

The conceptual approach, widely advertised during change of power in Seoul, was the so-called “creative pragmatism” of the conservatives, which undoubtedly influenced the choice of national priorities. It has turned into a categorical characterization of the current political process in South Korea and is based on three main principles reflected in the concept of ROK national security:
• Sober, realistic and consistent evaluation of the environment
• Setting achievable goals and developing sound plans to achieve them
• Ensuring the maximum possible benefits from investments and efforts

After ensuring her position in the Blue House, President Park Geun-hye had many reasons to be objectively interested in continuing the political drift in the direction of Washington. We should not forget her election platform that contained the postulate of establishing trusting relationships with North Korea. Of course, today that call looks very fantastic. By the efforts of Pyongyang, the Korean Peninsula was thrown down to the moment of the Korean War’s end, and the peace process had to be adjusted again.

Moreover, today the Korean problems as a whole, and both Korean states, have reached a deadlock because:

• It is pointless to repeat a half-century way of inter-Korean settlement using the old routes (the current events show the futility of traditional approaches to solving the problems).
• The starting point of today looks radically different.

In such circumstances, the South Korean leadership is forced to rely on years of proven strategies and tactics of unconditionally following the way of U.S. policy. I doubt the ability and willingness of the South Korean conservatives to promote something completely new for the resuscitation of normal inter-Korean relations.

Practical implementation of the principles of creative pragmatism, continued President Park Geun-hye, negated all the achievements of the Sunshine Policy. In the development of inter-Korean relations since 2008 there came a new stage, in terms of their content and perspectives, which threw the two Koreas decades back to the beginning of the 1990s.

**Pyeongyang and the problem of inter-Korean relations**

Of course, it would be unfair to put all of the blame for degradation of inter-Korean relations solely on Seoul. North Korean authorities also have done a lot to bring them in modern conditions to the “boiling point.” As was already stated above, the transition of the DPRK to active implementation of missile and nuclear programs, including a series of nuclear tests, provoked a final rejection of the Sunshine Policy by the South Korean leadership.

The political elite in Seoul does not want to reckon with the new reality of the Korean Peninsula, in which preservation and development of Pyeongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities are perceived as one of the conditions for sur-
vival of North Korea in the international arena. And it is not only the guideline of the ruling regime; this idea is firmly fixed in the public mind of the North Koreans. Nuclear missiles are needed by the DPRK in two capacities: 1) as a means to deter external aggression; 2) as a means for conducting diplomatic maneuvers in the international arena, primarily regional. Military and political circles and the public community of the North Korea believe that as long as the DPRK has nuclear capability, the socialist Korea will not become a target for attacks by the imperialist powers, especially the United States. Fears of a U.S. invasion of North Korea are quite objective; there is no need to substantiate them after the events in Iraq, Libya and the area of the former Soviet Union.

Analyzing Pyeongyang’s approaches to the problem of inter-Korean relations, it must be remembered that, in the assessment of the North Korean elite, any destabilization of the internal political situation in North Korea is a threat not only to the ruling center but to the regime as a whole. In other words, the very survival of the North Korean regime depends on its integrity and unity centered on the official leadership.

Compared with the previous decade, the North Korean regime looks extremely unstable. Many of the foreign policy actions are being justified by the need to demonstrate strength to its own people and possible internal opponents. Hence there often has been hysterical, indisputably inconsistent and irresponsible behavior in the inter-Korean space over the past two years. Instability of the ruling elite in the deteriorating socioeconomic situation is forcing those in power to regulate people’s dissatisfaction with all available means, including its “reset” in the usual external channel, operating statements about the intrigues of the U.S. imperialists and their South Korean stooges and puppets.

Against this sharpened ideological background and confrontational sentiments, hope of the North Korean leadership to improve inter-Korean relations and the situation on the Korean Peninsula as a whole looks, at the very least, naive.

Prospects for development of the situation

Still, based on the above background which is quite pessimistic, there are encouraging motives. In particular, in January and February 2014, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea showed their willingness to return to some of the previously established forms of inter-Korean cooperation. Thus, on January 4, for the first time in the last couple of years, Pyeongyang, through the head of the North Korean Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Father-
Igor A. Tolstokulakov

land, Kang Ji Young, expressed “the determination to improve relations with South Korea.” This intention was expressed in the New Year address to the nation by the leader Kim Jong Un, who called for the establishment of inter-Korean relations and noted that the DPRK “will make persistent efforts to improve relations if South Korea also will meet us halfway.”

The statement by the supreme leader of the DPRK was made in a timely manner, and it provides us with some shred of optimism. However, inter-Korean relations for many years have been developing according to the Leninist scenario: “one step forward—two steps back.” The response came from a number of senior and competent officials in Seoul: Minister for Unification Ryoo Kihl-jae; Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se; Press Secretary of the Ministry of National Defense Kim Min-sok, who unanimously declared, “[B]eware North Korea’s carrot and stick policy.”

The world community already has gotten used to the fact that “inter-Korean relations develop in waves—a crisis is followed by a relaxation period, which again gives way to aggravation.” We can assume that the inter-Korean confrontation of the last two years, including the most critical moments when Pyeongyang engaged in apparent military provocations and hysteria broke out, was the deliberate tactic of the DPRK, after which it could stand in the negotiation process in a more favorable position. The dialogue with South Korean counterparts from a position of power has always been a notorious dream of North Korean leaders.

Resumption of humanitarian cooperation between the two Koreas also pushes us to this idea. During February 20–25, 2014, after a long hiatus, meetings of separated families of the North and the South were resumed; it was the first time that the participants were not only victims of the Korean War but also relatives of ROK citizens abducted by North Koreans in the postwar period. This meeting is special not only for providing such an unprecedented opportunity but also for the number of participants: 501 citizens of the Republic of Korea and 204 citizens of the DPRK.

For the first time in seven years, from February 12–14, high-level inter-Korean talks were held. The South Korean delegation was headed by Kim Gyu-hyung, first deputy head of national security of the president’s administration; on the part of North Korea it was Won Don Yon, deputy head of the United Front Department of the Central Committee of the Labor Party. The talks were attended by representatives of the ROK presidential administration, the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of National Defense. The discussions at the meeting concerned US–South Korean military exercises and meetings of separated Korean families. The talks ended inconclusively, without any agreements. Pyeongyang demanded that the US–South Korean
exercises be postponed, and that Seoul stop criticizing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un by controlling the South Korean media. Seoul responded to all the demands with a categorical refusal, noting the unacceptability of such measures. The negotiations brought no result; still, the fact of resumption of inter-Korean political dialogue at the highest level is very significant. The main achievement is that the sides calmly listened to each other about the long-term aggravation of inter-Korean relations.

On February 24 in South Korea the joint military exercises “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” began. It is noteworthy that the DPRK previously required South Korea not to carry out these exercises, did not realize its threats and did not cancel the above-mentioned meeting of separated families. Does this mean that Pyeongyang decided not to mix humanitarian issues with political? It is obvious that the North Korean authorities are aware of their responsibilities in relation to this humanitarian tragedy of Koreans: more than half of the members of separated families who are living in the South are more than 80 years old, and the estimated duration of their life is 81 years (according to the Korea Institute for Economic Research); very soon there will be nobody to meet.

In mid-February, 18 South Korean businessmen visited the DPRK within the schedule of their participation in the North Korean–Russian Rajin–Khasan railway project. It is being implemented on the basis of the Eurasian Initiative by President Park Geun-hye, providing for establishment of a transport corridor from South Korea to Europe via North Korea and Russia.

Since December 2013, joint efforts of the two Koreas in normalization of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) have intensified: The Inter-Korean Committee resumed its management of KIC; on January 28 an electronic access control system was commissioned on the KIC territory, which greatly facilitated the access procedure for ROK citizens; the agreement to lay an Internet line on the territory of KIC was signed on February 8.

On January 24, 2014, Pyeongyang announced that it would stop all actions that “may cause irritation in South Korea” and was “ready to create a favorable atmosphere for multilateral cooperation and exchanges.” This was stated in an open letter of the DPRK National Defense Committee, sent by personal order of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, to authorities, political parties and public organizations of the ROK. The letter contains a proposal to replace the armistice agreement with a “peacekeeping mechanism.” It also emphasized that Seoul should not have any doubts about the “sincere desire” of Pyeongyang for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time it points out the need to maintain the DPRK “nuclear deterrent force for self-defense” as long as Seoul “will not abandon the demonstration of foreign
nuclear weapons on its territory.” It also emphasizes that hostile military actions “remain a major obstacle to improving inter-Korean relations.” In this regard, Pyeongyang continues to insist that the South Korean authorities should refused to conduct, “jointly with external forces, corrosive maneuvers aimed against the North.” But the North Korean side will not oppose the planned maneuvers of the South Korean army.

It is obvious that North Korea seeks to break out of its isolation and at least partially ease the confrontation with its southern neighbor. North Koreans recently showed a more subdued reaction to “hostile action” (joint maneuvers in South Korea, cessation of material assistance from the Republic of Korea, etc.), showing interest in restoration and maintenance of the inter-Korean dialogue.

The state of inter-Korean relations can be affected by two resent decisions of the South Korean authorities, as evidence of Seoul’s “adjustment” of pragmatic approaches. The first decision is associated with adjustment of the plan that was adopted in 1989 to prepare for the reunification of Korea. It includes three stages: 1) creation of a good atmosphere of friendship and cooperation, 2) formation of a Korean Confederation, 3) creation of a unified Korean state. On February 19, 2014 ROK Minister of Unification Ryoo Kihljae said that the 25 years that have passed since adoption of the plan show that the first step is taking much longer than originally anticipated, and creation of a good atmosphere for friendship and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula is still far away. In connection with this, the plan needs a certain revision and improvement. As the main problem, which they could not foresee 25 years ago, the minister named indifference to reunion on the part of young South Koreans, who see in the DPRK only a threat to national security. Please note that we wrote about this issue back in 2005, pointing to the need to overcome ideological confrontation and establish a single space in the sphere of education and upbringing of the youth of the two Koreas.

The second decision was announced on February 25, during the presentation of the three-year plan of economic reforms. President Park Geun-hye declared the establishment of the Committee to Prepare for the Reunification of Korea as an official organ of the presidential administration; its main function is to look for systemic and structural approaches to solving national problems. The president stressed that the new committee will work on broadening and strengthening the inter-Korean dialogue at both intergovernmental and public levels. Independent experts and organizations will work in it, providing genuine public participation in preparation for the reunification of North and South Korea.
All this could become a basis for cautious optimism, if not for more information, this time alarming. After the start of joint military exercises in the South, North Korean patrol boats on the night of February 25 three times invaded the territorial waters of the Republic of Korea; it’s good that the situation did not end with gunfire.

Today, as never before, the two Koreas need to make successive steps toward each other. Decline in the intensity of ideological confrontation, rejection of militant rhetoric, search for compromise on the nuclear program—these are the obvious questions on today’s agenda of inter-Korean relations. But the way to dialogue will be difficult and protracted. We cautiously hope for gently easing the inter-Korean confrontation and resuming the dialogue.

At the same time we cannot fail to note the conservation of problems in inter-Korean relations that are essentially insoluble in the current format, for the reason that the current leadership of the Republic of Korea:

- Under no circumstances will agree to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, which is consistent with the U.S. position.
- Insists that any negotiations with North Korea may be initiated only when the DPRK returns to fulfilling its international obligations.

What have we come to? Like it or not, we have to admit that we are as far from solving the Korean problem as we were a half-century ago. However, the situation in inter-Korean relations and on the peninsula has completely changed:

- The status quo on the Korean Peninsula that was good enough for all parties concerned has been substantially broken (in a soft estimation) or irretrievably lost (in a hard interpretation).
- In the nearest future, the Republic of Korea will aim to strengthen its military-political union with the United States.
- The Republic of Korea and the United States are coming to politics of “a harder defense of mutual interests on the Korean Peninsula,” including the possibility of “preventive shots” at North Korea and the United States’ automatic participation in repelling “local provocations” from North Korea.
- Pyeongyang is not ready to make concessions in connection with its rocket and nuclear armament.
- The six-party talks played an important role in the previous period, but today they look hopeless.

Objectively, Russia is forced to be satisfied with the role of an extra, because the time when it could influence development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula was missed. The time has come for Russia to consider its policy
toward the future united Korea; first of all, predict challenges that it will face with a new actor—a united Korea’s access to the regional and international arena—and determine the way to guarantee positive neutrality in Russia’s relations with a united Korea.

Summary

Rejection of the Sunshine Policy and the South Korean leadership’s transition to implementing creative pragmatism as the basis for its foreign policy toward the DPRK entailed serious consequences for inter-Korean relations. Bilateral relations were thrown back a quarter-century, almost to the level of the beginning of the 1990s. Pyeongyang’s response and its behavior in the last two years also have not contributed to normalization of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The inter-Korean space again is becoming a major threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The beginning of 2014 gives some hope for reducing the confrontation between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK, but it’s hard for us now to believe in sequential behavior of the leaders of the two Koreas. Inter-Korean relations develop smoothly when a crisis in bilateral relations is replaced by a temporary detente, but then aggravation comes again. The regional community is interested in easing inter-Korean confrontation, but there are no real mechanisms to ensure this process; the six-party talks as an alternative or supplement to bilateral contacts currently are not working and look hopeless.

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The Greater Tumen Initiative as an Economic Platform for Inter-Korean Dialogue

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In terms of international relations theory, Northeast Asia is a paradoxical region. In the presence of a pronounced tendency toward expanding intraregional cooperation, there is no institutional framework as such. Generally, all relationships are built on a bilateral basis. The result is that issues of regional cooperation become virtually impossible to solve. The six-party talks have limited terms of reference and do not address all the problems, concentrating on the issue of nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, under this format there is a very strong political component. In this situation, the Greater Tumen Initiative could become the institutional framework for strengthening relations in Northeast Asia.

The Greater Tumen Initiative is a direct continuation of the famous Tumen River project. However, since the 1990s it has changed significantly, conceptually and, most importantly, is close to being realized.

Significant changes occurred in September 2005 at the eighth meeting of the Consultative Commission of the Tumen River project, which was held in Changchun, the capital of China’s Jilin province. The so-called Changchun Agreement was adopted, which radically changed the form of cooperation within the Tumen River project. First, the basic agreements of 1995 in the format of interaction within the Tumen region were extended for another ten years. Second, the development program of the Tumen River area was renamed the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) and was aimed at continued expansion of regional cooperation to promote economic growth and sustainable development in Northeast Asia and the Greater Tumen region. Third, the geographic scope of GTI was enhanced by inclusion of the Chinese provinces of Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Mongolia’s eastern provinces, eastern ports of the Republic of Korea, North Korea’s Rason Special Economic Zone, and Russia’s Primorsky Territory. Fourth, in order to involve the private sector in GTI, a Business Advisory Council was created which would work under the GTI
leadership. And fifth, it was decided to expand the powers of a permanent secretariat for promotion of regional projects in key areas of cooperation—transport, energy, tourism and investment—plus cooperation within the environmental area as a binder.

These agreements have dramatically changed the very essence of the Tumen River project. The Area Development Program of the Tumen River was a well-structured and accurate time project, whose result was to be some form of economic relations between its member countries. The Tumen project, initially quite specifically, and then more abstractly, defined the ultimate goal of the movement and set the parameters to achieve this goal: the formation of specific international economic cooperation zones on the borders of the three countries in the area of the Tumen River’s mouth.

The format of the Greater Tumen Initiative involves only intensification of economic cooperation. Essentially, GTI is a platform for presentation and discussion of projects in a number of priority areas. In this respect, any timing becomes meaningless. The process of cooperation is very important.

The structure of the GTI governing bodies was refined in the course of two meetings of the Advisory Commission. Thus, at the ninth meeting, held in November 2007 in Vladivostok, the Department of Energy, Department of Tourism and Environmental Department were formally established. The Business Advisory Council was also inaugurated and the first Investment Forum of the GTI was held. The Department of Transportation and the GTI Committee for Trade Facilitation were created at the 10th meeting, held in Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia, in March 2009.

Unfortunately, since November 5, 2009, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ceased its membership in the Greater Tumen Initiative and withdrew its representatives from the Advisory Commission.

By now, the institutionalization of GTI is as follows. The main GTI structure is the Consultative Commission (GTI Consultative Commission), established by the intergovernmental agreement of 1995. The commission is composed of representatives of the Greater Tumen Initiative member countries (China, Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Russia) who are at the level of deputy minister or higher. The commission’s activities are supervised at the national level by the following government agencies: the Ministry of Commerce of China, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of the Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Finance of Mongolia, and the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia. The commission is headed by a chair who is elected from among its members on a rotating basis. The chair exercises his or her powers between regular meetings of the commission.
The Advisory Commission periodically (annually since 2010) holds official meetings on solving problems of economic cooperation within the GTI. The commission is authorized to make decisions on all GTI matters.

Beginning with the Vladivostok Meeting in 2007, and parallel with the meeting of the commission, an Investment Forum was held whose purpose was to exchange business information among private entities and government agencies to promote business activity in Northeast Asia and increase investment attractiveness of the regions that make up the Greater Tumen Initiative.

To promote private sector participation in the work of GTI, the Business Advisory Council (BAC) has been in operation since 2007. Its annual meetings are timed, whenever possible, to the meetings of the GTI commission. As defined at the first meeting of the council, its main objectives are:

- promoting development of economic activities in the GTI region
- making recommendations and proposals in the field of economic cooperation within GTI for public authorities of the participating countries
- fostering a favorable investment climate in the GTI region
- promoting investment in the region
- developing a mechanism for funding and defining priority for funding
- developing a framework for cooperation with new investors

In October 2009, the Executive Committee of the Council (BAC Executive Committee), responsible for coordinating the work of its members, started to function in Beijing.

The Secretariat (Tumen Secretariat) is the permanent body of GTI, designed to coordinate the activities of all GTI organs and liaise between the member states through national coordinators. The Secretariat is located in Beijing. Besides its basic functions, the Secretariat manages structures established in priority areas: Department of Tourism (Tourism Board), Department of Transport (Transport Board), Department of Energy (Energy Board), Department of the Environment (Environment Board) and GTI Committee for Trade Facilitation (GTI Trade Facilitation Committee).

Originally the Changchun Agreement identified five main areas of cooperation within the Greater Tumen Initiative: transport, tourism, energy, trade and investment, as well as cooperation in protection of the environment as a binding direction. Cooperation in tourism involves the development by GTI member countries of common approaches to policy formulation in this area, simplification of procedural formalities at border crossings, and offer of tourist products for various purposes. Perspective is the process of regional
cooperation in the energy sphere. The irregular supply of energy resources is a major feature of the Northeast Asia region. The main consumers—China and Japan—have virtually no energy resources, while Russia stands as their only supplier. In such circumstances, the successful development of regional relations depends on the ability of GTI member countries to develop a balanced energy policy and strategy. GTI efforts also should lead to stimulating cross-border trade and increasing the volume of trade between the countries in the region. The issue of environmental protection and especially consolidating efforts of the bordering countries is foremost. The Tumen River Basin District has always positioned itself as an area with a unique ecosystem (especially in Russia); therefore, any expansion of cooperation here requires significant efforts to minimize negative consequences.

The most important area of cooperation within the Greater Tumen Initiative has always been transport. The Tumen project 1991 was conceived largely as a transport hub. Today the transport component of GTI is one of the most significant. Naturally, development of a transport infrastructure and reducing border barriers are necessary conditions for promoting trade and developing other forms of regional integration. Traditionally, the key party boosting this GTI component is China, which needs more seaports to transport products to its northeastern provinces. In this issue Mongolia traditionally has supported all of China’s efforts.

In this regard, it is natural that the sphere of transport cooperation under GTI is represented by the highest number of projects, among them:

- Creation of an automobile ferry system in Northeast Asia
- Modernization of the Zarubino port in Russia’s Primorsky Territory
- Construction of a railway from Mongolia to China
- Completion of the railway between Makhalino (Karskino) in Russia and Hunchun in China’s Jilin province
- The road and harbor construction project on the border between China and North Korea

In this context the Greater Tumen Initiative is becoming quite similar to the Tumen River project, with all its internal contradictions and potential conflicts. Certainly, GTI is another form of regional cooperation, but it carries with it many flaws of its predecessor, and the worst among them is the omnidirectional geopolitical interests of the GTI participating countries. Countries in the region still see their priorities in forcing integration processes that, in fact, would maximize the benefits of regional cooperation, and in addressing their own energy and transport problems through geopolitical expansion toward their neighbors.
Strategies have become more subtle and delicate, but keep their focus. Thus, China is willing to compromise, but is not ready to abandon its main geopolitical aspirations regarding transit corridors to the Sea of Japan. Mongolia is increasing its presence in Northeast Asia and seeks to position itself as an equal player. South Korea continues to address its key geopolitical task—the unification of Korea under the rule of Seoul and builds all its relations with the DPRK proceeding from this strategy. North Korea seeks to minimize its involvement in all projects that it judges to be doubtful, believing that its economic potential cannot compete with any economy of the region.

Russia’s position has changed significantly. If in the initial phase of the Tumen project in the 1990s, Russia had to largely distance itself from such projects, the current state of the country allows for a more flexible policy toward regional cooperation. A number of projects in power generation (e.g., commissioning a hydroelectric power plant in the Bureysky district, mining projects Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2) and infrastructure development (construction of a pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific Ocean) have greatly increased the Far East’s economic potential. Of course, Russia—especially in its Far East region—is still far from being able to compete with the economies of China, South Korea or Japan, but the current state of the country allows it to substantially affect regional economic processes and diversify its participation in projects such as GTI. Proposals for oil and gas supplies to the region, as well as significant projects for transcontinental transit, force us to regard Russia as a major economic player in Northeast Asia.

To summarize, it should be said that the Tumen project, whether in the form of the River Area Development Program or the Greater Tumen Initiative, has not lost its value and will determine economic and political relations in Northeast Asia. It is important that North Korea, though minimizing its participation, is yet showing its increased interest in this initiative, or some of its projects. That’s why GTI can be regarded as a real institutional framework for building relations on the Korean Peninsula.

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I am truly honored to have this opportunity of presenting my thoughts on a peace-making project in my beloved region of Northeast Asia. Also, I am delighted to refer to my cherished subject of Middle East peace in reference to the Middle East Peace Initiative (MEPI), which was initiated by Dr. Sun Myung Moon, the founder of the Universal Peace Federation, which organized and sponsored this conference.

What is the Middle East Peace Initiative?

I would like to begin my presentation by briefly explaining two terms: MEPI and “heart power.”

First, what is MEPI and how can it be a model for solving Northeast Asia’s problems? The Middle East Peace Initiative, I believe, is one of the most profound and successful peace initiatives that UPF has undertaken until now. In peace or at war, situations in the Middle East are interwoven with religious elements. Thus, Dr. Sun Myung Moon and UPF have promoted peaceful dialogue and cooperation among Judaism, Christianity, Islam, the Druze and other religious groups present in the region.

Unlike numerous humanitarian or humanistic endeavors originated by religious organizations or related nongovernmental organizations, MEPI did not avoid dealing with the religious dimension. For instance, at its inception MEPI encouraged Christian denominations in the United States to take down the cross from their churches, in order to alleviate the terror and animosity that many Jews and Muslims associate with the cross.

Likewise, MEPI has attempted to forge an atmosphere in which followers of monotheistic religions can find ways of resolving their historical or psychological differences through confession, apology, forgiveness and reconciliation, which are ultimate expressions of the religious spirit.
What is “heart power”?  

This leads to another term, “heart power,” which I believe was the essence of the MEPI project’s success. This concept, of course, refers to the two categories of strength in international politics: hard power, including military, political and economic capabilities; and soft power including ideas, values and cultures.

The U.S. political economist Joseph Nye elaborated on the concept of soft power in 1990 as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies.” He implied that the West’s ideals of democracy and freedom, as well as attractions like blue jeans, cola and pop songs, helped win the Cold War.

Roughly speaking, in terms of these two concepts, World War I was won with hard power but lost in peace because of weak soft power, agitating the rise of Nazism in Germany and fascism in Japan and Italy. World War II was won with hard power and did well in peace with soft power, making Germany, Italy and even Japan important allies among the democratic camp.

The Cold War was won thanks to hard power and soft power combined, but it is being lost in peace, I guess, because of the deficit of heart power. Let me elaborate.

Heart power is the capacity to trust, respect, embrace and touch the hearts of one’s rivals or enemies. To me, the deficit of this power is obvious in the situations involving North Korea in its missile-nuclear development program and Russia in its Ukraine affair.

Over two decades after the end of the Cold War, the four major powers in Northeast Asia as well as the United States have not been able to open the hearts of the North Korean leaders. Similarly, the G7 nations have failed to forge true rapport and trust with Russia, in spite of several opportunities after Russia was admitted to the G8 forum. These failures are made in spite of superior hard power and plenty of soft power on the part of the West.

Why? Because the West was insensitive, even ignorant, as some people now admit, to the fact that there are worldviews and value systems different from their Western democracy and modernization.

However great and right the Western ideas and values may be, if they are imposed without much regard or respect to their local conditions and sentiments, particularly by force—economic, political or even military—their counterparts will simply feel pressured. Their reaction may vary depending on
their strength: from willing acceptance to reluctant submission to open resistance or doing things their own way.

**Examples of heart-power diplomacy**

Incidentally, I was able to attend the three previous Northeast Asia Peace Initiative (NEAPI) forums, held in Tokyo, Washington, D.C., and Seoul, where I heard from those who did make some significant breakthroughs with North Korean leaders in official or private diplomacy. All of them seemed to base their words and deeds on their heart power, namely, trust, respect and an embracing quality.

In April, our institute was one of the organizers of a lecture tour across Japan by Dr. Walter Schwimmer, the former secretary general of the Council of Europe. This is the 47-nation intergovernmental body that is working toward Europe’s integration and peace based on stated principles of democracy, human rights and rule of law.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Dr. Schwimmer was one of the chief advocates for Russia’s inclusion in the Council of Europe, against great odds and opposition. In retrospect, he said that in order to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, tolerance of differences is not enough; rather, it is necessary to have respect for the other’s dignity.

To this sort of argument, I am sure there are counterarguments over appeasement, if not benefitting the enemy or even spying. Therefore, the application of heart power requires a clear and definite vision, principles and worldview.

**Experiences with Islamic society**

I lived in the Middle East, especially in the Islamic society, for over two decades. I could witness its great spiritual, cultural and social heritage as well as its contemporary difficulties. Frankly, the position of Islam, particularly in modern history up until the Oil Crisis of 1973 or the events of Sept. 11, 2001, had been that of being ignored, misunderstood and overwhelmed by foreign forces, ideologies and cultures. I sympathized with their emotional, political or religious frustrations, caused by the West’s hard power and soft power.

I also realized that in such situations, soft power turns out a very hard pressure imposed on them. That is why anti-Americanism, or more correctly, hostility against Western, modern, Christian, liberal tendencies, is pervasive in
the Islamic world, erupting here or there even in the forms of terror incidents or radical politics.

This overall picture of Islam is strikingly similar to that of North Korea in Asia region. Like Islam, North Korea asserts pride in its heritage and history, which not only are not appreciated but even are despised by the rest of the world. Like the radicals of the Islamic movement, the North Koreans are obliged to resort to asymmetric struggles. Like Islam, in spite of the overwhelming odds, they believe in their final victory.

Clash of civilizations?

In short, they are indulged in pursuing and asserting their identities as the religion or as the nation. The main thesis thrown into the aftermath of the Cold War by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington in his celebrated book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order has proven right.

While sentiments on their belongingness to a nation or a religion become stronger, frictions and tensions stemming from their belongingness become more apparent.

In that sense, thanks to their rising national powers and self-confidence, China and South Korea are demanding the settlement of historical scores with Japan, causing the worst diplomatic relations for decades. Russia, it seems, is awakening to its national, religious or spiritual heritage, overcoming the trauma of the Cold War and its communist history.

Unfortunately, all these phenomena of resurgent senses of belongingness and national aspirations, which themselves should be something positive, have caused rather negative tensions involving islands, waterways or a peninsula. We have to find ways to generate heart power to avert these potential conflicts.

Engage religions!

To conclude my presentation, let me suggest how to generate and apply heart power in the field of diplomacy. The power of trust, respect and an embracing quality are generated more by religion in general than by any other fields of human endeavor. Thus, we need to engage religion: its values, spirit or thoughts, such as “Love thy enemy,” “self-denial and sacrifice,” “change yourself before expecting others to change.” Such a spirit or ethical code of conduct is indeed indispensable to generate heart power.
With such heart power as the basis, religious organizations, leading figures or members may be mobilized in peace-making endeavors. Religions’ contribution to peace-making is elaborated in many books such as Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft by Professor Douglas Johnston and other scholars.

In order to open such a path, we should re-evaluate the principle of separation of state and religion, or the modern concept of secularism. At the same time, religions must demonstrate clearly that they can generate heart power for peace by promoting interreligious harmony and cooperation in dealing with social, national or global issues together.

Finally, I do hope that this forum of leaders representing the very nations that still have lingering animosity, resentment and unsolved issues between them can generate the heart power that is required to foster an environment of mutual respect, trust and love.

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Cultural Exchanges and Tourism in Korea: Steps toward Understanding

Ms. Tatyana Kim

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The Universal Peace Federation launched the Northeast Asia Peace Initiative (NEAPI) to promote peace and sustainable development through dialogue, trust and cooperation among the nations and peoples of Northeast Asia. Special attention has been directed to the Korean Peninsula and a number of issues concerning relationships between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their conflict, which remains unresolved more than 60 years after the end of the Korean War.

At the same time, NEAPI is addressing these issues in a broader context with the countries involved in the six-party talks: China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and North and South Korea. The Korean Peninsula attracts a wide range of stakeholders from these countries. Many topics remain under discussion, such as economic development, peace and security, education, social development, cultural affairs and youth affairs. Activists of the Universal Peace Federation represent many diverse areas of activity, including government, diplomacy, academia, civil society and the private sector.

NEAPI programs are based on the following principles:

• Dialogue is a tool for peace and development; it provides a basis for mutual respect, trust and cooperation.

• Despite different viewpoints or disagreement between the peoples and governments of the region, there are common values, common interests and common aspirations, and they should be studied and supported.

• Civil society organizations or NGOs can play an invaluable role, in addition to the work of governments through official diplomatic channels.

• Economic and trade cooperation is an important component of a comprehensive peace agenda.
Grassroots diplomacy involving ordinary citizens, youth, women leaders, etc., promotes mutual understanding, common and favored cooperation. Academic experts and experienced diplomats express different points of view based on reliable academic research and years of experience; they prepare a platform for dialogue, promoting openness and constructive interaction.

In February 2009 there arose the idea of opening a Russian branch of the Northeast Asia Peace Initiative to contribute to the peace process. Since then this branch has been working actively for the reunification of North and South Korea.

Diplomatic dialogue, cultural programs, pilgrimages, women’s organizations and activities in the demilitarized zone help to unite the conflicting countries through six-party talks. To support the Northeast Asian peacekeeping initiatives, the Universal Peace Federation is working actively in those nations that are nearest to Korea: Russia, Japan and China.

Initiatives made by North and South Korea toward reunification have been unprecedented and unforgettable. The development of bilateral relations began when Kim Dae-jung became president of the ROK in 1998. His “Sunshine Policy” focused on the ROK providing assistance to the DPRK, the North becoming more open to the outside world, and the two Koreas finding compromise solutions on all key issues of intergovernmental dialogue.

The “Sunshine Policy” is based on the ancient parable of Aesop, wherein the wind and sun argued to see who would make an old man remove his coat. The stronger the wind blew, the more tightly the old man wrapped himself in his clothes, but in the warm rays of the sun the old man took off his coat of his own free will.

Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” became a real formula for normalizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Kim’s services toward national reconciliation of North and South Koreans are unquestionable. He rightfully deserved his Nobel Prize for his consistent efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Korean issue.

The inter-Korean summit in June 2000 in Pyongyang was a significant event in the two Koreas’ rapprochement. It is important to point out that it was the first meeting between the two Korean leaders, which attracted the attention of the international community. The basic principles of the Republic of Korea for uniting the Korean Peninsula are “independence, peace and democracy.”
The Republic of Korea adheres to the three-stage reunification plan. The first stage is reconciliation and cooperation; the second is the creation of a transitional North and South Commonwealth; and the last is the creation of a unified state, with “one nation, one state, one government, one system.”

Since then much time has passed. Despite the efforts of various organizations, states and democratic parties, Korea remains divided.

Today, however, issues of regional cooperation in the humanitarian sphere are relevant, including health, education, science, culture and the exchange of delegations at the governmental level, reduction of military tension between the two countries, issues of inter-Korean economic cooperation and meetings of “separated families.”

In the wake of reconciliation and cooperation, now the basic steps toward unification include culture, tourism and sports. There are positive examples to be taken as a foundation.

**Sports**

In 1991, the DPRK and the ROK presented a combined team at international competitions in soccer and table tennis, though in the Olympics and Asian Games they were not together. However, at the opening and closing of the Summer Olympic Games in Sydney in 2000, the two countries held a single column.

The XVII Asian Games are being held in the South Korean city of Incheon from September 19 to October 4, 2014. Since 1951, these Asian Games have taken place every four years. Within the competition at Incheon, there are 437 events in 36 sports, including 28 Olympic disciplines. The decision to send their representatives was confirmed by 45 countries in the region, including the DPRK.

**Culture**

Cultural exchanges between North and South Korea are playing an important role.

In 1998, the Little Angels, a South Korean troupe of children aged 7 to 15 who perform Korean folk dances, visited the DPRK, and in 2000 a children’s dance group from Pyongyang visited Seoul. This has contributed to improved relations between the two countries.
Exhibitions of art, crafts and contemporary painting have been a means to bring about further reconciliation.

Rich national traditions in arts and crafts are maintained in the DPRK. The art of making fine needlework with silk, for which Korea has long been famous, has not been lost. The development of porcelain and ceramic handicrafts, in particular, is at the highest level. Modern artists and ceramists have restored many previously lost secrets of ancient masters and now are struggling with the mystery of Korean celadon.

The traditions of Korean pottery and molding are alive; many products reproduce the shape of a pomegranate, melon, lotus flower or calyx. Lovely North Korean vases range in size from 5 centimeters up to 2.5 meters. Traditional vases are covered with reliefs or ornamented bars. White North Korean glaze is highly praised by international artists.

The *mannenhwa* ("eternal art") paintings, made of mother of pearl and shells, are a relatively young field of applied arts. Among the new kinds of DPRK artistic crafts are pictures made of feathers or thread. North Korean embroidery features fine harmony and unusually bright colors; in artistic principles, it is very close to painting. Embroidery is done on a plain silk background with different shades of colored silk thread. Other traditional arts includes metalwork, wood, natural stone and bone carving.

Arts and crafts have always been one of the most popular artistic manifestations of the North Korean people. They are rooted in historical traditions and reflect the living conditions, style and everyday lifestyle of Koreans.

**Tourism**

In recent years the number of tourists visiting North Korea from other regions has increased dramatically. The world community is interested in developing tourism in Korea. Cultural tourism in North Korea includes concerts of the world-famous State Symphony Orchestra; the world’s largest database of art; the Pyongyang Ethnographic Park where the five thousand years of Korean history are on display; tasting original national cuisine and getting to know the national customs. All of these represent the history and culture of Korea.

Many modern facilities for sports and cultural tourism were commissioned in 2013 all over the country, for example, the Masikryong Ski Resort located on the coast of the Sea of Japan and the high-tech Munsu Water Park and Mirim racecourse in Pyongyang.
Many hotels were newly built or renovated, among them the Machzhon, Hyansan and Embunchzhin. The quality of hotel service has improved greatly.

Reconstruction of the highway from the port of Rajin to Vnochzhon has led to significant improvement of infrastructure in the Rason Special Economic Zone; special tourist trains travel to and from Mount Chilbo. In 2013, irregular flights to North Korea from the Chinese cities of Shanghai, Harbin, Xi’an and Yanji began.

The second Korean–Chinese exhibition on economic, foreign trade and cultural tourism took place in 2013 in the border city of Dandong. Cooperation between North Korea and the World Association for Tourism, the Asia-Pacific Society for Travel and other international tourism organizations, state tourism bodies and world travel offices has been developing. Korea, long known as the “land of morning calm,” is also famous for its abundance of natural tourism resources, including health resorts in the DPRK featuring balneotherapy, a mud-cure with mineral water.

The extinct volcano Baekdu is located on the border with China. The region has much hardened pumice, so this area was called the “white mountain home.” Here is one of the deepest mountain lakes in the world, Heaven Lake. Kumgang Mountain is one of the most famous mountains of the country. This is one of the most beautiful places in Korea: bizarre rock interspersed with tiny lakes and waterfalls, hidden in tiny valleys of Buddhist shrines and temples.

Mount Chilbo on the coast of the Sea of Japan and the Myohyang and Kuwol mountains in the western part of North Korea are famed for the beautiful scenery of the mountain gorges and ridges, and coastal shores.

The famous mountains and countryside of Korea preserve the natural beauty and there is no pollution.

Korea has a long history of five thousand years. On its territory there are many historical monuments and relics, including the tomb of Dangun, founder of the Korean nation; the tomb of King Dongmyeong, the founder of the Goguryeo kingdom (37 BC to 668 AD); the world’s oldest large set of Buddhist scriptures, “Phalman techzhangen,” printed with 80,000 engraved boards. Tombs with frescoes of the Goguryeo period and historical monuments in the city of Kaesong have been designated by UNESCO as World Heritage Sites.

In North Korea there are many monumental buildings reflecting features of our time and showing a model of modern Korea. Foreign tourists are attracted by the Rason Special Economic Zone, which evolved as a center of
international trade and investment, and Masikryong, a world-standard ski lodge and the first in the DPRK.

The new tourist complex is located at an altitude of more than 1.3 kilometers above sea level on a natural plateau. The total length of all its ski slopes is about 110 kilometers. The width of the runs is between 40 and 120 meters. According to preliminary construction plans, the complex will house ski rentals, hotel complexes, as well as a helipad and a ropeway.

Tourists from abroad are deterred through numerous restrictions. However, in general conditions for tourists are gradually improving; for example, the former bans on mobile phones and unrestricted photography have been lifted. North Korea is making efforts to develop foreign tourism. However, development of tourism is impeded by the image presented in the Western media of a brutal totalitarian dictatorship. Now there are few Western tourists visiting North Korea. Accurate statistics on this subject will not be published, but it is estimated that annually between 5,000 and 6,000 tourists from developed Western countries visit North Korea. The isolationism that was long pursued by the DPRK government led to the underdevelopment of international tourism. For foreign tourists the most inviting aspects of North Korean tourism are the natural attractions and the “neo-Stalinist” atmosphere.

Certain steps taken to simplify entry and exit procedures are showing significant improvement of tourist services, including accommodation, transportation, etc. The majority of foreign tourists in North Korea are Chinese, whose number in 2012 was 240,000. In recent years the DPRK, besides proposals for one-time visits to places of interest, has been offering specialized tourist programs in culture, sports, health treatment and ecology.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that integration in the field of culture, sports, and tourism are major steps toward mutual understanding, cooperation and unification of Korea.

North Korea is a unique state. Impressions gained from visiting the country are not possible to compare with those of any other place on earth. For many people born in the Soviet Union, a trip to North Korea is a real journey back in time. A country of “completely victorious socialism” lives by laws and regulations that are very different from those of most of the modern world.

North Korea’s natural wonders are little affected by humans. The country has a unique political system and ideology based on Juche, the local creative interpretation of socialism. This includes public street celebrations filled with sincere joy, mass dancing of youth organized in the squares, and folk music. North Korea also has a complete lack of crime, an unusually calm and orderly life, and multi-kilometer roads lined with flowers.
Visiting North Korea will help many tourists to rediscover Korea and to understand the pain and the problems of the divided Korea.

Let us do our best to work for peace on the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and around the world.

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Is an Enduring Inter-Korean Dialogue Possible?

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Russia and South Korea have set a goal to bring bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership. What does this mean? After all, Seoul already has a long-standing and close alliance with Washington; this implies the possibility of differences with Russia on a number of international issues. But at the same time, in Russian–South Korean relations there are no significant disputes. Russia is not seeking any privileges for itself in South Korea and is not going to compete with anyone for influence in this country. We do not consider our relations with the Republic of Korea through the prism of our relations with third countries.

This means a new type of strategic partnership—not at the expense of already established connections and relations. Besides, our country is committed not only to ensuring interaction with the ROK for establishing a system of multilateral security in Northeast Asia. Korea, among the top ten most industrialized and advanced countries in the world innovation, is valuable for us as a trade and economic, scientific and technical partner that can help Russia on its way to modernization.

And given the nature of modern Korean–Chinese relations (both sides also are seeking to enter a strategic partnership), there emerges, for example, the prospect for a trilateral strategic dialogue between China, Korea and Russia, which could significantly enhance the stability, security and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Regarding the relations between North and South Korea, here Russia does not seek to exercise any initiative that would directly touch inter-Korean relations. The capitals of both Koreas have made it clear repeatedly that Koreans can sort out their matters themselves, without outside interference. But this does not mean that Russia is “like a monkey on top of a hill watching two tigers fighting.”

Our country intends to fully support the dialogue between the two Koreas: for example, hosting a summit of the leaders of the two Koreas at a propitious background. Or contributing to the organization of cultural and sporting events to which South and North Korean athletes could be invited.
The problem, however, lies in the fact that, unfortunately, both Pyongyang and Seoul (at the levels of constitutions and policies) perceive unification of the country only as mutual absorption of each other. Koreans themselves have to go through a long and difficult path to reconciliation and harmony to achieve mutual recognition at the international level that will usher in the future possibility for reuniting the nation. Russia, for its part, is ready to fully contribute to this and will appeal to other interested external players: China, the United States and Japan.

Russia has consistently supported building bridges between Seoul and Pyongyang and favors the steps of the two Koreas toward independent, peaceful unification. In this, Russia is keeping an independent position, which ensures its role as one of the defining elements of the system of “checks and balances” in Northeast Asia.

This applies to our approaches to North Korea. North Korea’s emerging from its isolation, enjoying socioeconomic growth and becoming a full participant in international communication—all this would only benefit Russia, and not only Russia. Counting on an imminent crash of the existing system in North Korea is unlikely to be justified: The country has shown repeatedly that it has a considerable margin of safety. The DPRK as a relatively secure and confident country is a much more reliable partner for negotiations on any issues than the one cornered under the burden of sanctions.

Appealing to Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo and Washington, Moscow urges them to separate the interests of the North Korean population (desire for survival and well-being) from the interests of conservation of the ruling regime; accept, if possible, the latter—in order to achieve the former.

Russia intends to intensify its role in promoting inter-Korean normalization by initiating major tripartite infrastructure projects with the participation of Russia, North Korea and South Korea. Among them: an international railway corridor between Europe and South Korea, a pipeline going from Russia through North Korea and on to South Korea, and a Northeast Asian unified energy system involving Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Given the promising prospects of trilateral integration dialogue among the ROK, Japan and China (to which Russia would like to connect), these projects will help to create an economic partnership of Northeast Asia, in which, along with our country, China, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia and, after a while, North Korea may be involved. In this partnership, aimed at addressing the challenges of energy security, sustainable development, environmental protection, creation of a single customs space, etc., Russia would play the role of the resource and energy basis of regional integration, modernization partner and liaison between Northeast Asia and Europe.
Promulgated by ROK President Park Geun-hye, the schedule for developing inter-Korean relations is focused on measures of transparency and mutual trust, without which development of these relations would be impossible. Goals and objectives that the South in relations with the North intends to reach are designed to achieve progress in the field of security and economic cooperation, conditions for changes in North Korea, as well as create a substantial basis for progressive unification in the future and formation of a security and cooperation system in Northeast Asia.

Unsettled relations between the two Koreas and the extremely high concentration of armed forces and armaments within a small area create a high potential for tension. Solution of the Korean problem lies in the path of gradual development of a political dialogue, nuclear non-proliferation and bilateral relations in all areas under a favorable external environment. Development of confidence-building measures on the Korean Peninsula is the main content of this process.

The political and juridical basis of a transparency regime and confidence-building measures on the Korean Peninsula constitute the Protocol on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchanges between North and South, introduced on December 13, 1991, and the provisions of the Agreement on Mutual Non-aggression, ratified in September 1992. The proposals on confidence-building measures that are contained in these documents, based on the rich experience of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and successfully tested in Europe for a number of years, can be successfully applied in the conditions of the Korean Peninsula. They are based on the principles of transparency and restriction of military activities, which are mutually reinforcing.

In particular, Articles 12–14 of the Protocol provided mutual notification and control of large-scale military exercises; peaceful use of the demilitarized zone (DMZ); exchange of information and military personnel; establishing a telephone “hot link,” and creation of a joint military commission to develop and implement transparency measures and military confidence. This list is quite exhaustive and needs only mutually agreed-upon procedures for implementation of the envisaged measures.

However, implementation of transparency measures and military confidence in the Korean Peninsula cannot exist without the mutual desire and willingness of the parties to create a culture of dialogue, based on the principle of mutual openness and a culture of confidence-building measures. This is the “supreme task,” the solution of which requires patience, political courage and diplomatic skill. It is very difficult to overcome the inertia of the past several
decades, during which the image of an “enemy” has been formed on both sides.

Transparency (voluntary and mutual openness of information) may require particularly strenuous efforts: Achieving transparency will be impeded not only by the strong political momentum on both sides of the 38th parallel but also by the essence of the North Korean regime, which is based on secrecy and non-transparency. However, the gradual opening of Pyongyang for dialogue and cooperation could be possible, provided that the other side is ready to consider the interests of Pyongyang’s security and economy.

The basic approach inherent in Seoul’s new strategic concept—to move from small to large, gradually developing trade and economic relations and interpersonal contacts—is quite logical. This should create in perspective the “critical mass” of mutual interest and trust that will provide stability of the dialogue and guarantee against sudden threats to its maintenance.

Sino-U.S. relations can be a perfect example: For all divergence of national interests of the two powers, their political and geostrategic differences and contradictions, the trade and economic interdependence between Beijing and Washington is so cramped and unprecedentedly large-scale that now any serious open conflict in bilateral relations is impossible to imagine. “Interdependence is not a mutual threat, if it is balanced,” said the well-known American political scholar Joseph Nye.

This approach also has an “external” dimension: Implementation of a series of projects in the field of energy and transport infrastructure in Northeast Asia could make the foundation for economic and humanitarian cooperation as well as promoting the socioeconomic development of the North. And the mechanism of six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear problem could evolve gradually into a system of security and cooperation on a regional scale.

Only interdependence, based on transparency and trust, will ensure preservation and development of the inter-Korean dialogue. However, this interdependence can turn out to be a serious test for the parties: It is possible to predict, for example, attempts of the North to use the structure of the inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation in order to drive a wedge between Seoul and its closest ally, Washington.

Yet the measures of transparency and confidence are not evidence of absence of conflicts and contradictions, but only tools to overcome them. If the North and South accept them and stand the test of future interdependence, the Korean problem eventually will be resolved.

The main problem to be overcome is North Korea’s missile and nuclear program. After recent aggravation of inter-Korean relations, Pyongyang once
again stated its readiness to return to six-party talks “without preconditions” and discuss its “nuclear development program,” while all the other negotiators are accustomed to denote the subject as “the North Korean nuclear issue.”

The difference is clearly not only semantic: the North is trying to emphasize that at future six-party talks, it intends to discuss not conditions of abandoning its nuclear program but conditions of its maintenance and even further development, of course, referring to (again as many times before) its “peaceful” defensive nature and economic needs.

This position is justified by a certain reason. At the time, Pyongyang began nuclear research in the absence of security guarantees from the United States, trying thus to ensure preservation of the regime and protect the independence and territorial integrity of the country. Since then, more than a decade has passed, the nuclear program (at least, creation of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles) has advanced; so what’s the point, according to Pyongyang, to curtail it now, when so much effort and money have been invested in it?

Especially that the United States continues to refuse to negotiate with Pyongyang about concluding a peace treaty and establishing diplomatic relations. Previous agreements to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for delivery of food and energy, as well as helping to develop energy facilities (e.g., the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO) have been “repeatedly frustrated by the fault of the West side.”

It seems to be logical, but if you put these arguments in the context of global politics, it immediately entails many questions. The main question is that Pyongyang’s policy for many years has openly and consistently ignored the nuclear nonproliferation regime, one of the cornerstones of the current world order.

This regime is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Other treaties and agreements, the work of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will reflect the consolidated will of the global community to put a barrier against proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means of its delivery, both “horizontally” (across countries and continents) and “vertically” (by advancing nuclear weapons technology).

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is based on the fact that the right to possess belongs to the United States, China, Russia, Britain and France (they are permanent members of the UN Security Council). They provide security guarantees to all other participating countries, which, in exchange, agree to their non-nuclear status.
This system, not perfect but in the current international environment probably the only one possible, gradually covered almost every country in the world. During all the years of its existence it has been criticized as “unfair”: Why can some countries have nuclear weapons, while others cannot? Pyongyang has repeatedly appealed to this argument; just remember its consent, after much persuasion of the international community, to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and then its demonstrative withdrawal from the Treaty in 1993.

Tired of years of nuclear blackmail from North Korea, some people in the South are beginning to wonder: Could the only way to protect ourselves be by acquiring our own nuclear bomb? Japanese government official Takashi Suzuki in the Japanese newspaper Nikkei Shinbun asserts, for example (with reference to the conservative political circles of the Republic of Korea), that 66 percent of South Koreans favor the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons.

If so, this is an alarming symptom; then both Japan and Taiwan, and others, would want to get the bomb. It is unlikely that Northeast Asia would be in a safer place in such circumstances. Therefore, international nuclear non-proliferation in all its costs is the only way to prevent this succession of events. The great powers, also known as “official” nuclear powers, with all their contradictions and disagreements, have spent a lot of years and efforts to halt nuclear proliferation in different regions of the world, including the Korean Peninsula.

Suffice it to recall the arrangements of Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush Sr. not to place Soviet and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and in the adjacent waters. That indeed was what paved the way toward signing the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991, which, if properly observed by all parties, would have long helped to solve the problem of security in the region.

From the standpoint of formal international law, no one can force a sovereign state to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or get out of it, says Pyongyang. But if such a path is taken by only one out of the nearly 200 countries that have acceded to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, it will be perceived by others as illegitimate behavior and a challenge to the world community.

This path was followed by India and Pakistan, which, in defiance of other countries’ calls, provided themselves with nuclear weapons. But if someone managed to make a dent in the international nonproliferation regime, it does not mean that Washington, Moscow, Beijing and the other “nuclear” capitals will suffer another attempt to do so, whether in Pyongyang or Seoul.
In this regard, the appropriateness and effectiveness of international sanctions against North Korea need special consideration. Complex restrictions adopted by the U.N. Security Council in March 2013 allow the blocking of bank transactions, the freezing of accounts of the DPRK, and the inspection of aircraft and vessels, as well as diplomats, in search of large sums of money on suspicion that they are aimed at the development of a nuclear and missile program in Pyongyang. However, Pyongyang announced that it intends to proceed with its nuclear and missile program, no matter what the circumstances. And here you cannot but wonder: Do we need international sanctions against North Korea, and how effective would they be?

These sanctions were adopted by the U.N. Security Council, in response to North Korea’s nuclear test, in October 2006. A series of resolutions (№ 1718, № 1874, 2094) provide restrictive and prohibitive measures designed to stop development of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and their delivery systems (ballistic missiles). The resolutions, according to which North Korea was sanctioned by the European Union, the United States, Canada and other countries, urge the DPRK to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, fulfill all requirements for inspections by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and return to the six-party talks involving the United States, Japan, China, Russia and the two Koreas.

The resolutions abound in threatening calls and categorical formulations containing a detailed list of technical and financial measures designed to stop the growth of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. But Pyongyang keeps on building up its military potential from year to year.

In response, the resolutions on sanctions become more comprehensive and radical—but hardly more effective. For example, the U.N. Security Council in its Resolution 2094, of March 7, 2013, “condemns all nuclear activities carried out by the DPRK” despite the fact that the IAEA, in its Charter, is called to promote “development of nuclear energy and its practical use for peaceful purposes.”

Studying the texts of the sanctioning resolutions, one can draw attention to the fact that the proposed measures are accompanied by a characteristic proviso: They can be used “if there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the activity, subject to restrictions and prohibitions, is related to the North Korean nuclear and missile program. Considering a certain cunning and skill on the part of Pyongyang, these “rubber” formulations often make sanctions unenforceable, so that the international community still has much to do to make its sanctions really reasonable and able to reach the goal.
On March 28, 2014, South Korean President Park Geun-hye, during her visit to Germany, gave a speech on the “Dresden doctrine of unification.” She urged the divided Korean nation to restore solidarity and common identity: “We, like the Germans before, must tear down the Berlin Wall that divides us. We are one nation!”

It is a worthy attempt to break the vicious circle of threats and accusations: a proposal to create sustainable and long-term mechanisms of mutual exchange and cooperation, with the desire to lay the foundation for the future of the national unification in three key areas: “humanity, co-prosperity and integration.” Neighbors in the region were invited to participate in the creation of the Northeast Asia Development Bank to promote the socioeconomic development of the North and adjacent areas in the framework of multilateral trade and economic cooperation.

The South Korean president also proposed to establish an inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation office, make exchanges of families separated by the Korean War regular, and create a Peace Park located at the demilitarized zone along the 38th parallel. Significantly, all of these proposals, in contrast to earlier ones, were not accompanied by requirements to fulfilling prerequisites (the main one being, of course, Pyongyang’s stopping the nuclear program).

President Park Geun-hye did what was expected of her by many people on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. However, there will be a lot of opponents to the new initiative—both in the North and in the South. The military and political inertia of the past is too strong; for many influential circles in the sphere of defense and security, it would be much easier to leave everything as it is.

Should we regard the North Korean demarches as a response of the DPRK to the Dresden Declaration of President Park Geun-hye? The Dresden doctrine is of a long-term nature, and even the moody, conflict-prone North Korean leadership, on sound reflection, may find it greatly helpful.

We must take into account the difference in mentality of leaders in the South and the North: The former use “inductive” thinking and suggest a gradual, phased rapprochement through exchanges, cooperation and confidence-building measures. The latter, the Northerners, are accustomed to demand “all at once”—and that is the “deductive” approach.

Therefore, we need to have patience and promote the Dresden initiative, even if it would be very hard to do. And it should be done by joint efforts, not only from the South, but also external forces of inter-Korean settlement—the United States, China, Japan and Russia should persuade the North to take a reasonable approach to the dialogue. Smooth, stable and
good neighborly relations with the two Koreas fully meet Russia’s interests in Northeast Asia.

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